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Preface: A note to the reader, and a disclaimer  
 
This is the draft of my PhD thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham, after addressing 
and accommodating the corrections suggested during the successful thesis defence.  
 
As with any full-length work, there will always be some errors. My original draft had errors as 
well.  
 
Typographical and grammatical errors aside, the four main viva suggestions from the defence 
committee were to (a) standardize the citations, (b) to consolidate one single theory chapter, 
(c) to elaborate the methodology part, and (d) to move up the central research question in the 
introduction chapter. All those suggestions were incorporated to the best of my abilities. Other 
minor suggestions included some stylistic changes, chapter designs, content details, and other 
advisory guidelines about adding more primary sources in support, most of which were also 
addressed, while staying true to the original intent, aim, and design of the research, which were 
decided at the very early stages in consultation with my supervisors.  
 
Some time has passed since I successfully defended my thesis and, in that time, there were 
changes in European geopolitics, as well as a once-in-a-lifetime global pandemic, which 
affected every aspect of life.  
However, none of that so far, to my knowledge, had any effect on the overall findings of this 
thesis. Incidental errors are also unlikely to change my overall argument, which explores a 
particular theory of international relations, alongside the actual behaviour of a great power. 
Theoretical studies, as Kenneth Waltz once mentioned, are to determine timeless policy-
relevant patterns. This project, while perhaps not comparable, is still at the end of the day, a 
theoretical contribution, and not an area-study. The attempt was to find similar policy-relevant 
patterns.  
In the future, I hope to publish parts of it as research papers.  
One such paper, titled "NATO, Russia and Balance of Threat", is already accepted at the 
Canadian Military Journal, Department of National Defence - Government of Canada, to be 
published in summer 2021, volume 21, issue number 3.  
I am also currently working on a few more, including a monograph, after being elected as an 
Early Career Research historian, at the Royal Historical Society, London, UK.  
My request to the reader is to treat this thesis holistically, given the fluidity of the situation in 







What explains Russian balancing behaviour and use of military force in Europe? Over the last 
decade and a half, shifting geopolitical setting in Europe renewed the question about Russian 
military capabilities and strategic intentions. Exacerbating the shift has been the evolving 
balancing behaviour of Russia regarding NATO and use of military force in Ukraine and 
Georgia. Recent literature, and conventional wisdom attribute Russian military posture and use 
of force in Europe primarily to domestic politics, but also to Christian conservatism, 
civilisational exceptionalism, imperial expansionism, and domestic factors like diversionary 
war and regime stability. My thesis attempts to test Russian post-soviet foreign policy, 
balancing behaviour, and use of military force in Europe, in light of Stephen Walt’s Balance 
of Threat theory. Moscow indulges in the military use of force and balancing behaviour, only 
when it perceives its interests to be threatened, but seeks to preserve, uphold, or return to the 
status-quo the moment the threats, subside or are neutralised by balancing actions, acting more 
as a security maximiser, than a power maximiser. 
The thesis employs a qualitative research design and case study method, relying on secondary 
literature, military sources, and observed and recorded news. The evidence relies on Russian 
strategic actions, and not Russian rhetoric. The evidence explored suggests that, first, Russia 
balances against perceived threats, and Russian use of force is directly proportional to any 
strategic and material loss. Alternatively, Russia behaves like a status quo power, when the 
perceived threat subsides. Second, Russian military aggression is focused on geopolitical 
balance and has narrow strategic aims, and Russia either lacks the will and/or capability, or 
both, to be an expansionist or occupying power. Third, Russia is inherently a reactive power 
with limited regional aims, which are not commensurate with an aspiration of a continental 
hegemony. The findings have future policy relevance for European/British security, as the U.S. 
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“ …what an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided 
superiority of power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others.  
At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is only with numerous allies that 
they attack a neighbour; now is it likely that while we are masters of the sea, they will cross 
over to an island? ”  
- Athenians, to Melians.  








Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
This thesis aims to explore and understand Russian use of military force and Russian balancing 
behaviour in Europe, with an intention to understand the causes that lead to Russian military 
and strategic balancing actions.  
There have been multiple academic and policy analyses about post-Soviet Russia from 
domestic and ideological foundations of Russian foreign policy.1 A significant number of them 
focusses on Vladimir Putin’s “regime” or “reign”, and how that shapes Russian foreign policy. 
Others focus on the ideological aspects, for example, how “honour” or “identity” influences 
Russian foreign policy, or how Moscow is simply “imperial” in nature, and Russian actions are 
predicated on territorial expansionism.2 There are only a few works of academic scholarship, 
mostly research papers, which studied Russian grand-strategy.3 A lot of them focus on 
individual cases or events. Yet more such research simply focusses on the unit level tactical 
and military dimensions, such as analyses of Russian energy sector, or force structure and 
operational details.4  
                                                             
1 For analyses focusing on domestic politics, regime stability, and economic influence on the ruling elite of 
Russian foreign policy, see Stoner, K. & McFaul, M. (2015) ‘Who lost Russia (this time)?’ The Washington 
Quarterly, 38(2): 167–187; Shevtsova, L. ‘Putin’s Russia’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (March 
31, 2003); McFaul, M. ‘Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin’ Slavic 
Review 62(1): 198; McFaul, M. (2018) From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s 
Russia New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; Sakwa, R (2008) ‘Putin and the oligarchs’ New Political 
Economy 13: 185, 191 etc. 
 
2 For scholarship on how Russian foreign policy is influenced by Christian conservatism, far right nationalism, 
etc., see, Snyder, T. (2018) The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America New York: Tim Duggan Books; 
and Clover, C. (2016) Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism New Haven: Yale 
University Press. For scholarship on how honour influences Russian aggression, see Tsygankov, AP. (2012) 
Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
3 See, Götz, E. (2015) ‘It’s geopolitics, stupid: Explaining Russia’s Ukraine policy’. Global Affairs, 1, 3–10;  
Haukkala, H. (2008). ‘The European Union as a regional normative hegemon: The case of European 
neighbourhood Policy’, Europe-Asia Studies, 60, 1601–1622; Feklyunina, V. (2008) ‘Battle for perceptions: 
Projecting Russia in the West’, Europe-Asia Studies, 60, 605–629. 
 
4 Hill, F. “Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia’s Revival,” Report for the Foreign Policy Centre, London, UK, 
September 2004; Gelb, BA. “Russian Oil and Gas Challenges,” CRS Report for Congress, RL33212, January 3, 
2006; Ndefo, EO. et al., “Russia: A Critical Evaluation of Its Natural Gas Resources,” Energy, Larsson R. 
(2007) ‘Nord Stream, Sweden, and Baltic Sea Security’ (February 13, 2007), Tribune.  
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What has not been done in research or scholarship is an attempt to explore two broad theoretical 
questions. First, what variables explain the differences within Russian behaviour, often in 
similar situations, and second, what does that lead to regarding characterisation of Russia as a 
great power. The central research question of this thesis is therefore as follows. Can neorealism 
as a systemic theory adequately explain post-Soviet Russian balancing behaviour and military 
actions in Europe? To date, at the time of the final submission of this thesis, to the best of my 
knowledge, there has not been a systemic study of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy using a 
single theoretical lens.  
The absence of such a book-length theoretical analysis of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy 
and balancing behaviour is thus a significant gap in the academic literature which this thesis 
aims to fill. Is there a theoretical framework, that explains if not fully, at least satisfactorily the 
causes of Russian use of military force in specific cases, as well as the causes of Russian calm 
and rapprochement in similar instances? To what extent can one theory, in this case a neorealist 
theory, explain that difference in behavioural pattern? And if that is indeed done, can Russia 
be defined as a realist great power? These are some of the theoretical questions this thesis 
explores and addresses. 
The rest of this introductory chapter proceeds to explain why theoretical analysis of a great 
power is important as a scholarly endeavour, before explaining why Russia was chosen as a 
subject of analysis. The chapter then charts the post-Soviet timeline in brief, before proceeding 
to introduce and explain some alternative explanations and clarifying some definitions for the 
purpose of this thesis, before explaining the structure of the rest of the thesis in details. In brief, 
the introductory chapter is followed by a chapter reviewing the relevant literature, which is 
then followed by a long chapter expounding the theoretical framework of this thesis, relevant 
case selection, and methodology. That is followed by three chapters on three different case 
studies, followed by a concluding chapter, which sums up the theoretical findings.  
 
Why Theory? 
A recent observable trend in scholarly literature argues that “theory” as a simplistic way to 
understand reality.5 The world is, of course, enormously complex for one single theory to have 
                                                             
5 See, Robert, A. ‘Grand Strategy Isn’t Grand Enough’ Foreign Policy, February 2018; Fuchs, M. ‘America 
doesn't need a grand-strategy’ Foreign Policy, July 2019; Reus-Smit, C. ‘International Relations Theory Doesn’t 
Understand Culture’ Foreign Policy, March 2019; Kirss, A. ‘Review: Does Grand Strategy Matter? Strategic 
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complete explanatory power. But as Kenneth Waltz suggested, for that very reason, the purpose 
of a theory is to simplify reality, and facilitate a discussion, and most importantly, formulate a 
way forward. Waltz wrote, “A theory arranges phenomena so that they are seen as mutually 
dependent; it connects otherwise disparate facts; it shows how changes in some of the 
phenomena necessarily entail changes in others. To form a theory requires envisioning a pattern 
where none is visible to the naked eye.”6 “Data never speak for themselves” Waltz added, 
“observation and experience never lead directly to knowledge of causes.”7 The world might 
very well be enormously complex, with unit level differences, and there are in depth area 
studies to focus on that, but theories help to see emerging patterns, patterns which in turn are 
used for categories, categories which help formulate policy. At the risk of sounding like Henry 
Kissinger, it is not a perfect system, but it is better than enormous amount of information, data 
and knowledge, but zero wisdom, and complete policy paralysis. 8  
In light of that, Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory is used as a framework for this thesis.  
Walt argued that a theory is important as much as providing a causal connection, as well as 
explaining the said connection, and theories are therefore expected to provide patterns in 
perplexing phenomena.9 This thesis attempts to understand Russia from a theoretical 
perspective, with the hope that that helps in formulating policy in the future.  
One will also observe a visible similarity of structure and template of this thesis to Walt’s book, 
The Origins of Alliances.10 The similarity is deliberate. This thesis, as explained in detail later, 
is a theory testing exercise. It was therefore prudent to use the same template and design of the 
original theory, for hypothesis testing, using the same theoretical framework. 
The importance of this subject is manifest. Since 2007, there has been one state versus state 
war in Europe involving Russia, and one ongoing proxy war, and an annexation of an entire 
                                                             
Studies Quarterly, 12:4 Winter 2018: 116-132; Carrese, P. ‘High Theory versus Grand Strategy in Guiding 
Foreign Policy’, World Politics, September 2017, etc.  
 
6 Waltz, KN. (1979) Theory of International Politics New York: Random House, 11. 
 
7 Waltz, Ibid., 6. 
 
8 Kissinger, H. (2018, 15 June) ‘How the Enlightenment Ends’, The Atlantic. 
 
9 Walt, SM. (2005) ‘The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in IR’, Annual Review of Political Science, 
23-48. 
 
10 Walt, SM. (1986) The Origins of Alliances Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
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region. There have also been multiple cyber-attacks, assassinations, chemical poisoning, 
commercial jet downing, and other domestic interference. All of these scenarios trace their 
roots to Moscow. While not a superpower, Russia is the world’s 11th largest economy, 6th 
largest by purchasing power parity, second most powerful state in nuclear arsenals, with newly 
modernised military doctrines, and with growing capabilities in cyber security and artificial 
intelligence domains.  
Added to that, since 2016, the balance of power in the European continent appears to be shifting 
with the rise of populist movements. Both Britain and the United States are showing signs of 
retrenchment, with the United States, the preponderant security guarantor of EU and NATO, 
demonstrating a desire to pivot to Asia. American, European, and British policy towards Russia 
alternates between a desire for complete détente and rapprochement, and a return to adversarial 
ideological competition. A better understanding of the causation behind Russian military 
actions will provide some clarity in understanding the character of a great power on the 
periphery of a continent, which has historically been antagonistic. It is imperative as a scholarly 
endeavour, and it fills a gap in the literature and is enormously topical and policy relevant.  
In order to do that, a brief background is necessary. This chapter starts with a historical 
background which sets the stage to demonstrate a contradiction in Russian behaviour, followed 
by a summary of some recent literature exploring this topic, and followed by a laying out of 
the research design. I define some key terms and concepts, which are used throughout the 
thesis, and summarize the project with a guideline to subsequent chapters.  
This introductory chapter is then followed by a chapter discussing the relevant literature briefly 
explaining the phases of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, and thereafter is followed by a 
detailed chapter on Realism and its key concepts, as understood in international relations 
theory, and on the theoretical framework of Balance of Threat theory that is employed in this 
thesis, the key concepts regarding balancing, some broad hypotheses, as well as a discussion 
on the methodology and limitations.  
The next three chapters discuss three case studies, namely Russian relations with NATO, 
Ukraine and Georgia, and various Russian reactions, balancing actions, and military 
aggressions. Finally, a concluding chapter discusses the findings of this thesis, and ends with 





This section attempts to introduce the subject and set the stage for further detailed discussion 
in the following chapters. Why and how is Russia important for a detailed theoretical study? 
From the Russian tanks in Chechnya for the second time in 1999 to gestures towards 
Washington right after 9/11, which almost bordered on an alliance formation, to the Russian 
tanks rolling into Georgia in the summer of 2008, the timeframe between 1999 and 2008, under 
Vladimir Putin, marked the return of Russia as a great power, a major international player, after 
a decade of relatively reduced influence and decline in status after the Cold War. This return, 
and renewed powerplay continues to this day, as evident from the Syria intervention, the 
ongoing Ukrainian crisis, and electoral interference in 2016 American elections, as well as 
added naval patrolling, forward deployment, and rearmament.11 The new Russia is more 
economically stable, compared to the early 1990s, due to bourgeoning oil wealth and energy 
revenue (although since the interference in Ukraine and renewed sanctions, Russian economic 
growth has stalled) more authoritarian and considerably less free and democratic than even a 
decade back under Yeltsin.  
Moscow is also not shy to demonstrate or use hard power and its renewed strength and 
confidence, as evident from the 2008 gas crisis with Ukraine resulting in a subsequent squeeze 
on Europe, South Ossetian war of 2008, renewed long range bomber sorties over the Atlantic 
since 2007, a rigid non-negotiating stance to the European ballistic missile defence shield, 
subsequent Russian foreign policy during the “Arab Spring” and Syrian crisis, to annexation 
of Crimea, and so on. 
No serious wargaming analysis anticipates a full-scale military conflict between Russia and the 
West. 12 While there are studies simulating a war between Russian and NATO forces, as war 
planning studies are supposed to calculate, the statistical possibility of any full-scale conflict 
remains extremely low. Russian forces are primarily positioned and structured around key 
population centres and industries and forward bases, and the formations are mostly defensive 
                                                             
11 For a detailed study on Russian aggressive acts, especially in Europe, see, Lanoszka, A. (2016) ‘Russian 
hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe’, International Affairs, 92/1: 175–195 
 
12 Shlapak, A. & Johnson, M. (2016) ‘Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank Wargaming the 




in posture, with no visible long-term changes or remodelling. 13 There is no indication of Russia 
actively seeking a full-scale peer to peer conflict anywhere across the globe, and Russian 
military literature highlights the understanding of relative martial inferiority in Moscow.14  
On the other hand, there is no visible intention of any European power, or United States or 
China preparing to go to war against Russia. In fact, the reaction from the United States, both 
under President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump, after the Georgian war 2008, 
Crimean annexation 2014, and even the 2016 cyber interference has been one of caution and 
restraint, much to the concern of a lot of allied countries in Europe.  
While there are interminable differences between the current European powers and United 
States with regards to the crisis of Ukraine, Nord Stream pipelines, and overall European 
defence there is uniformity in restraint. It is of course possible that a conflict breaks out, due to 
miscommunication, miscalculation, or sudden geopolitical changes. But at the time of writing 
this thesis, the very last region where Western forces and Russian forces worked in close 
proximity, in Syria, and where the interests of Russian and Western forces differed, there were 
active measures taken by both sides to continue the process of deconfliction, and maintain 
backchannels of communication, as well as ensure extra caution. One can, therefore, infer from 
that and argue that if anything, this at least proves a desire from both sides, to avoid 
miscalculated conflict.  
And yet, Moscow legitimately remains a concern. Since 2008, Moscow has used military force 
against two sovereign nations states, Georgia, and Ukraine, and annexed a region by force, 
within the European continent. Russia has also intervened militarily in Syria, far away from 
Russian immediate neighbourhood, a force projection feat most military analysts thought was 
impossible for Moscow to carry out. Russia has coerced Europe repeatedly with weaponised 
gas and energy, has committed cyber-attacks in Estonia and other former Warsaw pact 
countries, started massive re-armament programs, used proxies to shoot down a civilian 
airliner, committed war crimes in Syria, interfered in the 2016 American elections, and 
murdered dissidents in the United Kingdom. At the risk of an understatement, one might argue 
that the assessment of former US President Barack Obama and former Secretary of State John 
                                                             
13 See, Kofman, M. (2016, October 21) ‘The Russian Navy’s Great Mediterranean Show of Force’, The National 
Interest; and Kofman, M. (2016) ‘US and Russia in Syria’s War: Cooperation and Competition’, in A. Pabriks 
(ed.), The War in Syria: Lessons for the West (pg.65-86). Riga: University of Latvia Press.  
 




Kerry, about Russia being a regional power, acting in a fashion similar to a 19th century great 
power, were not quite correct, and Moscow remains considerably dangerous, if not directly to 
the US, at least to European security and balance of power. 15  
And that is what leads to the central research question of this thesis; why did Russia behave 
the way it did, and what explains that behaviour? What are the sources of Russian use of 
military force, and what triggered Russia to go to war? The purpose of this dissertation was 
twofold. One, to answer the primary questions posed above. Russia remains, without doubt, a 
great power heavily invested in European balance, with its own set of interests and policies, 
Russia also acts independently and contrary to the norms of international law, and often against 
the interests of broader Euro-American positions. And given Russian belligerence in the last 
decade alone, which included one declared war, one proxy war, and one military intervention, 
it remains topical to understand the sources of Russian military use of force, especially in the 
context of European security. 
Second, this thesis also attempts from those answers, to derive an explanation of a bigger 
theoretical puzzle. To what extent does neorealism explain Russian behaviour? Or 
alternatively, does Russian behaviour in Europe, broadly conform to the dictates of any realist 
international relations theory, or a broadly realist paradigm. To put it simply, by the end of this 
thesis, can we say, with reasonable certainty, that Russia is a realist great power? 
The historical contradictions 
To understand Russia’s confusing pattern of demonstrating military power and reaction to 
perceived threats, there is a need to elaborate on a central puzzle. From Moscow’s relative 
military weakness in the 1990s to Russian use of military force against Georgia in 2008, the 
visible changes in the growth of the Russian economy and Moscow’s renewed assertiveness 
are observable. 2000 to 2008 were the most successful years in the Russian economy. 
Economic growth was around 7 percent, and national income was doubled. The total size of 
the economy increased six times, from US $ 221 Billion to US $ 1348 Billion, and measured 
in dollars the Russian economy grew even faster than China. 16  Russia benefited from the 
                                                             
15 Haddad, B. & Polyakova, A. (2018, March 5) ‘Don’t rehabilitate Obama on Russia’ Brookings Institution; 
and, ‘Kerry: Russia behaving like it’s the 19th century’, Politico, March 2014.  




growth, as real consumption rose by an average of 15 percent annually, more than twice the 
size of the GDP. 
Until very recently scholarly arguments suggested that Russia used this new-found wealth and 
economic prowess to pursue a more assertive foreign policy in the geopolitical arena. That 
made perfect logical sense. Centralised government control and state-supported capitalism was 
a permanent fixture under this process, with an idea that a hierarchical state model is a workable 
economic model for Russia. 17 Economic determinism was the pressing model for Russia, and 
this was reflected in the RF Security Council document of May 2002, which stated, “Russia 
has to avoid being cornered by ideological notions of division between friends and foes. 
Economic benefits for Russia should become the main factor and criteria of foreign policy 
orientation.”18  Russia’s goal was to use all opportunity of economic development to prepare 
Russia to face the potential security challenges, and in order to do that initial rapprochement 
with the West was not ruled out. 
One of the implications of Russia’s economic power was the correlation with its assertive 
foreign policy. An “aggression index” based on 86 events in Russian foreign policy from 
January 2000 to September 2007 was compiled in a report, a paragraph of which is quoted 
below: 
“We found that as the price of oil rose, the aggressiveness index increased: that 
is, the more valuable oil became, the more hostile Russian foreign policy 
became. The reverse was also true: when oil prices dropped in 2001 and 2002, 
so did Russia’s aggression. The relationship proved strongest at the annual 
level: a $1.48 increase in oil prices yearly correlated with an additional “point” 
increase in Russian aggression. Oil prices rose from $17.37 a barrel in 
December 2001 to $73.88 a barrel in September 2007; over that same period, 
the aggression index rose from 17 to 55. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the most comprehensive dataset available to analyse the effect of oil prices on 
Russian foreign policy; a few events missed here or there will not alter the 
bigger picture.”19  
                                                             
17 Ibid 
 
18 Isakova, I. (2005) ‘Russian Governance in twenty first century’ Cass Contemporary Studies.  




The graph showing the correlation in the early years of Vladimir Putin up to 2007 Munich 




Russia would repeatedly use this energy power as a persuasive, coercive diplomatic tool against 
European Union, by stopping the supply of oil and gas to Ukraine for show reasons like price 
of gas, and transit cost. Russia provides approximately a quarter of the natural gas consumed 
in the European Union; the majority of those exports travel through pipelines across Ukrainian 
soil prior to arriving in the EU. But one can gather, this was the Russian response to intimidate 
the colour revolutions, supported by United States which was happening in Georgia and 
Ukraine. 
But Russian military posture changed after 2008, with the war in Georgia, despite economic 
downturn and sanctions. Moscow carried out substantial reforms, and capability transformation 
in the same timeframe. Russian military also changed and is now used again as an instrument 
of distant power projection, even when Russian military is still qualitatively inferior to a near 
peer adversary. This new assertive posture, as well as technological advances gave a new boost 
to Russian foreign policy. Russian aggression in the last decade, especially to seek to maintain 
the buffer zone in Ukraine to stop it from being too closely aligned to NATO or deciding that 
offensive actions are fundamentally a good deterrent, or to preserve the correlation of forces 
around Russian borders, especially in Georgia hints at newer grand strategy.  
Recent circumstances in Crimea and Syria both also highlight a new impulse of seizing the 
initiative and to go on the attack. The Russian military is now more adaptive than the past, 




operational variance as well as implementation of planning are observable every day. For 
example, the Russian operation in Georgia, was flawed compared to Crimea, and Eastern 
Ukraine, which in turn was different than the far superior and sophisticated operations in Syria. 
Likewise, the Russian cyberattacks in Estonia was a crude cyber assault on grids. Compared to 
that, the Russian interference in US elections in 2016 was far more sophisticated. 
To quote a Rand Corporation study on the Russian military preparedness, “Russia’s historical 
experience of repeated invasions over the centuries has created a powerful legacy that shapes 
its defence and foreign policy. Its leaders expect to have privileged interests in the smaller 
states on Russia’s borders; they maintain defensive treaty agreements with several of the former 
Soviet republics and have military bases in some of them. Owing in part to interpretation of 
how Western nations have conducted conventional warfare since 1991 and to concerns of a 
massed conventional aerospace attack on Russia, Russia has invested heavily in air defences 
and possesses one of the most advanced and extensive air defence networks in the world. 
Russia’s reforms have augmented its military’s offensive potential.” 21  
However, the Russian security posture and military doctrines suggested that despite Russian 
use of force, the primary intention of the military was the defence of Russian territory and 
spheres of influence. From military posture, to training, to capability to force structure, all attest 
to the idea that the military exists to defend Russia, rather than to project power globally. 
Likewise, long-range surface to air missiles based in Kaliningrad, instead of short-range towed 
artillery and armour for rapid thrust into enemy territory, signify a deterrent force instead of an 
offensive force posture. Some of the most capable Russian weapons that are exported, are 
systems currently used for air defence weaponry. Russia has also invested in rapid deployment 
short range infantry readily available to be deployed in its near abroad, one that was visible 
with ruthless precision in Crimea 2014, instead of long-range expeditionary forces. While 
Russian military is far more capable and adaptive than the early nineties, it is still focused on 
conventional theatre strike capabilities, and focused on preserving Russian territorial integrity, 
and buffer zones instead of projecting Russian global power. 
In short, to use one of the clichés, Russia remains a “riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an 
enigma”. 22 Russian use of military force in the near abroad, is incompatible with Russian force 
                                                             
21 Boston, S. and Massicot, D. (2017) ‘The Russian way of warfare’. Rand Corporation Report.  




structure and military doctrines and declared intention, and this is one of the many 
inconsistencies that led to the central research question, when and why does Moscow resort to 
military force and balancing.  
Some alternative theoretical explanations 
What explains such confusing Russian balancing behaviour, and use of military force in 
Europe? Theoretically, Russian balancing and use of force in Europe are attributed in recent 
scholarly literature commonly to domestic politics, but also to Christian conservatism, 
civilisational exceptionalism, imperial expansionism, and domestic factors like the need to 
divert public discontent, or to shore up the regime. Overall, Russia is broadly considered as an 
expansionist or revanchist power in Europe. 23 
A detailed literature review is in the latter chapters, but a brief summary here is needed. Since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has consistently tried to restore its privileged position 
of power in Europe, initially through a short-lived phase of Atlanticism, but soon, followed by 
a push for multipolarity, which continued despite changes in leaders and governments, and 
through phases of relative rapprochement and outright hostility. Two assumptions about 
Russian perspective are common in all analysis and is backed by observable evidence, 
discussed in further details in the latter chapters.  
One, Russian policy makers believe that the world is in transition, and unipolarity is 
unsustainable, and therefore it is important for Moscow to facilitate that multipolarity, as one 
of the poles. President Vladimir Putin, for example, made this very clear in the 2007 in the 
Munich Security Conference, where he mentioned how the United States is acting as a 
hyperpower, and there is a need to bring balance in global politics. “Today we are witnessing 
an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that 
is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts”, Putin said, in a speech that was 
considered a straight break from post-Soviet Russian foreign relations. 24 The speech also 
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highlighted that something which Moscow is predisposed to stop American unipolarity. The 
logic given was that unipolarity is destabilizing for the world and leads to greater chaos.  
Which brings us to the second assumption Russia has, about itself being a natural pole. Russia’s 
self-perceived role is one of a historical great power, as a centre of influence, best described in 
the words of Sergey Karaganov, Russian political scientist and head of the prestigious Council 
for Foreign and Defense Policy, “We want the status of being a great power: We, unfortunately, 
cannot relinquish that. In the last 300 years, this status has become a part of our genetic makeup. 
We want to be the heart of greater Eurasia, a region of peace and cooperation. The subcontinent 
of Europe will also belong to this Eurasia”. 25  
Causal explanations about Russian behaviour can be accordingly divided into broad categories, 
discussed further in a detailed literature review later in the thesis. But to give an example of 
each, the first category consists of analysts who attribute Russian behaviour to the need to shore 
up the regime. This explanation ties up Russian foreign policy to the variable of Russian 
domestic concerns, i.e., regarding the stability of the regime in Kremlin.26 Proponents of this 
idea claims that Russian policy makers, especially under Vladimir Putin, acts like a small 
coterie of privileged, interdependent oligarchy, and are paranoid about the survival of their 
system and regime. Naturally, any disorder, is seen as chaos and a push for regime change by 
external adversaries of Moscow. This line of thinking arguably influenced Russian decision-
making process, during the breakup of Yugoslavia, the wars in Kosovo, the “colour 
revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as the Western support for democratic movements 
during the Arab Spring. The Kremlin, according to this understanding, wants to prevent the 
emergence of a “true democracy”, which might instigate similar movements in Moscow, and 
which might destabilize the Russian ruling elite.  In short, to forestall destabilisation in 
Moscow, Russia often takes actions in near abroad, whenever Moscow feels threatened, by 
what it perceives to be any snowballing movement, Western sponsored revolution or regime 
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change, and anarchy in the neighbourhood. Most liberal theorists use this lens to explain 
Russian behaviour. 
The second causal line claims Moscow to be an expansionist power, motivated by hegemony, 
or imperial ambitions.27 Scholarly opinion is divided about what exactly motivates the said 
imperialism, whether it is honour, pride, civilisational glory, Christian conservatism, neo-
Sovietism, or great power expansionism and sphere of influence politics, but the common 
thread is that Moscow is considered as a hegemonic, expansionist and even imperial power. 
Moscow’s approach to the post-Soviet states is characterised by a sense of privileged 
entitlement, and Russia’s hegemony is tantamount to establishing Russian political authority 
as well as preponderant use of military power. 
There is a third (and comparatively rare) line of causal explanation, which is structural in 
nature.28 This explanation hints at strategic and material causes behind Moscow’s aggression, 
whether resources or defensible terrain. This explanation while logical, is relatively under-
explored. Most of the scholarly work focusses on individual events, and there is a lack of a 
systemic, or regional study over a certain period of time, which covers different regimes, 
different leaders, and different timelines.  
John Mearsheimer, to give one example, has hinted that Moscow’s actions in Ukraine in 2014, 
is a reaction to Western expansionism and “liberal hegemony”, which he mentions to be an 
unnecessary, irrational, and foolhardy mistake. But even his argument fails to explain the 
halting aggression of Russia, or even the periodic retrenchment, even from positions of power 
and material advantage. For example, in Georgia, where Moscow controlled a huge part of 
territory, Russia returned to a status quo, once a peace deal was negotiated. And in Ukraine, 
Russian aggression was limited to a certain territorial sphere. In short, it was not simply 
expansionism or imperialism on Moscow’s part, and there appears to be a method in the 
madness.  
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The drawbacks of the abovementioned analyses are manifold. Both constructivist and liberal 
analysis of Russian foreign policy offer causal explanations about some aspects of Russian 
behaviour. But both suffer from significant disadvantages, as discussed in the following 
chapters. One, any explanation that resorts to unquantifiable conceptual vacuums, for example 
the role of honour and pride, and civilisational exceptionalism, are almost all based purely on 
the “rhetoric” of politicians. While they are of valuable historical importance, they are not 
strictly objective. A constructivist analysis focusing on the resurgence of the Orthodox 
Christianity, and the influence of far-right ideologues and how that identity shapes Russian 
support for and far right parties, would fail to explain the same Russian support for left-wing 
populist parties around the same timeframe. Unless an explanatory theory is capable of at least 
somewhat answering these differences, it leaves further questions.  
That Russian foreign policy is influenced by domestic elements also is insufficient in 
explaining the differences within foreign policy. Russia has been increasingly getting more 
assertive since 2007 and barring one sudden alignment during the Western intervention in 
Libya, has been antagonistic to NATO and EU interests, regardless of the domestic situation. 
Vladimir Putin has also overwhelmingly enjoyed positive approval ratings, both during the 
times of relative retrenchment as well as military aggression. At the time of writing this thesis 
especially in the last two years, Moscow has adopted the view that any uprising in any area 
where Russia has any strategic interest requires some sort of military pushback. While it is not 
a case study of this particular thesis, it is unlikely, for example, that Russian use of military 
force in Syria, Ukraine, and Georgia, are determined by either domestic considerations or 
Orthodox Christian and civilisational considerations. 
That said, there is simply no broad overarching theoretical study done so far which can readily 
explain the differences within post-soviet Russian foreign policy, which is one of the purposes 
of this thesis, to ascribe a theoretical understanding on Russian foreign policy. If Russian 
foreign policy is not explained properly by constructivist lens, of honour, pride, religion, and 
civilisation, and if Russian foreign policy deviations are not fully explained by liberal theories 
focusing on economy or regime stability, then the only other lens which might provide a 
theoretical explanation is structural. Structural arguments, therefore, provide a better analytical 
lens. Is Russia then a realist great power? Perhaps so, but that needs more than scholarship 
focusing on individual events like the Russian annexation of Crimea. This thesis, with three 
different cases, attempts to chart a broader answer to that question, and attempts to till a 
significant gap in the literature.  
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For the purpose of this thesis, I chose three cases where I study Russian foreign policy, use of 
military force and/or balancing behaviour, in regard to NATO, Ukraine and Georgia. A detailed 
explanation behind the logic of case selection is given in the theoretical framework and 
methodology chapter, but to briefly summarize, all the three cases involve scenarios, which 
Russia perceived as threatening, whereupon Russia balanced against the threat.  
Russia considered NATO expansion to be strategically threatening, and with both Georgia and 
Ukraine, Russia is engaged or has engaged in military aggression. Both Georgia and Ukraine 
are also cases where there had been a colour revolution and where older pro-Russian regimes 
were toppled by mass movements, which led to situations which Russia considered detrimental 
to its interests. Both those countries also provide cases where there has been both cooperative 
phases as well as military aggression and makes it easier to infer causation. NATO on the other 
hand, provides a greater external validity to this thesis. NATO being an institution and not a 
nation state like Georgia and Ukraine, avoids the allegation of selection bias. Each of these 
cases will constitute individual chapters in this thesis.  
Structure of enquiry and chapter details 
This thesis, if it is already not evident, will follow the same linear model as followed in Stephen 
Walt’s The Origins of Alliances and will be divided into the following parts, all interconnected. 
with one segment leading to the next one. 
The introduction will be followed by a chapter reviewing the relevant literature and 
summarizing the relevant scholarship dealing with the history of post-Soviet Russian foreign 
policy. The Russian foreign policy, for the purpose of analysis is divided into four broad 
periods or phases. The first phase of an Atlanticist foreign policy and liberalizing economy and 
Pro-Western outlook, immediately after the end of the Cold war, is followed by the start of the 
second phase around the first Chechen War, to the end of the Yeltsin presidency, where broad 
differences in interests of Russian federation vis-à-vis the West are observed. Widespread 
disillusionment over economic reforms, as well as hard-line pushbacks with regards to foreign 
policy marks this phase, even with relative military decline, in the face of peak American 
hegemony culminating in the War in Kosovo and the ascent of Vladimir Putin to power. The 
third phase with Putin in power, the second Chechen war, and September 11 terror attacks on 
US soil marks the return of pragmatic Russia with a huge economic boom, and which initially 
involves steady rapprochement between Russia and the United States, but which quickly ends 
with increasing rifts due to the Iraq war and the colour revolutions in the Russian 
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neighbourhood. That is followed by the fourth and final ongoing phase, the return of Great 
power Russia, which involves Russian military aggressions and wars in Georgia and Ukraine. 
This chapter lays down the background history of Russian foreign policy, as well as provides 
a thorough rundown of the current theoretical literature and provides an understanding of why 
that is inadequate. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis will be detailed in the next chapter. The purpose of this 
thesis is to analyse Russian foreign policy, especially focusing on Russian balancing behaviour 
and military aggression, and to see if there are patterns which emerge which in turn can be used 
to test hypotheses. This deductive approach is therefore narrow in scope, and case specific. 
Naturally, to understand that, one needs to explain why a chosen theory is a good framework 
to demonstrate if Russian behaviour as the dependent variable influenced by external factors 
consistent with the theory of neorealism. This thesis is at core a theoretical study and explaining 
why a particular theory is chosen and deemed to be causally explanatory is a significant part. 
This particular chapter is therefore the most important one to lay the groundwork for the case 
studies, longer in length than the others, and will discuss what realism in international relations 
is, and what it constitutes, and then proceed to answer the question about why neorealism is an 
ideal theoretical framework needed for this project, what neorealism as a research framework 
consists of, and whether it can be even deployed to successfully understand and explain the 
foreign policy of a great power. By the end of that section this thesis will demonstrate that 
neorealism is indeed a sound framework to study foreign policy and can be successfully used 
for the purpose of this thesis, and it would also show that neorealism contains various different 
sub-theories all useful in theory testing, further leading to the next part of the thesis. The chapter 
will also explain the logic of balancing in international relations and will lay down the theory 
of Balance of Threat, as the theoretical framework for the purpose of this thesis. It will then 
proceed to explains the research design, case selection criteria, the methodology and some 
primary hypotheses. Divided in two sub-sections, the first one providing the logic of balancing 
in realism and explain what Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory is, as well as how balance 
of threat works alongside external factors like revolution in the neighbourhood and changing 
security scenarios. Second, it will explain why, and in which order the three cases for study are 
chosen, and the methodology behind them. 
The following three chapters will be the three detailed case studies, namely, exploring and 
testing Russian reactions, balancing behaviour, and use of force, with regards to NATO, 
Ukraine and Georgia respectively. All of them explore when and why Russia balances against 
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what perceived threats. The chapter on NATO highlights the differences in Russian balancing 
actions, depending on the interplay of variables, namely, aggregate power, geographic 
proximity, offensive power and offensive intentions. NATO enlargement phases are studied 
alongside Russian reaction to them, and the reasons for Russian aggressive balancing action, 
as well as Russian muted reactions are explored. The next two chapters on Ukraine and Georgia 
combined, helps settle the theoretical questions of whether Russia is actually an expansionist 
power, or a reactive but status-quo power, and what leads to the triggering of Russian military 
actions. The Ukraine chapter highlights that the primary drivers of Russian actions, and the 
structural aspects of Russian reaction, like Russian naval bases as well as control over the 
material and industrial centres crucial to the continuation of the supply chains for the Russian 
military, and in turn, the continuation of Russian position and status of a great power in the 
balance of Eastern Europe. The chapter on Georgia explores the questions about Russian 
capability and intention in the broader balance of power with detailed discussion about Russian 
preparation for the war, as well as neutralizing and punitive operational procedures, force 
structures. 
It is important to note at this juncture, that while there are three case studies employed to 
explore and understand one overarching theoretical question, the cases are, by definition, 
different from each other. But all of them explore Russian balancing against perceived threats. 
NATO is an alliance, and Russian reaction is measured against phases of NATO enlargement. 
The chapter on Ukraine gives us an understanding of what variables were lacking during 
Orange revolution which led to a relatively muted Russian reaction, compared to a proxy war 
after the Euromaidan. The chapter on Georgia examines a single case in depth and sheds light 
on the question of Russia being an expansionist power or status quo power. All three chapters 
in turn, combined, and only combined, gives an answer to the central research question, of what 
theoretical explanation can be satisfactorily attributed to Russian military actions and foreign 
policy, and whether Russia can be considered a realist power, acting according to the dictates 
of Balance of Threat theory. Social science is of course not like Physics, and any attempt to 
replicate a scientific structure in a historical study attempting to explore and construct a 
narrative will fall short. While there is an attempt to at least give a structural semblance to the 
three cases, they are still different than one another, and have differences in their structure 
within. The dissertation is after all theoretical, and the theoretical answers are tied up at the 
end. While individually each case study can form a separate academic paper, that is not the 
intention here, and this thesis is structured holistically. 
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The final chapter of the thesis, accordingly, summarizes the three empirical chapters on NATO, 
Ukraine and Georgia and outlines the findings. It then ties them up in light of the Balance of 
Threat theory and explains the basic theoretical findings of the thesis as a whole, connecting 
them to the primary hypotheses outlined in the third chapter. It explains why Russia broadly 
acts according to the dictates of balance of threat, why Russian aggressive actions, and even 
more importantly Russian muted reactions can be explained by the presence and absence of the 
causal variables, and which in turn explain if Russian foreign policy is broadly realist. The 
thesis explains if Russia balances against threats, and acts as a security maximiser determined 
to uphold what it considers a status quo. It also sheds some light on the broad auxiliary 
theoretical questions, if Russia is indeed a defensive realist power, or an offensive realist 
power, and if Russia has expansionist aim, will or capability. Finally, it clarifies, why this thesis 
contends Russia as a defensive realist power, which acts per the assumptions of balance of 
threat theory and ends with providing some brief policy prescriptions and suggestions. 
Definitions and conceptualisation 
Perhaps, one of the most important parts of any thesis is to outline the definitions, concepts, 
and limitations. Accordingly, for the purpose of this thesis, a few key concepts and terms are 
hereby defined. 
First, “the West”, EU, US, and NATO are often used interchangeably as a nominal concept. Of 
this, the concept of the West is arguably the most problematic. The “West” is of course not a 
defined territory, but during the Cold war, it was considered to be the countries formally under 
NATO, or NATO allies such as Australia and New Zealand. The concept has been significantly 
diluted lately, given Turkey’s recent authoritarian turn, as well as NATO enlargement since the 
mid-nineties. For example, under no measurable metrics can Turkey be still considered more 
“Western” than even Russia.29  Putting aside Turkey, even former Warsaw Pact countries like 
Hungary and Poland have shown recent signs of changes in domestic politics which are 
significantly different normatively, than the Western European and Scandinavian nation-states. 
One can also argue the West was never normatively “liberal democratic” but rather a territorial 
entity, and the current government of Hungary and Poland falls squarely within that tradition, 
given that NATO included dictatorial Spain during the Cold war. But Australia and New 
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Zealand are (and was) also considered Western nations, and they are as far away from the 
geographic West as possible. 
That being said, two factors assist in clearing this conundrum. First, West is still used to 
understand any country under NATO, as well as Australia and New Zealand. Broadly, the 
Anglosphere, and European nation-states, which are either formally under NATO and 
European Union, or to use Karl Deutsch’s terminology, under one “security architecture”, are 
called “the West”, in both regular conversation, media, as well as scholarly literature. 30 Almost 
any newspaper, for example would mention “The West” as a phrase, and use it interchangeably 
with NATO or EU.31 Likewise, to give an example of the latest in academic literature, historian 
Timothy Snyder consistently used the phrase of “West” and “Western” to denote both United 
States and European Union.32 And finally, for the purpose of this thesis, the Russian point of 
view is far more important, than the conceptual debates one can see within “the West”. And as 
observed in later chapters, for the Russian political and military elite, there is no discernible 
difference between EU, NATO, US, and “the West”. 
Second, for the purpose of this thesis, although the phrase NATO enlargement is mostly used, 
there is no difference between the phrases, NATO enlargement and NATO expansion. The 
question of NATO, which will be studied in detail later, is still one of intense scholarly debate. 
There is still scholarly dispute, on whether there was any verbal guarantee or a no-enlargement 
pledge from NATO to Soviet Union. But scholarly opinion suggests that there was. 33 However, 
terminology wise, this thesis mostly uses enlargement, rather than expansion, as NATO did not 
proceed to conquer the new territories, or annex them by force, and the enlargement was mutual 
and consensual. That said, like “The West”, enlargement and expansion are also used 
interchangeably in security studies academic literature. 34 And as with the previous point, from 
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Russian point of view, there was (and is) no difference. As discussed in detail in the chapter on 
NATO, from the Western point of view, NATO enlargement was not just strategic, but also 
institutional and normative, not just meant as a strategic buffer but to institutionalize liberal 
democratic peace. 35 From the vantage point of Moscow, it was simply territorial encroachment 
of a hostile political and military alliance, closer and closer to Russian borders. Given that the 
thesis tries to understand and explore the causes of Russian “reaction”, that distinction or lack 
thereof, should be kept in mind. 
Third, “Russia”, in this context means Russian ruling elite. There is a rich history in qualitative 
theoretical analysis of great power behaviour, to essentially use the name of the state or capital, 
to what usually amounts to the ruling elite or policy makers. 36 This thesis carries on that 
tradition. It is of course difficult to “process trace” Russian elite decision making. There are 
some examples of recent scholarship which uses backroom channels, administrative leaks, and 
even gossips to construct a narrative. Those are good as pop-history but may invite questions 
about academic research validity, especially in this field of “security studies”. There are other 
forms of scholarships which does historical analysis over a long period of time, which uses 
primary sources, long form interviews, and archival material. Instead, as mentioned in the 
methodology section later in the course of the dissertation, this thesis uses secondary literature, 
and infers from observed Russian behaviour and military movements, and then tallies it with 
relevant Russian rhetoric, from the political, and military elites, to test the hypotheses. And as 
observed in later chapters, Russian decision making is usually hierarchical and contingent on 
a section of political and military elite, who have remarkably similar thought process and threat 
perceptions. There are opposition parties and fringe groups, but they do not carry much weight, 
nor does public opinion has any observed sway, in matters of war and peace. For the purpose 
of this thesis, therefore, the standard “security studies” template of interchanging the terms 
Russia and Moscow, for Russian ruling elite and state. 37 
Four, the ultimate aim of the thesis is to explore a simple assertion. Is Russia a realist great 
power? But to achieve that, one needs to first explain a set of complications. Realism is a very 
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broad theoretical paradigm. Realism as an International Relations discipline traces its roots to 
realism in philosophy, which in turn goes back to the times of Thucydides. Realism in 
international relations, is both a theoretical framework, as well as a research design. To take 
the example of a Russian matryoshka doll, realism as a philosophy can be divided between 
classical realism and neorealism, and neorealism in turn is divided between offensive, and 
defensive realism. Defensive realism has several different explanatory theories like Offense-
Defence balance, Security dilemma, and Balance of Threat, which attempts to explain specific 
foreign policy behaviour. Of that, one specific realist theory of foreign policy, Stephen Walt’s 
Balance of Threat, is used to explore and test various hypotheses. The idea being, that if 
majority of Russian actions match the hypotheses, it can be argued that Russia acts within the 
dictates of neorealism, and within the broader confines of realism as a theoretical framework. 
By that logic, Russia can be termed as a realist great power. 
This thesis does not naturally claim to answer all theoretical questions. The intention of the 
thesis was to provide a theoretical understanding of Russian foreign policy, with multiple cases, 
over a given period of time, under different Russian regimes and leadership. At the time of 
writing this thesis, there are two conflicts Russia is involved in, in Syria, and Ukraine, with the 
United States reneging on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and possibly the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as well, there are protests going on in Moscow, and NATO 
is increasing funding under constant pressure from Washington DC.  
As Walt himself wrote in the opening of The Origins of Alliances, I am also primarily relying 
on secondary sources and research papers, instead of primary sources, in investigating a theory 
rather than building one, and the assessment is based on the scholarship provided by the area 
specialists and military theorists. Within the time frame of this thesis, and limitations of 
durability, funding, and primary source research, this thesis tests a theory to see if Russia can 
be termed as a realist power, which in turn will help Western policy makers to decide and 
debate on a future grand-strategy moving forward. 
 
To sum it all up, this thesis attempts to explain Russian post-soviet foreign policy, balancing 
behaviour, and military use of force in Europe, in light of Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat 
theory. In order to address that overarching research puzzle of whether Russia acts per the 
dictates of Balance of Threat, and therefore broadly as a security maximiser and defensive 
realist power, this thesis endeavours to assess Russia’s foreign policy and military ambition. 
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The thesis also debates some broad and topical theoretical questions, on whether Russia is a 
revanchist and expansionist power, and power maximiser, or a defensive realist power and 
security maximiser. The thesis employs a qualitative mixed methods research design, focusing 
on secondary military sources. The evidence is primarily determined from Russian strategic 
actions, and not Russian governmental rhetoric, as discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
The findings have significant policy relevance for future European/British security, as the USA 
grows increasingly isolationist, and NATO and EU rift widens. If Russia balances against 
threats and only uses military force in areas where it already has entrenched material and 
military interests, it becomes easier for policymakers to somewhat calculate where Moscow 
would be determined to defend its interests compared to regions where Moscow will only be 
rhetorically aggressive. The findings also shed light on broad theoretical questions and suggest 
that Russia is a security maximiser as opposed to a power maximiser. That in turn, logically 
entails that Russia is a defensive realist power and not an offensive realist power. It is difficult 
to coexist with an imperial expansionist. It is, however, possible to maintain a negative peace 
with a power which is determined to uphold the status quo, but which lacks further hegemonic 
ambitions. According to the theory, post-Soviet Russia should indulge in aggression only when 
it perceives its direct interests to be threatened and revert back to status quo the moment the 
threats subside or are neutralised by balancing actions. To test that, in itself, is a contribution 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
To understand if Russia is a realist great power, and whether Moscow acts within the broad 
dictates of realism, this thesis, as elaborated earlier, explores Russian balancing in Europe, 
especially in reaction to NATO enlargement, and Russian use of force in its near-abroad. This 
chapter explores some recent relevant literature which attempts to provide a causal explanation 
of Russian foreign policy. Russian foreign policy underwent several major changes since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, often overlapping. Scholars differed on the direction of Russian 
foreign policy, with optimism among certain sections about trade and cooperation between 
Russia and the West, as well as voices of concern that great power rivalry will be back. 38 The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in relative lack of coherent strategy and objective, 
and ideological vacuum.39 These in turn, resulted in internal crises, power-struggles, economic 
downfall and diverging elite identities, that hindered Russia from developing a coherent foreign 
policy objective.40 Russia, however, has since then re-emerged as one of the major geopolitical 
players.41  
While there were broad changes, there has also been a distinct continuity. The notable and 
reflexive anti-western rhetoric that characterised Russian foreign policy for the most part also 
had elements of pragmatism. It included an acknowledgement of American military hegemony 
and American led Western Liberal International order. 42 There has also been notable similarity 
regardless of administration, especially when it comes to Russia’s near abroad, and areas which 
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Russia considered to be in its sphere of influence. Russia has often resorted to active diplomacy 
upholding the status-quo in its privileged sphere, and has resorted to military force, twice in 
the last decade. Russian actions and displeasure with the West during the Balkan conflicts, 
Russian aggressive behaviour in the Baltics, and outright hostility in Georgia and Ukraine 
points to a new resurgent Russia where Russia is not shy to use military force to assert 
geopolitical goals in the region it considers as its “privileged interest”. 43  
On closer observation, patterns emerge in phases of Russian foreign policy. In this chapter, 
Russian foreign policy since the Soviet collapse is divided into four phases. Broadly, each short 
phase of cooperation and rapprochement is followed by a longer phase of disillusionment, and 
pragmatic balancing behaviour. The first phase runs in the early few years of Boris Yeltsin’s 
foreign policy, with Russia being pro-Western in both international politics and economic 
orientation. The second phase follows that, when under the premiership of Yevgeny Primakov, 
when Russia faced with stalled economic reforms and structural difference with the West, 
looked for pragmatic multipolarity. The third phase started with Putin’s first term and steady 
rapprochement with NATO and the US, over the War on Terror and Afghanistan campaign. 
The fourth phase starts around 2003, and continues to this day, barring minor rapprochement 
and reset in between, where Russia returned to its traditional great power role and balancing, 
with assertive foreign policy and willingness to use force in its spheres of influence.  
The literature is also segmented, in explaining these broad trends, as noted in the subsequent 
sections. The liberal theories and analysis broadly focus on Russian behaviour predicated upon 
domestic regime stability and economic considerations, trade, and Atlanticist policies abroad, 
and attributes it to broadly lobby groups, energy sectors, and perceived threat felt by the 
Russian regime by colour revolutions in the near abroad.44 No foreign policy analysis is of 
course monocausal, and naturally any liberal explanation of Russian foreign policy often 
attribute Russian behaviour to a combination of causes, nevertheless they are divided on their 
causal variables, which broadly fall under traditional liberal theories of foreign policy. The 
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second line of analysis is a newer constructivist one, which focusses on Russian sense of 
honour, and identity. 45 This line of argument attributes to Russian elites having a sense of 
aspirational identity of a great power, determined to maintain Moscow’s status, honour and 
privileged position in the European balance. An attempt is made hereinafter, to chart the arc of 
Russian foreign policy in the four abovementioned phases, followed by an explanation by these 
theoretical schools, and provide a short critique.  
 
First phase: Pro Western orientation 
The first phase of Russian foreign policy immediately after the Soviet collapse was one where 
Russia was oriented towards the West, more precisely, towards a Western modelled democratic 
liberal society. Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first elected President stated in 1991 that the country 
would turn “to the world community with pure intentions in order to win friends but not 
enemies, and to establish honest and civilised relations with other states”. 46 During the early 
years of this new relationship, it appeared that the West and Russia could become strong 
partners. 47 Overall relation with the West, and especially EU, Russian foreign policy under 
Yeltsin was enthusiastic.48 Yeltsin stated as late as in 1997, that Russia was working towards 
a recognition of being a full European state and in due course of time, join the European Union. 
49 
This initial phase lasted until 1995-1996, although there were slow changes that started from 
1994 onwards.50 The objective of Russian foreign policy in the first few years under Yeltsin 
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can be summed up as consisting of “democratic peace” abroad, economic investment and 
support from the West, and being recognised as respectable law-abiding member of the 
international community. 51  
Yeltsin’s early foreign policy was formulated by Andrei Kozyrev, and it broadly focused on 
the liberal ideas of democratic peace, promotion of human rights, and liberalisation of an 
economy from central-command. 52  Kozyrev and Yeltsin, and a section of the Russian ruling 
elite, were of the opinion that it would be in Russia’s national interest to gain membership in 
the club of developed democratic states and their economic institutions, thus assuming the 
"fitting place that has been predetermined for us by history and geography." 53 Economic 
‘Shock therapy’, sought to integrate Russia within the most important “transatlantic economic 
and security institutions” such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), NATO and the Group 
of 7 (G7) while limiting Russia’s economic ties with its former territories in Eurasia, as it was 
considered necessary to combat stagnation. As Checkel and Donaldson both mentions, the 
primary goals of what came to be known as an Atlanticist, liberal foreign policy, were global 
economic integration, nuclear and environmental security, Westernisation and 
Europeanisation, and market reforms.54  
Even when Kozyrev’s foreign policy outlook was liberal, it was not strictly internationalist in 
the Soviet sense. 55 Kozyrev argued that the basis for the new foreign policy would be Russia's 
national interests as compared to the theoretical, more universalist, international class struggle 
which formed the nominal principle of the Soviet foreign policy.56 57 Kozyrev argued that good 
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relations with the West were necessary because "no developed, democratic, civil society . . . 
can threaten us."”, which scholars maintain was a Russian version of the Liberal Democratic 
Peace Theory. 58 Liberal scholars maintain that domestic consideration was more important in 
this phase, as Russian policy makers realised that with Western help in gaining entry to 
international economic institutions, a sound economy and subsequently a sound civil society 
would be formed. 59 The entire Russian administration was therefore focused mostly on 
domestic development and restructuring.60 Added to that was structural reasons like sudden 
and relative inferiority in military strength, size, and economy and all these factors combined 
in shaping the early Post Soviet Russian foreign policy.61  
There is broad scholarly consensus about this direction of Russian foreign policy from 
immediate post-Soviet collapse and during the early Yeltsin years62 in the sense that this first 
phase of Russian foreign policy was relatively straightforward and pro-Western, without major 
deviations and shifts; there are differing theoretical analysis as to why.63 Liberal scholarly 
opinion and interpretation of this period claims that the rapid economic decline and the relative 
weakness, produced an urgent need for the Russian administration to give a direction to its 
foreign policy. Regime stability as well as democratic peace seems to be the key driver behind 
the liberal push under Yeltsin and Kozyrev.64 McFaul, for example, points out the centrality of 
Russian domestic politics during this period influencing the articulation and implementation of 
Russian foreign policy. McFaul argues that groups with economic interests, like Gazprom 
started to push away the traditional Russian state, and resulted in a peaceful direction of foreign 
policy. 65  
Even with differing expectations and ideas about Russia’s global role among the ruling elites 
there were basic agreements, regarding objectives. Those objectives were revival of the 
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economy to avoid further disintegration of the country and to stabilize the regime, economic 
and social revival with the help of financial aid from the West, to maintain a parity in the 
nuclear forces with the west. Boris Yeltsin, consequently, followed this foreign policy of 
peaceful accommodation with the West, and Russian diplomacy aimed at promoting Russian 
integration in mainstream, Western institutions, and securing Western help for internal 
transformation and stabilisation of Russia’s economy and domestic polity. Russia’s foreign 
policymakers were prepared to accommodate Western interests on a whole range of issues, 
including nuclear cooperation, and privatisation. 66 
While liberal analysis of this period is relatively straightforward, Constructivist arguments are 
broader, and are not very useful in explaining specific actions in time periods of Russian 
history, but rather Constructivist analysts try to explain the broad arc of Russian foreign policy 
and what shaped it. Constructivist theorists argue that Soviet disintegration altered Russian 
identity and therefore altered Russian national interests. The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the official Marxist-Leninist state ideology left a conceptual vacuum, which also affected the 
Russian identity.67 The policy paralysis during Yeltsin’s early days was attributed to these 
debates within Russia regarding Russian identity.68 The fundamental argument of all 
constructivists are that Russia as a nation state suffered from an identity crisis often oscillating 
between identifying as a European Great power or a unique land power between Europe and 
Asia, echoing the nineteenth century debates of Slavophiles and Westernizers.69  
However, a strong sense of Russia being a unique civilisation remained. A significant majority 
of Russian elites believed that Russia is a unique civilisation, a Russian version of 
exceptionalism, and a bridge between the European and Asia landmass with a unique burden 
in history. 70 Clunan argues, “despite the rejection of the ideologically driven past, elites shared 
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common memories of Russia’s past as a distinct civilisation that not only was premised on 
ideology but also arose out of Russia’s history as a multicultural authoritarian empire as well 
as Russia’s cultural traditions” adding that “the collapse of the Soviet Union left Russian 
political elites with a shared aspiration to restore Russia’s status as a great power on a par with 
the leading countries in the West.”71 To explain the periodic pro-Western behaviour of Russia, 
Tsygankov also defined the Russian concept of honour as a key variable in Russian foreign 
policy. 72Tsygankov claims that Russian elites consider being part of the West in virtuous joint 
projects as honourable, but since Russian cultural lenses vary, and Russia is more conservative 
as a society, it ended up sometimes feeling isolated from the West. Tsygankov defines two very 
different and opposed course of actions which historically Russian rulers have undertaken. 
Historically Russia sought to be either like the West and win its recognition or beat the West 
in their power game. Therefore, Europe’s recognition of Russia has also been equally 
problematic as Europe’s rejection of Russia, as Russian identity is reflected on Europe. The 
Russian honour has naturally two dimensions, European and local. Russia only acts on the 
Europeanness, when the West does not challenge the distinctive aspects of Russian honour. 
Similarly, when Russian distinct honour is challenged by the West, Russia tends to act 
defensively. An example of this “distinct sense of honour” is Russian traditional Eastern 
Orthodox and Slavic ties with Serbia and other Slavic allies and instinctive defence of such 
areas which Russia considers her traditional sphere of influence. What Moscow views as 
honourable objectives, West often views as revisionist behaviour.  
This identity crisis reflects Russian foreign policy establishment “mindset” with simultaneous 
attraction and repulsion regarding Europe, where Europe is to be revered and pitied and feared 
and emulated all at the same time.73 Tsygankov and Lo both states that this is a key factor in 
determining Russian behaviour, where the variable is how Russia views itself alongside the 
West. An instance of technological advancement, or great power show of force results in an 
elite aspiration in Russia to follow, in what Tsygankov considers an honourable cooperation. 
All the other times, honour is used defensively. This has been a key component deciding 
Russian behaviour during NATO expansions, wherein Russia cannot look over the fact that it 
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was the Eastern European states which demonstrated interest to move Westward. 74 Russian 
policy makers during the early nineties started identifying themselves with the European 
nations again, as they regarded the Soviet times as an aberration from Russia’s European past. 
The ‘Westernisation’ of foreign policy was rhetorically justified during the early days of 
Yeltsin on the ground of Russia’s lost Western identity, which had been oppressed by 
Bolshevism and the Soviet experience.75  
This first phase of Russian foreign policy immediately after the Soviet collapse is relatively 
straightforward, when explained through the lens of Liberal international relations theories. It 
logically makes more sense that the Russian elite viewed Moscow’s diminished status, 
alongside still chaotic and turbulent domestic politics, and focused on regime stability within 
her borders, and a peaceful foreign policy abroad in relation with other powers, often at the 
cost of subservience to economic institutions. It is difficult to argue the same with 
Constructivism in this phase and it cannot explain short phases of Russian behaviour, especially 
where Russian actions and deviations can provide successful causal logic. None of the 
constructivist authors explain and define clearly what is a “unique Russian honour”, and more 
importantly how is honour measured, quantified, and what variables influence the difference 
of behaviour in the same phase. For example, Clunan, cites polls about Russian elites aspiring 
a great power status, and argues that all sub-group of Russian elites aspired for regional 
hegemony. That however fails to explain subsequently the differences between Russian 
Atlanticists and nationalists or foreign policy pragmatists. Clunan notes, that “data suggests 
that shared memories of the Russian and Soviet past produced common aspirations with regard 
to Russia’s international status, but not regarding its future political purpose.” 76 She adds, that 
Russian elites were united in their opinion that Moscow “is to unite the best of both 
civilisations, thereby ameliorating the inevitable conflict between them. In another version, 
Russia’s geographic destiny is to be the integrator of the Slavic or Turkic or Mongol peoples, 
as it is the natural hegemon and patron of the Eurasian continent.” 77 Her argument, however, 
fails to explain the difference in Russian Atlanticist orientation from 1991 to 1993, and 
Moscow’s more pragmatist balancing, during the latter years of Yeltsin’s presidency. Likewise, 
                                                             
74 Hopf, T. 2005. ‘Identity, legitimacy, and the use of military force: Russia’s great power identities and military 
intervention in Abkhazia’, Review of International Studies, 31/1: 225–243. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Clunan, pg. 54.  
 
77 Clunan, pg. 66. 
31 
 
Tsygankov’s qualifiers remain vague throughout, and as will be further illustrated later, often 
even contradictory. He fails to mention, why Russia would consider defending Slavic countries 
as honourable, while not explaining the numerous times when Russia actively failed or looked 
away without defending the honour of a fellow Slavic country. The notion of honour sometimes 
borders on civilisational exceptionalism and is non-quantifiable. Constructivist analysis of 
Russian foreign policy in this period, therefore, are holistic, and overarching, and fails to 
consider, for example, Russia’s hard bargaining with IMF and the West even during the most 
pro-Western phase of Yeltsin’s early years, negotiations with Ukraine and the West on the 
issue of nuclear weapons. Forces of economics were also neglected in this line of analysis.   
 
Second phase: Seeking Pragmatic Multipolarity 
The early phase of Atlanticism faced sporadic difficulties domestically, and was never very 
popular among Russian hardliners, culminating in the 1993 constitutional crisis.78 The pro-
Western tilt subsided with the nomination of Yevgeni Primakov in 1996 as the foreign minister 
of Russia.79 Primakov solidified a strategic shift in Russian foreign policy which was already 
increasingly becoming evident, as Russian Western relations suffered from major differences 
over Russian hard-line actions in Chechnya since 1995.80 This phase under the stewardship of 
Primakov saw Russia’s return towards a more “pragmatic” foreign policy and Russia’s shift 
from Westernisation towards a more multipolar realpolitik.81 Russia’s domestic politics at this 
stage was again nationally charged with anti-Western rhetoric. 82 Russia in this phase continued 
to seek trade partners like India and China while simultaneously courting Western investment, 
opposing Western interventions in the Balkans, as well as fending off Western criticism over 
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Russia’s first Chechen war. Simultaneously, Russia also continued to cooperate in nuclear 
proliferation issues, and partnered with NATO, while vocally opposing what it perceived as 
NATO’s gradual eastward encroachment.  
Liberal theorists argue that economic necessities and regime stability were the primary 
variables deciding Russian foreign policy at this stage. In simpler terms, Russia was suffering 
from a combination of factors, such as extreme domestic instability due to the failure of 
economic shock therapy as well as Chechen crisis and rising intolerance. Added to that was 
what it perceived as Western encroachment. Russia however needed the West as well, most 
importantly Western investment to keep the government and economy stable so that the 
Russian government stays stable. Kubicek, Hopf and Lynch argues that Primakov’s 
pragmatism was essentially opportunistic manoeuvring, as Primakov had to resort to 
nationalistic rhetoric because Russian population was dissatisfied with the pace of economic 
reforms, as well as perceived highhandedness of the West.83 They argue that simultaneously 
Russian business lobbies as well as Russian policy makers needed the West, which compelled 
Russia to be more pragmatic.84 The stark realities of economic transition resulted in domestic 
disorder, corruption and poverty, and was exacerbated by the 1998 financial crisis, and 
therefore proved to be an obstruction for Russian Westward Atlanticism, while simultaneously 
kept Russian ambitious foreign policy grounded. 85 Russian economic situation negated the 
earlier pro-Western pro-liberal ideas within the country, as Russians were dissatisfied with the 
slow stalled reforms, and that in turn pressured Russian policy makers to be at least rhetorically 
opposed to the West, while simultaneously search for other regional trade partners and markets. 
Russian expectations concerning Western assistance were not and could not be met, and the 
euphoria regarding rapid change to market economy and liberalism also subsided. Primakov’s 
strategy was intended to create a traditional multipolar environment, however, was hindered 
repeatedly due to domestic disorder, and financial instability.86 Therefore, despite a change 
from pro-Western to sharp anti-Western rhetoric Russian foreign policy options were 
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constrained. While Russia continued to aspire to be a regional hegemon in its former Soviet 
space, it was compelled to acknowledge American and European geopolitical dominance.  
This division within Russian elites regarding the West is explained by McFaul as he divided 
this period between Pro-Western pragmatists and Anti-Western pragmatists. 87The previous 
group consists of groups with economic interests and lobby groups including Gazprom, oil 
companies, mineral exporters, and the bankers, influencing policy outcomes which resulted in 
somewhat asymmetric engagement in foreign policy. Russian business lobby groups and 
oligarchs were the Pro-Western pragmatists who had had limited set of interests including 
keeping Western funds channels open and not so much interest in other foreign policy aspects 
like NATO expansion, and Balkan conflicts. The anti-Western pragmatists like Russian 
military-industrial and security elite on the other hand desired equal treatment from the West 
and alternative funding sources to balance the West. The anti-Western pragmatists depended 
on reflexive anti-western sentiment to maintain their position, funding, and legitimacy in either 
bureaucracy or politics. McFaul explains that Russian foreign policy therefore suffered from 
instances of strain and inconsistency.  
The constructivist argument of this period focused on the continuing crisis in Russian identity 
and defence of Russia’s honour. Tsygankov claimed (without clarification) that Primakov’s 
version of foreign policy objective fits the “defensive honour” vision.88 The policy goals of 
Russia at this stage was shaped by Russia’s relative decline, and desire to revive capabilities 
and prestige of a great power. Primakov realised that with actual diminished capabilities, the 
only way to maintain honour is to portray a stiff opposition to the West and NATO expansion. 
In relation with the West, Primakov insisted that Russia needs to “prove” her strength by 
balancing against the stronger power, in this case, the United States. In the context of growing 
security threats in Chechnya, a portrayal of strength was also needed to show Russia as a great 
power to both domestic and international adversaries. It is important to note here, that 
Tsygankov mentions honour as a cause that determined Russian actions, but in his examples, 
he has used logic of balancing against a stronger adversary to project strength, which falls 
essentially under neorealist theory. Tsygankov quotes Primakov as saying that NATO 
enlargement affects Russia “psychologically”, and therefore a pragmatic foreign policy would 
ensure a Russia-China-India multipolar arrangement, to somewhat balance the overwhelming 
                                                             
87 McFaul, M. ‘Russia's Many Foreign Policies’, Demokratizatsiya, 7: 393-412. 
 
88 Tsygankov, A. P. (2012) op. cit. pg. 172-195. 
34 
 
power of the United States. Like most constructivist theories, the analysis heavily relies on 
political rhetoric emanating from Moscow, in this instance, one particular politician, Yevgeni 
Primakov. 89 
Other Constructivist argument of this period also are broadly theoretical about the nature of the 
Russian state, without explaining how they define or explain Russian foreign policy. For 
example, Lo argued, as Piontkovsky and Hopf before him, that Russian behaviour was 
essentially caused by an identity crisis, where Russia’s perception of the West is a declining 
civilisational entity, which needs to be engaged and feared at the same time, and it is guided 
by Russian crisis of identity (European/Eurasian) and insecurity (economic/socio-cultural). 90 
Prizel argued that Russian national identity always reflected a nation’s identity in contrast with 
“the other”, that is Europe and the West, therefore Russia instinctively opposed Western 
dictates.91 Russia, of course does not, as that is evident from the various cooperative 
partnerships even during the most trying of times between Russia and West, which points out 
that there are some other incentives at play.  
The Constructivist analysis of Yeltsin’s period, both in the first phase and the second phase 
raises valuable points in understanding the nature and character of Russian state and the 
influences on Russian elites, it also suffers from limitations, as arguments fail to provide a 
direct link between idea and measurable foreign policy output. While these are all valid 
observations about Russian identity crisis during the 1990s, none of them give us any testable 
measure for Russian behaviour. Tsygankov mentions that Primakov understood Russian 
domestic conditions are dismal due to the Chechen crisis, and needs a strong stabilisation but 
it is not clear how that could not be explained by more liberal regime stability argument. 
Tsygankov argues that real income at this stage fell drastically and therefore forced Primakov’s 
pragmatism. Put simply, even when Primakov wanted to balance the West by looking for 
partners in India and China, Russia could not afford to antagonize the West as Primakov needed 
IMF assistance. While this is a logical explanation of Russian behaviour, it is hardly a 
Constructivist argument. Heller, Prizel and Piontkovsky while providing an understanding of 
factors which might or might not cause Russian behavioural changes, never provide a way to 
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measure ideational factors like historical experience and perception and how much in reality 
they shape Russian foreign policy. The Liberal analysis of Yeltsin’s Presidency is 
comparatively straightforward and is better at explaining the pro-Western orientation of Russia 
immediately after the Soviet collapse, as well as the disillusionment of Russia with the West 
after failed economic policies.92  
 
If one compares the Constructivist arguments and the Liberal arguments of this period, the 
Liberal argument is more logical, and could be used to determine the causes of Russian 
behaviours. For example, Constructivist logic of the identity crisis between Eurasians and Pro-
Western Atlanticists is flimsy compared to the Liberal argument that the Russian economic 
crash during August 1998, and the subsequent Kosovo crisis severely diminished the influence 
of the Pro-Western Liberals in Russian policy making circles. The majority of constructivist 
arguments are predicated on rhetoric emanating from the political class but fails to account for 
the causal behaviour. Arguments like Primakov desiring a multipolar world with China and 
India, to balance against NATO enlargement is logical, but they do not make it conservative. 
Liberal theories on the other hand, appear more logical on why Russia might have looked for 
more multipolar alignments and diverse trade partnerships, and why Russia was more inclined 
to accept Western preponderance in European balance, given that domestic situation especially 
in the Caucasus was unstable. 93  
 
The Kosovo crisis, in particular illustrates a Liberal causal explanation why Russian foreign 
policy establishment regardless of ideology, goes rhetorically anti-Western to preserve 
domestic legitimacy while acting pragmatically in reality. As McFaul and other liberal theorists 
highlighted, Russian policy makers understood that Russia, collapsing under heavy economic 
stagnation, needed western engagement, but anti-Western sentiment was high during the 
NATO bombing campaign. As McFaul demonstrates, Russian politicians, carefully balanced 
their anti-Western rhetoric, while paying attention that the anti-Western sentiment on the streets 
of Russia never spills out of control. It allowed Russia to carefully position itself as a staunchly 
anti-interventionist country, while positioning itself as pro-peace and pro-International law. 94 
                                                             








Third phase: Rapprochement and tactical alignment  
The third phase of Russian foreign policy started around the time Putin ascended the Russian 
leadership at the turn of the millennium. Putin’s rise gave new directions to Russian foreign 
policy, one of a great power rapprochement, with a shift in orientation and objective 95 Putin 
aspired to be a partner or even a member of NATO and cement his partnership with the United 
States.96 The primacy of the United States was implicitly recognised, and Putin was the first 
leader to call the United States after the September 11 attacks, and initially also did not respond 
to the United States unilaterally withdrawing from the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty which 
maintained strategic stability in Europe since the Cold War. Russian and US cooperation during 
the campaign in Afghanistan, sharing intelligence, and allowing US military presence in 
Central Asia and flight over Russian air spaces. While there were alternative routes that the 
United States could have taken in case of Russian reluctance, this cooperation highlighted a 
turn towards a tactical alignment of sorts during the early days of the War on Terror.  
Liberal analysis of Russia’s actions under Putin during this phase is more consistent with the 
idea how internal factors and regime stability shaped Russian policy abroad and focused on the 
domestic, institutional and the economic factors which influenced Putin’s policy. The distinct 
and marked transition of Russia from Yeltsin to Putin symbolised Russia’s return to the ranks 
of major powers and was starkly influenced by domestic level variables and economic 
prosperity which in turn led the Russian regime to be secured, and have more leverage in 
dealing with Europe and the US. 97  
There are of course minor differences in what liberal analysts argue with regards to Putin and 
how Moscow deals with foreign policy during the early Putin period. Compared to Kozyrev 
and Yeltsin’s early era, where Russian foreign policy was influenced by a distinct democratic 
peace objective, the liberal analysis of Putin’s early era suggests the primary objective of 
Russian government was and remained regime stability. The main factors which influenced 
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Russian behaviour was therefore economic leverage and domestic stability and for that Russia 
wanted to have good relations and forge tactical alignments with the West. The Russian ruling 
political elite agreed on the essential argument that the Russian state needs to be strong and 
centralised in order to have a cohesive unified foreign policy objective. The foreign policy 
objective was to maintain Russian economic stability, use oil and gas as bargaining blocks in 
negotiation with Europe, try and find common grounds with Washington and use the rhetoric 
of the war on terror to solidify Russian domestic stability and suppress dissent. 98 Russia was 
waging the second Chechen war, and it was imperative for Russia to align with the West. It 
was in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo bombing campaign, and Russia needed the West 
to not be overtly critical of its own Chechnya campaign, and Russia was worried that the West 
would give diplomatic and moral support to the rebel groups. Headley argues that from 1999 
onwards Russian policy makers were talking about an “Islamist” arc of instability from 
Afghanistan to Turkey, while facing growing Islamist insurgency at home. Russian policy 
makers were baffled that the West was not seeing the infiltration of Chechen fighters by Al 
Qaeda. The American war on terror immediately after the World Trade Center attacks provided 
impetus to this idea that Russia was a natural ally against global Islamism, and helped Russia 
solidify its status as an important geopolitical actor, while stabilizing at home.99 Russian 
cooperation with United States was from Russian side partly about gaining great power status, 
but mostly a tactical alignment, addressing Russia’s own Chechnya crisis. 100 Russian 
cooperation during the Afghanistan invasion also proved Kremlin’s willingness to act within 
the Western led international system, while acknowledging US hegemony, Putin pragmatically 
hijacked the war on terror to tackle and suppress the Chechnya insurgency, and ratchet up 
domestic and international support against Chechen militants. Russian domestic problems, 
regime stability and suppression of dissent was the primary goal. Sakwa summarised that a 
stable Russia, pursuing its national interest while aligning with the West was the primary 
foreign policy objective of Putin. 101  
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Constructivists like Tsygankov argued that Russian great power confidence came back due to 
the quick recovery from the 1998 financial crash. The economic recovery that coincided with 
Putin’s first term alleviated much of Russian domestic woes and allowed Russia to chart a more 
assertive and coherent foreign policy, in a way, that the Russian ruling elite found this domestic 
economic resurgence useful to install a sense of pride and honour and patriotism, which in turn 
led to an uptick of regime support which allowed Russia to act more aggressively. 102 In search 
of a national identity and purpose, Putin combined czarist and Soviet symbols, adopting the 
czarist double-headed eagle as the national symbol and the Soviet national anthem (with new 
lyrics) while giving increased support to the Russian Orthodox Church and promoting orthodox 
and conservative forces abroad.103 Tsygankov argues that Putin’s personal sense of honour was 
one of the Russian state as a great European and Christian power, able to defend against 
external adversaries and threats. Putin therefore sought to join the West in “honourable” joint 
projects such as “fighting the global war on terror”. 104 
It is important to mention that while Tsygankov talked about how “cooperative honour” 
explained Putin’s tactical alignment with the West against Islamism and the war on terror, his 
examples could be attributed to traditional liberal analysis. For example, Tsygankov states that 
a “cooperative vision of honour” works when there is a recognition from the West, and Russian 
economic conditions made it attractive to foreign investors, which in turn helped in the 
Kremlin’s desire to integrate with the West further.105 Tsygankov also mentions quite correctly 
in the later part of his analysis, that Russian assertiveness and antagonism towards West 
increased after the colour revolutions which started around 2004-2005 but failed to mention 
why Russian behaviour changed as Russian economic conditions did not change much and 
Russia was still an economically attractive destination for the West. Cooperation over terrorism 
and central Asia also continued even after the Iraq war fallout and Russian Western relation 
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despite all the bombastic rhetoric was broadly cooperative till 2008. The argument that Putin 
steered the course of Russian policy simply based on arbitrary measures of Christian honour, 
without any rational geopolitical calculations, seems extremely far-fetched.  
 
Fourth phase: Return of Great Power Russia 
The fourth phase of Russian foreign policy that started around 2003-04 saw Russian 
rapprochement and tactical alignment with the West come under strain. This period 2003 
onwards saw a return of hard balancing and realpolitik in Russian foreign policy, which broadly 
continues to this day. Putin’s second term starting from 2004 saw even more international 
disagreements between Russia and the West. 106 It is during this phase, alongside the US 
unilateral invasion of Iraq, and the perceived Western encroachment in Eastern Europe, due to 
the potential for NATO to expand membership in post-Soviet space in Ukraine and Georgia, 
as well as the colour revolutions added to Russian threat perceptions and exacerbated the 
traditional conflict of interests. 107 Broadly, this period marks the return of the Russian use of 
traditional hard power, more assertive foreign policy in its former spheres of influence, constant 
balancing tendency especially with United States. Russia alongside Germany and France 
opposed American intervention and was vocal about NATO expansions. Colour revolutions in 
former Soviet states like Georgia and Ukraine further strained the relation between West and 
Russia as Russia perceived them to be both a geopolitical threat as well as a threat to domestic 
regime stability.  This great power resurgence reached a culmination point from Munich 
Conference 2007, and subsequently with Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, which 
highlighted that Russia is willing to actively use its military power when it comes to what it 
considers its core area of interest. 108Russian intervention in Georgia also further sent a signal 
of deterrence to EU and NATO from pursuing expansion further eastward and marked a 
significant strategic shift in Russian foreign policy marking military hegemonic intentions. 
Scholars highlighted this period as the start of a completely unilateral and self-interested action 
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of Russian foreign policy, and some even highlighted it as the potential start of a ‘New Cold 
War’ between Russia and the West. 109  
Why did Russia start to turn away from the West? Scholars are divided on that. Stoner and 
McFaul claimed that Putin’s shift towards anti-Americanism, anti-liberalism, radical 
nationalism, and an ever more aggressive foreign policy toward his neighbours is a direct 
consequence of Russian domestic political and economic developments. 110 They both argue 
that despite occasional belligerence, the Russian relation with the West was relatively calm, 
and was only hampered after tumultuous elections of 2012, which turned Putin hostile to the 
idea of Western interference in Russian domestic politics. Leon Aron highlights that Putin 
enjoyed the first two terms with strong Russian economic growth, while in his third Presidential 
term, the domestic economic growth that Russia enjoyed, stopped, even with oil prices at a 
historic high, which might have influenced Putin to act more aggressively to divert domestic 
attention, in a continuation of the analysis that domestic politics primarily continued to shape 
Putin’s foreign policy.111  Rumer and Wallander argued that Russia maintains its aggressive 
diplomacy and energy sector as a leverage and maintain regime stability at home. Instead of 
military alliances, therefore, Russia seeks to diplomatically balance the United States, often 
playing Europe against US, as Russia remains relatively weak in institutions, with declining 
demographic and economic outlook. 112 Trenin states that during the first few years of Putin, 
Russia wanted to be friendly to the West, but was pushed around. The Putin administration 
came to the conclusion that the multipolar world idea of the 1990s is becoming a reality, and 
the relative decline of American power is a fact. Alongside, the Western model of democracy 
is no longer something to be imitated and perceived Western interference and economic 
warfare in Russian domestic affairs resulted in Russia taking an antagonistic role. That 
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coincided with Russian perception of Western interference in the colour revolutions in Russia’s 
near abroad. According to Trenin, Russian leaders therefore started to use Russian “patriotism” 
as a mobilizing factor. 113 Russian policy makers were opposed to these colour revolutions as 
they viewed these events as foreign interference in former Russian sphere of influence and 
consequently a threat to Russian regime stability. Liberal analysis provides evidence that to 
tackle and thwart this perceived threat, since 2006 onwards, there has been a continuous 
political assault on the western idea of democracy promotion and intervention alongside 
creating youth movements within Russia like the Nashi, as a counterweight to the various youth 
movements that were the driving forces behind the colour revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and 
Ukraine, while maintaining that the Western form of democracy is incompatible with Russia. 
114 
Domestic regime stability is also regarded as the key component by another slightly different 
take within the broader liberal analysis of Putin’s foreign policy, which focusses on Putin as 
an individual and his “cronies”, and claims that it is the economic/political/survivalist interests 
of these elite that is the chief determinant of Russian policy. According to this thesis, Putin’s 
Russia paid lip service to the Western institutions and order to maintain a strictly elite driven 
authoritarian model within Russia. Shevtsova therefore predicates Russian foreign policy as a 
reactive idea to the threats to this model. Shevtsova’s case study is Ukraine, where Russian 
elites led by Putin lead to a public mobilisation against the threats to the motherland, and the 
“Putin Doctrine” legitimizing a harsher rule at home and a more assertive stance abroad. Putin’s 
foreign policy is therefore based on the stance that he is opposed to anything that threatens his 
rule, any real or perceived threats, like colour revolutions in the near abroad, and any Great-
power aspirations or rhetoric are “just a way of sustaining personalized power at a time when 
internal displays of might are no longer sufficient.” Shevtsova argues that Putin Doctrine is 
based on an imitation of the liberal order, and what she calls Russian interpretation of liberal 
institutions to prolong its life and power structure. 115 The Putin doctrine, or Putinism, 
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essentially calls on Putin and his allies and cronies deciding the policy of Russia based on their 
own sustenance.116 Applebaum shares a similar thesis, which states that Putin and his “cronies” 
are essentially a product of the Soviet System,117 who gained political ideas during the reign of 
Andropov, and for them the fundamental lesson was that the West is out to dismember 
Russia.118 Russian and in turn their own economic and political survival therefore primarily 
depends on opposing the West at any cost, in every way possible. Nichols states that Putin is a 
“Sovok” and there is no concrete rational ideology, other than to recreate the last two decades 
of the Soviet Union system of a handful of Russian elites taking advantage and sharing the 
profits of the Russian economy. 119 A version of this line of analysis claims that Russian foreign 
policy is essentially run by a handful of lobby groups who are close to Putin, especially the oil 
and gas and energy lobby, and the military industrial lobby. The Russian energy lobby and 
Russian state therefore has similar interests and the influence of the energy sector on Russian 
behaviour is evident in Russian aggressive influence and will to use the weaponised oil and gas 
economy, over the post-Soviet space by such means as cutting off the supply of oil and gas, as 
an energy superpower. 120 The supremacy of the Russian energy sector is something which is 
regarded as the sole determinant and not an area to be bargained, according to this analysis. 
The primary national goal is therefore, to manage and strengthen the Russian role in global 
markets, and energy security is therefore a priority agenda. 121 A slightly different analysis was 
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that Russian foreign policy, is shaped by its military industrial complex, and that Russian 
aggressive actions in Syria and other near abroad is either due to an internal budgetary battle 
between its different segments of armed forces,122 or a showcase of Russian weaponry to 
prospective buyers. 123 
If we return to the argument of colour revolutions, as an aside, it is important to mention that 
while there are not many realist analyses of current Russian foreign policy, especially under 
Putin, there is a similarity between realist and Liberal scholars highlighting the colour 
revolutions as one of the chief factors behind Russia turning antagonistic. As mentioned above, 
the Liberals highlight that colour revolutions were perceived by Russian elites as a threat to 
Russian regime stability and increasing interference by the West in domestic affairs of Russia’s 
near abroad in the name of democratic promotion. Realist scholars also agree, at least on this 
point that colour revolutions and NATO expansion in Russia’s near abroad was the final straw 
in the already toxic relationship between Russia and the West, although the causality is 
different. The recurrent theme of this line of analysis is that Russian assertive foreign policy 
from 2003 onwards had been a reaction to Western actions, which forced Russia to focus on 
more traditional geopolitical balancing roles. Putin’s strategy here since 2003 is analysed as a 
pragmatic, fluid use of resources and power, as a means of statecraft, especially when there is 
in effect no specific grand strategy other than balancing the West by successfully using 
economic, political, and military resources. 124 The rapid successive European developments, 
especially NATO expansion and colour revolutions in former Soviet states, were regarded as a 
direct security threat to the Russian state, as well as a covert Western attempt to destabilize 
Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. 125 The colour revolutions and new democratic 
governments in Georgia and Ukraine, especially was regarded by Russia as a threat to the status 
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quo and survival of the Russian state. 126 This line of analysis was continued more recently 
when Russian actions in the Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia drew renewed attention on Russian 
strategy, including how or if Russia uses hybrid tactics to sow discontent. Umland suggests 
Putin does not have a unified or coherent grand strategy as such, but rather reflexively playing 
on the fear of the West, and Russia, acting as a traditional great power here, is focused on 
dividing Europe and is making it up as it goes, an assessment shared by Galeotti. 127 Putin, 
therefore, is using a classic balancing tactics since 2003, and is using “pragmatic” divide and 
rule policy in Europe within NATO is highlighted in both Russian and EU analysis. 128  
Mearsheimer echoed similar arguments that Russia’s growing aggressive actions, since 2004 
which culminated in the Ukrainian crisis, were primarily reactions to what he terms as crawling 
“liberal hegemony” of the West for the last twenty years, including NATO expansion, and 
intervention in Kosovo. 129 The arguments were essentially similar that Moscow was pushed 
to the corner, as a great power, due to NATO/EU expansion, and saw its strategic and military 
interests threatened in Ukraine (and later Syria). As a result, according to Mearsheimer, as per 
the theoretical predictions of neorealism, it was inevitable that Moscow lashed out militarily, 
even at great cost of economic retribution. 
From this lens, every action of Russia is a reaction to Western actions. Götz echoed similar 
arguments in explaining why Russian aggression towards Ukraine, underlining three separate 
causes for Russian behaviour namely the geographical location of Ukraine, the EU activism in 
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Eastern Europe, and the Ukrainian government’s tilt towards a more pro-Western foreign 
policy. Götz maintains that a combination of these three factors led Russia to act more 
assertively towards Ukraine. 130 Bukkvoll analyses and reaches a similar conclusion about 
Russian actions in Crimea, stating that from the Russian perspective it looked like the West 
exploited Russian weakness in the near abroad, and used popular uprisings as a means of war 
and all that contributed to Russian interests being threatened. 131 Russian analysts also mostly 
share this line of assessment of Russia geopolitically balancing the West. Lukyanov wrote in 
2016, that Putin’s foreign policy is based on flexibility and predicated on the fact that the US 
hegemony and unipolarity is over and Russia is ready to take back its place in a great power 
rivalry. 132Arbatov shares the same assessment of Russian world view, stating that the collapse 
of the world order is taken as an inevitability in Russian policy circles, 133 as does Karaganov, 
who predicts that in future, there will be some sort of tactical alignment with China, when it 
comes to providing economic boost and security in the broader Eurasian region.134  
Summary 
As discussed above, on careful reading of the literature on Russian foreign policy, four distinct 
phases can be determined, which shows broad continuity. The period from Soviet 
disintegration to the current government of Putin’s third term, Russia managed to traverse the 
different political fragmentations, weak geostrategic and military status, international systemic 
constraints, and economic swings and resultant contradictory pulls in charting a foreign policy. 
The first phase is from Yeltsin’s first foreign policy speech in 1991 and lasts broadly until 
1994. Russian foreign policy in this phase was consistently pro-western, and focused on 
economic development, political and economic liberalisation, and reforms, and oriented 
towards having a friendly relation with former adversaries in Europe and US. The second phase 
lasted from 1995 to 1999, around the start of the First Chechen war was waged, which resulted 
in some political differences with the West. It continued with Primakov’s premiership, and 
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resulted in a more multipolar and pragmatic approach towards foreign policy and was parallel 
to widespread disillusionment within Russia with failed economic reforms, and hard-line 
pushback against decreasing pro-western factions in the Yeltsin government. However, even 
during this time, with all the rhetorical animosity, Russia acknowledged NATO and US 
hegemony, due to its own diminished military and relatively weak economic status. While there 
was a search for more pragmatic manoeuvring, overall, it did not affect much qualitative 
change in Russian behaviour, when it comes to NATO expansion, the Kosovo war and the 
colour revolutions.  
The third phase of Russian foreign policy coincides with Putin’s rise to power, and Russia’s 
second Chechen war. Due to shared interests over the threat of Islamists and conflict in Central 
Asia and Caucasus, there was a tactical alignment with the United States and NATO which 
was solidified even further after September 11th attack on World Trade Center and resulted in 
intelligence cooperation during the campaign in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the fourth phase of 
Russian foreign policy, started around 2003, coinciding with the US invasion of Iraq. This is 
the final stage, which continues to this day. Differences over NATO expansion, colour 
revolutions in former Soviet and Eastern bloc countries, US/NATO interventionism in Iraq and 
Libya, influenced Russia to chart a more hard-balancing approach to foreign policy, with more 
traditional great power roles in near abroad. Russia in this phase, also was not shy to use overt 
and covert force, including hard power and interventions, in what Russia considered its 
traditional spheres of influence, regardless of how Russian economic strength was.  
Current Russian assertive foreign policy also forces scholars to ponder if the world is indeed 
in a new Cold war. 135 Russian interventions in Syria and Georgia, its interference in Ukraine, 
and covert operations in the Baltics and Finland, is compelling evidence of Russia in a more 
traditional great power role, considerably more assertive and different from the first three 
phases discussed above.136 While Russian foreign policy, always had a guiding component of 
national interest even at its most liberal phases, it has now eventually arguably reacquired a 
foreign policy based on hard power balancing.137 The Russian foreign policy since the 
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Georgian war had its shares of cooperation with the West, even an arguably failed attempt at 
rapprochement, but insofar they have been only tactical changes, nominal, rather than 
substantial.138 It can be argued, that there is an observable common pattern is a short phase of 
cooperation like the first phase of Yeltsin/Kozyrev and immediately after 9/11, followed by 
longer phases of pragmatic power politics. The first phase of Atlanticism was followed by 
active seeking of multipolarity. The rapprochement and intense phase of cooperation 
immediately after World Trade Center attack was followed by an ongoing and active Great 
power balancing.  
The analysis of Russian foreign policy also follows specific traditions and schools all of which 
provide valuable insights. The constructivist and liberal analysis of Russian foreign policy as 
mentioned above, focusses broadly on cultural and economic/domestic influences, and provide 
significant explanation with regards to Russian state behaviour. They both are also somewhat 
limited in their explanatory power. Considering the Constructivist analysis first, it provides 
valuable understanding on what might “influence” the ideas behind Russian state behaviour. It 
explains the notion of conceptual vacuums and role of ideas, the role of honour, identity and 
pride, and civilisational exceptionalism, and how it might influence Russia.139 It however 
doesn’t provide any measurable understanding on how much such ideas influence actual 
policy.140 For example, a typical constructivist analysis of Russia would suggest that Russian 
civilisational pride and the resurgence in Orthodox Christian identity shapes Russian support 
for conservative forces and far right parties within Europe, but it then fails to explain the 
cooperation between Russia and the West during the same period of time, nor does it mention 
that Russia funds not just far right, but also far left groups within EU, as a means to destabilize 
Europe rather than to pursue a grand strategy based on a Christian conservative ideal. 141 A 
common such argument is that Russia is positioning itself as a cultural Christian conservative 
bastion and is promoting similar conservative forces across Europe. That, however, fails to 
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explain that Russia is fundamentally supportive of any forces from any side of the political 
spectrum, regardless of conservatism or not, as long as those forces are opposed to EU and the 
liberal world order. The idea that Russia is culturally conservative and/or Putin and his regime 
is guided by cultural and civilisational exceptionalism, fails to explain the deviations of Putin’s 
foreign policy and its continuing cooperation with the West when it comes to intelligence 
sharing and space research and non-proliferation and Iran and North Korea talks. 142  
Similarly, although it provides significantly more consistent analysis, liberal economic 
argument has limitations in explaining Russian aggressive behaviour, regardless of the strength 
of Russian economy.143 Barring few alignments, like one over the Libyan intervention, it is 
observable that Russia has only grown increasingly more assertive, and willing to use hard 
power, especially in its sphere of influence, regardless of its declining and weakening 
economy.144 The economic argument however might be helpful in explaining to a limit on why 
Russia might not have carried on an intervention in Ukraine and changed gear from direct 
intervention and annexation in Crimea to a more low tempered destabilisation. It might also 
help explain  Russian limited or shifting strategic goals and achievement in Syria.145 But overall 
Russian behaviour since 2003 as discussed above, and increasing will to use hard power, falls 
in line with traditional great power behaviour, as in great powers act as ruthlessly when it 
perceives its interests to be under threat, and regime type or economic condition does not matter 
as such when it comes to defending interest or spheres of influence. 146 In the last two years, 
Russia has adopted the official view that any uprising in any area which Russia perceives under 
its sphere of influence, including Syria and Ukraine, to be some sort of non-military warfare 
by the West. From viewing colour revolutions as an ideological threat to Russian domestic 
regime, Russian view has now changed to a position where any opposition, or intervention 
anywhere in Russian sphere is considered active Western interference with a geostrategic zero-
                                                             
142 Rovner, J. (2015, 14 September) ‘Searching for strategy in Putin's Russia’, ‘Dealing with Putin’s strategic 
incompetence’,  August 12, 2015, War on the Rocks. 
 
143 ‘Vladimir Putin Just Wants to Be Friends’ Exclusive Interview. 8 Sep 2016 Bloomberg Businessweek. 
 
144 Bew, J. (2015)‘The Syrian War and the return of great power politics’, 15 December The New Statesman; 
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sum outlook. 147 Domestic stability explanation therefore does not explain Russian intervention 
in Syria.  
It therefore leads to a next logical query. What then led or influenced to this Russian assertive 
foreign policy, and what explains it, if not economics, or ideas? The next chapter lays down a 
theoretical understanding of realism, as well as the basic assumptions of Balance of Threat 
theory, and subsequently test those assumptions vis-à-vis Russian behaviour to see if the 
actions match the dictates of theory.  
  
                                                             
147 Nicolas, B. (2016) ‘Russia’s “militarization” of colour revolutions’ Policy Perspectives 4/2. 
50 
 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework   
 
The aim of this project is to analyse recent Russian behaviour from a theoretical framework as 
a great power, to seek and find if there is any predictable pattern in its behaviour. The approach 
is deductive, whereby an attempted explanation is provided on how the Russian behaviour is 
influenced by other external factors, and if there are any observable patterns to it which will in 
future help in formulating policy. The scope of this project is therefore narrow and case specific 
and neorealism is chosen as a preferred theoretical framework.  
 
This chapter attempt to explore the intra-realist debates with regards to whether neorealism is 
or can be successfully used as a theory of foreign policy and illustrate why the theoretical 
framework of neorealism is chosen to demonstrate the behavioural pattern of contemporary 
Russian foreign policy. In short, what is realism in international relations, and why should one 
employ neorealism as a theory to understand great power behaviour, if it can even be done 
successfully. To understand if Russia acts within the confines of neorealism, as a realist great 
power, this chapter attempts to therefore clarify what realism as a theoretical framework entails, 
and touch upon the tenets of neorealism which specifically deal with great power behaviour, 
before introducing the Balance of Threat theory used for the purpose of empirical testing and 
case studies in the upcoming chapters.  
 
In light of that, this chapter will be divided into parts, wherein first, I will briefly discuss, and 
touch upon the relevant tenets of neorealism and the theories within the school of neorealism 
which will be suitable for subsequent analysis and deal with the concern that the theory of 
neorealism, including its basic assertions are capable enough to perform as a broad theoretical 
framework and can be actually used as a theory of foreign policy. Realism is both a theoretical 
paradigm, as well as a method of enquiry. Realism, on the whole contains within itself different 
branches, and sub-theories, explaining specific behavioural patterns. The overall purpose of 
this thesis is to find if realism, specifically neorealism, in some ways, explain or help 
understand Russian foreign policy. For the purpose of this thesis, Stephen Walt’s Balance of 
Threat theory is used, as my theory to explore Russian behaviour. The template followed in 




The assumptions and hypotheses set forth in this chapter hints at how a great power would 
behave facing the combination of factors, and how Russia might have behaved. In the previous 
chapter I highlighted how Russian balancing behaviour are observed in phases. To test 
that behaviour with the general hypotheses presented in this chapter, there is a need for cases 
and a body of evidence which will help determine if the theory indeed explains the phases and 
patterns in Russian foreign policy after Soviet collapse. I would then proceed to review briefly 
the logic of balancing in realism, as discussed in detail in the previous chapters, and then 
explain the different assumptions of balance of threat theory, how balance of threat works when 
mixed with external factors like revolution, and attempt to formulate some testable predictions. 
This will help understand why Russia balances against threats, and not powers per se. The 
chapter deals with testing the theory, some brief general hypotheses, followed by brief case 
specific predictions, details on why the cases were chosen, methodology and limitations. Given 
the subject matter and scope, this chapter is designed to be longer in length than the other 
chapters, as a detailed discussion of theory is necessary.  
 
The debate over neorealism, is twofold. Neorealism, as derived from realism, is both a 
philosophical tradition, as well as a social science research programme, therefore could 
logically pose an infinite number of interpretations and debates. It is important to mention here, 
that even though Kenneth Waltz’s theory of neorealism is the canonical baseline with or from 
which all structural realist concepts and sub-theories are derived, it is by no means considered 
complete and perfect, by either Waltz himself or other realists, and is both modified and 
complemented by several other theories, sub-theories, and doctrines, some of which are 
themselves part of ongoing scholarly debates. Neorealism as a philosophical tradition is 
therefore a mutating and evolving concept, and it does not fall within the scope and ambit of 
this project to attempt such a grand discussion on that, and no attempt will be made as such. 
As mentioned above, it is imperative to remember, that the attempt here is more on theory 
testing, rather than theory building, and therefore the major focus in the upcoming chapters 
will be on testing Russian behaviour against the theories and more essentially the sub-concepts 
of neorealism, notably security dilemma and offense-defence theory, which are discussed here, 
as those concepts specifically deal with great power behaviour and can be tested against 
empirical evidence like policy papers, archived speeches, troop movements, which is the key 
intention of this project. 
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Russia is a great power, and realism dictates that great powers have the biggest impact on 
international politics. There is consensus that current great powers are categorised broadly on 
the basis of power dimension, spatial dimension, and status. 148 A great power is therefore 
assumed to be a country, among a set of countries, which possess more influence over other 
countries, and more effect on world politics and in International Relations.149 Also categorised 
by Kenneth Waltz, who shed light on the characteristics of a great power by these five 
following criteria, namely population and territory; resource endowment; economic capability; 
political stability and competence; and military strength.150 By all of the aforementioned 
indices, Russia qualifies as a great power. 151  
What is Neorealism? 
Realism, as proposed by Hans Morgenthau, was predicated on some key assumptions, chief 
among which was the idea of balance of power.152 Kenneth Waltz draws on traditional realists 
                                                             
148 Danilovic, V. (2002) When the Stakes Are High—Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers Ann Arbor: 






151 As recently as 2014, US President Barack Obama claimed that Russia is “at best” a regional power and not a 
great power, per se. While some may wonder if a great power is still not a global power but a regional power, it 
is discussed the reasons why Russia is granted as a great power, for the purpose of this project. (Further 
discussions which corroborate Russia’s great power status may include, Nixey, J. [2015] ‘Is Russia still a key 
world power?’ Russia and Eurasia Programme head, Chatham House” BBC News 21 Dec 2015 and Trenin, D. 
[2014] ‘Russia's great-power problem’, The National Interest). There might be a cause of argument that Austro-
Hungarian empire, by that logic, was not a great power, as it was powerful only within Europe. That argument is 
flawed. The fact that Austro Hungarian empire was influential inside Europe, which at that point of time 
included colonial powers which covered most of the globe, and those same powers could not afford to form any 
balancing coalition within Europe without keeping the Austro-Hungarian empire in mind, proves beyond doubt 
how much influence it wielded within the continent. Regardless of the spatial dimension, one can safely argue 
Austro-Hungarian empire was a great power. For further reading, see, Mead, W R ‘The Seven Great Powers’ 
(January 4, 2015) The American Interest. Also, Taylor, AJP (1954). The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–
1918. The Oxford History of Modern Europe, OUP; Diplomacy in a Changing World. Ed. by Stephen D. 
Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), and Iggers and von Moltke 
In the Theory and Practice of History, Bobbs-Merril (1973).  
 
152 First, Morgenthau regarded states as the key actors in the World. Secondly, that the natural state of 
international politics is anarchic, which lays emphasis on the lack of hierarchy of the system. Morgenthau 
acknowledges treaties and institutions but is sceptical of their overall power. Thirdly, states try to achieve and 
increase power. Fourth, this seeking of power states acts as organic beings, which is essentially a reflection of 
human nature. Fifth, in the pursuit of security or power, states usually act rationally. Sixth, states also use force, 
or intend to use force as an important tool of statehood. See, Morgenthau, H. J. (1978) Politics Among Nations: 
The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pg. 4-15. 
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like Morgenthau.153 While Morgenthau was ambivalent about the possibility of developing a 
rationalist scientific theory of international politics, Waltz adopts for the first time, a workable, 
systemic, structural approach.154 Waltz’s theory is considered canonical if one utilizes it as a 
theoretical framework for a project which defines or establishes an explanatory behaviour of 
foreign policy, somewhat contrary to what even Waltz wanted at times. This framework has 
been the target of both different schools of realism, and even non-realists.  Of all realist 
approaches, Waltz’s neorealism is assuredly the most influential and certainly the most 
controversial, and undoubtedly the target and approach of most scholars. It is considered that 
Waltz’s theory has achieved a “position of intellectual hegemony in the discipline”.155  
According to Schmidt, it 'established the basis of the neorealist school of thought and has since 
become one of the leading texts in the field'. 156 Donnelly mentions that it 'was for a decade the 
most influential theoretical work in the academic study of international relations'.157 Ruggie 
argues that 'Rarely has a book so influenced a field of study', as does Brown who states that 
‘Theory’ 'is, justly, the most influential book on International Relations theory.158 Keohane 
states that the significance of Waltz's theory 'lies less in his initiation of a new line of theoretical 
inquiry or speculation than in his attempt to systematize political realism into a rigorous, 
deductive theory of international politics'. 159 Buzan, Jones and Little argue that Waltz's 
                                                             
 
153 Waltz, KN, “Theory of International Politics”, 1979, Chapter 1. 
 
154 Hans J. Morgenthau (1978) op. cit. (Neorealism adopts the basic tenets from classical realism, the anarchic 
nature and states being the primary actors. But classical realism is not the framework which is adopted for the 
project. For further detailed discussion on the tenets of classical realism, please refer, Gilpin, R. G. (1984) ‘The 
Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, International Organization 38/2 (Spring): 287-304. 
 
155 See Vasquez, J. & Elman, C. (eds.) (2002) Realism and the balancing of power: A New Debate Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice Hall; Elman, C. & Elman, M. F.  (eds.) (2003) Progress in International Relations Theory: 
Appraising the Field Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
156 B Schmidt, “The political discourse of anarchy” 1998  
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~plam/irnotes07/Schmidt1998.pdf 
 
157 J Donnelly, Realism and international relations, 1998 
http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/99053676.pdf 
 
158 Ruggie, J. G. (1998) Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization New York: 
Routledge; Brown, C. (2009) Understanding International Relations London: Red Globe Press. pg. 41-2. 
 
159 Keohane, R. O. (1986) 'Realism, neorealism and the study of world politics', in Keohane (ed.) Neorealism 
and its Critics New York: Columbia University Press. pg. 15.  
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development of 'the idea of a structural explanation for the logic of power politics' stimulated 
interest 'in the philosophical foundations of International Relations theory'. 160  
Neorealism assumes systemic approaches to study and determine state behaviour based on 
structures. The fundamental concepts of neorealism revolve around the concept of anarchy, 
structure, polarity and balancing behaviour and national interest.161 Waltz informs that, anarchy 
does not necessarily mean chaos or disorder but rather an absence of hierarchy.162 According 
to Waltz’s theory of neorealism or structural realism, there is no overarching all imposing 
global authority that provides security and stability in the international system.163  World 
politics is therefore lacking a structural hierarchical organisation as opposed to domestic 
politics, which is comparatively more hierarchical and centralised. This international system 
with its ‘anarchic structure’ has implications, as Waltz talks about the structures which can 
suddenly change as well, due to systemic changes, like the emergence of bigger powers, or 
revolutions.164 In multipolarity, the chances of conflict increase, whereas in bipolarity the 
system is more stable. The reason is states are drawn to the strength of poles, just as during the 
Cold War, and that in turn maintains a relatively peaceful world. 165 Also, perception about the 
intention of the other pole is comparatively clear and easy to measure for strategic calculations 
and strategic communications, compared to a multipolar system, where it is much more 
difficult. In short, the system forces states, to take sides, just as they were forced to accept the 
new bipolarity during the Cold War. 166  
                                                             
160 Buzan, B., Jones, C., & Little, R. (1993) The Logic of Anarchy: Neoliberalism to Structural Realism New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
 
161 Waltz, K. N. (1979) op. cit.  
 




164 Waltz, K. N. (2000) ‘Structural realism after the Cold war’ International Security, 25/1: 5–41 
 
165 Gaddis deals extensively on why bipolarity was the stable, for reasons like the American capitalism not being 
expansionist like Imperialism, the advent of nuclear weapons, Mutually Assured Destruction, and rules of 
Superpowers understanding the importance of communication. See, Gaddis, J. L. (1986) ‘The Long Peace: 
Elements of Stability in the Post-war International System’, International Security, 10/4: 99-142. 
 




As a result of this anarchical system, every actor in this system is acting in its own interest, and 
“self-help” is the norm. Survival is the key objective in this system.167 Nation states, and great 
powers, are therefore the primary unit or actors in this system, and they act in accordance with 
their interest. In an anarchic system, states are guided by their constant insecurity and notion 
of survival. International structure, rather than regime types therefore decide how states interact 
with each other.168 Waltz’s structural realist approach strives to cover a gap in the classical 
literature and helps in explaining why states behave broadly in similar ways despite their 
different forms of government and diverse political ideologies.169  
Waltz’s systemic theory and balance of power forms the bulk of his neorealist theory, and is 
further enriched by other scholars, concepts which form baselines and frameworks in the course 
of this project. Waltz suggests in an “anarchic world” the absence and presence of a government 
both guarantees violence, and that no human order is without violence. Waltz tries to explain 
that the structure of international politics influences and limits the cooperation between states, 
and structures also encourage certain behaviour and penalize others who do not conform. Waltz 
explains this rationale, that there are instances where states and powers ignore balance-of-
power logic and act in non-strategic ways due to various internal, domestic, unit-level variables 
which is why it is difficult to predict individual state behaviour; however, when states do act 
irrationally, the system punishes them.170 On the other hand, states that act rationally are 
usually rewarded for their smart behaviour by the system. Balance of power, therefore, explains 
such results and patterns, and leads researchers to believe and predict that states will engage in 
balancing, and strong tendency towards balancing will be more than bandwagoning between 
states. “States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a 
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168 Mearsheimer, JJ. “Reckless States and Realism” International Relations June 2009 vol. 23 no. 2 241-256 
 
169 A further detailed discussion of this point is found in “The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security 
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” by Michael Mandelbaum, where it is explained why “Two states 
that are similarly situated in the system but have different domestic orders will tend to pursue similar security 
policies.” The behaviour of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War was therefore decided by 
more by the fact that each was a superpower in a bipolar structure than by the fact that one was democratic and 
the other Communist. Ideology mattered less, according to Mandelbaum and the system mattered more. Waltz 
himself contributed on this point, predicting the behaviour of Iran during the debate on whether they should be 
having a nuclear bomb, and how it might affect their state behaviour. Waltz’s point was, the state behaviour 






self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest” 
Waltz observed. 171  
The anarchic structure of the international system constrains and limits the behaviour of states, 
according to Waltz, and as a result, bipolarity, or multipolarity would always be produced by 
the system, which in itself would produce a tentative balance of power.172 That might not last, 
due to instances of systemic changes due rise of domestic and unit level variables failures like 
for example rise of ultra-nationalism after the First World War, but eventually it would return 
to a balance guaranteed by a balance of power and deterrence factor, the reason being that the 
system will force the states to act in such ways.  
Waltz and his systemic theory, therefore, relies on the Darwinian logic of the system, as the 
states which misbehave or act irrationally are punished. Waltz talks about ‘the process of 
selection’, which explains why ‘those who conform to accepted and successful practices more 
often rise to the top’, while those who do not ‘fall by the wayside’. 173 Waltz claims that it does 
not matter whether states in the long run are either revisionist or status quo power, the 
international structure would push them to pursue policies that would result in a balance of 
power. 174 Waltz maintains for example, that states should not try to pursue hegemony, because 
it goes against the logic of rational behaviour in a systemic theory, the logic being, the moment 
one state will seek hegemony, and the other states will be forced to choose to balance against 
the rising hegemon. Waltz also argues, despite that, sometimes states do seek hegemony and 
end up being balanced by other states or being punished by the system, wherein states overreach 
and perish, Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan as well as Nazi Germany, being such 
examples of reckless great powers. According to Waltz, smart states should realize the folly of 
ambition and will avoid seeking absolute hegemony and will seek to gain an ‘appropriate 
amount of power’. In the eventuality that states seek additional power, Waltz maintains that 
their more important goal remains to ensure that other states do not gain power at their expense. 
‘The first concern of states’, he maintains, ‘is not to maximize power, but to maintain their 
                                                             
171 Waltz, K. N. (2008) Realism and International Politics London: Routledge.  
 
172 Freyberg-Inan, A. & Harrison, E., & Patrick, J. (eds.) (2009) Rethinking Realism in International Relations 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. pg. 29-30.  
 





positions in the system.’175 Under the theoretical framework of realism, therefore, one can 
assume that states will always be concerned about their survival and would seek a favourable 
balance in the existing or altering balance of power.  
Neorealism and state behaviour 
Drawing from Waltz’s baseline, neorealist literature guides us to some basic distilled 
predictions regarding state behaviour. States tend to balance. States prefer to prioritize relative 
gains, rather than seeking absolute gains. States prefer to be more aggressive when they 
perceive that offence is preferable to defence. Here I explain each of these assumptions, to 
portray a clearer picture of great power behaviour, operating under the confines of realism.  
The first set of predictions is related to internal balancing within states. Anarchy in the system 
does not necessarily mean violence, but rather a system of self-help, however, anarchy limits 
cooperation between states. Waltz identifies two ways in which the structure limits 
cooperation. He states, "the condition of insecurity--at the least, the uncertainty of each about 
the other's future intentions and actions--works against their cooperation. A state worries about 
a division of possible gains that may favour other “more than itself." and "a state also worries 
lest it become dependent on others" through trade and/or cooperation, and therefore also 
chooses to limit its cooperation with other states. 176 He underscores that states do not willingly 
place themselves in situations of increased independence, since a self-help system, 
considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest. 177 The structure of 
the system forces states into this kind of behaviour, which in turn leads to states forming 
balances and balancing coalitions. Waltz draws three major conclusions with regards to 
balancing. States are unitary actors who seek their preservation. States seek to achieve this 
goal either through internal balancing (increasing economic and military strength) or external 
balancing (creating alliances) against rival states or peers. Finally, Waltz contrasts balancing 
and bandwagoning, wherein weaker states choose to ally with the stronger state. Waltz 
posits that "because power is a means not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two 
coalitions." 178 Waltz notes that the fundamental reason why the anarchic international system 





177 Waltz, Theory, pg. 105-7. 
178 Ibid. p. 126 
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restricts cooperation: insecurity and unequal gains; in the context of anarchy, each state is 
uncertain about the intentions and resolve of others and is afraid that the possible gains resulting 
from cooperation may favour other states more than itself, and thus lead it to dependence on 
others. 
Stephen Walt adds on to this traditional balance of power theory. 179 According to him states 
will balance against power, to protect themselves, and states actually balance against threats 
and not just power alone.180 “Balance of Threat” theory compliments and modifies the 
fundamental assumption of the balance of power theory, which is a core tenet of both classical 
and neorealist theory and predicts that states attempt to prevent a potential hegemon by 
balancing against it.181 Bandwagoning on the other hand also happens, due to both defensive 
and offensive reasons, as exemplified by Mussolini’s Italy and Stalin’s Soviet Union, and Walt 
draws the inference that states can be attracted to strength, especially during times of tension 
and conflict. The more a state demonstrates its strength, the more likely other states which 
observe the strength are supposed to be joining it. 
Walt’s theory of Balance of Threat is used as a framework for this thesis. The baseline of this 
theory (which is tested in this thesis), is that states (and especially great powers) balance against 
threats, rather than against power alone. The four factors which affect this balancing behaviour 
are, aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions. 
                                                             
 
179 “[…] Realists believe that: (1) the state is the primary actor in world politics; (2) stares weigh options and 
make policy decisions in a more-or-less rational (3) security is the fundamental aim of states; and (4) power, 
especially military power, is the most important factor shaping international political life. Most Realists’ argue 
that systemic forces (e.g., relative power) exert a greater influence on state than unit-level factors do, but no 
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Aggregate power is the sum total of a state’s power, including factors such as population, 
industrial and military capability, technological prowess, et cetera which adds on to a state’s 
threat component. As power can be threatening as well as rewarding, aggregate power therefore 
can influence both balancing and bandwagoning. Since the ability of power projection also 
declines or increases depending on the distance, threat perceptions are also influenced based 
on proximate distance and the vicinity of the threat. When it comes to offensive power, states 
might simply realize that balancing is not an option. If the offensive power is rapidly increasing 
in the neighbourhood then bandwagoning is a viable option. As Walt states, “When offensive 
power permits rapid conquest, vulnerable states may see little hope in resisting. Balancing may 
seem unwise because one's allies may not be able to provide assistance quickly enough.” 182 
Finally, perception is an important factor, as states that appear threatening influence other states 
to balance. Offensive intention therefore leads to balancing behaviour. Walt sums up his theory 
of alliance formations and balancing with the following three points; states prefer to form 
alliances to balance rather than bandwagon, ideology is usually a weaker cause of alliance 
formation than interests, and only interests form alliances, although aid reinforces alliances, 
but rarely creates them in the first place. 183 The reason balancing is more visible than 
bandwagoning behaviour is simply because states according to neorealist theory are interested 
in survival. Compared to that, in a bandwagoning world, states act in a much more competitive 
manner. Walt states that bandwagoning usually occur among weaker states, because they are 
“more vulnerable to pressure” and because their resources are inconsequential. Also, 
bandwagoning occurs when allies are unavailable and when leaders believe that potentially 
threatening states can be successfully appeased. That is because great powers try and appear 
both strong and dangerous to attract other smaller alliance partners, which results in smaller 
states allying with the strongest or the most threatening states, which logically result in intense 
international rivalries. Since states do not usually want, nor do that, it is Walt’s theory that 
balancing behaviour is the norm. 184  
                                                             








Therefore, to summarize, the balancing behaviour of states that one can predict from alliance 
formations are distilled as follows. When there is a perceived existential threat, states usually 
align with other states to balance the threat, and the greater the threat, the greater the tendency 
to balance. More offensively oriented threats form more defensive coalitions against it, just as 
the perceived intentions of a state matters. If a perceived intention of a state is aggressive it 
results in more coalitions formed against it.  Predictions on balancing and bandwagoning 
behaviour are these; Balancing is usually more common than bandwagoning, stronger states 
tend to balance against threats, whereas weaker states may balance or choose to bandwagon 
based on availability of alliance support, the vicinity of the threat, and the perceived aggressive 
intention of the threat. During wartime, it is also observed that states bandwagon with the side 
winning the war. 
Often however, that leads to a Security Dilemma. 185 If a state is relatively strong, it could 
influence other states to build up its capabilities, which will in turn threaten the stronger nation, 
and will subsequently lead it to build up more capabilities. “If a nation is too strong, this can 
be provocative since most means of self-protection simultaneously menace others. On the other 
hand, if a nation is too weak, great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo 
powers are weak in capability or resolve. Thus, directly and indirectly, both strength and 
weakness can upset the balance of security in international relations.”186 For example, in a 
“Spiral Model” conflicts start when punishments are meted out with the expectation that it 
might reform or elicit better behaviour from the other power, which can also fail and elicit a 
more aggressive behaviour from the adversary. “Angered or frightened by the punishment, the 
other becomes more aggressive”, thereby militarizing more or becoming more willing to use 
force to defend them. 187In the “Deterrence model”, on the other hand, a conflict may arise 
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when appeasement influences the rival power to miscalculate, and it results in further threats 
and ultimately, a breakdown of deterrence. 188  
Finally, neorealists claim that power is a relative concept and that due to the anarchical nature 
of the international system any gain in power by one state is logically a threat to the other 
state. 189 Therefore, it is assumed that any potential exchange between states must exactly 
preserve the pre-existing balance of power (i.e., they focus on relative gains).190 According to 
Robert Powell, the cost of fighting can be deduced by the offense defence balance. Powell 
assumes that states seek to maximize their economic welfare. Joseph Grieco also contends that 
the structure of the international system and the relative nature of power forces political leaders 
to view the world in relative terms. 191 The hypothesis is that all states and leaders therefore 
prefer relative gains. 192 Cooperation usually collapses in the model when the use of force is at 
                                                             
 
188 Spiral model and deterrence model are both worthy explanations for conflict in defensive realism. Spiral 
model is used mostly in defensive realism, and deterrence model is more in line with offensive realism. The 
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further enquiry and empirical evidence. For further detailed discussion on these models, please refer to Jervis, R. 
(1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 3. 
 
189 Rousseau, David L. Relative or Absolute Gains: Beliefs and Behavior in International Politics (It is accepted 
that cooperation is rare in an international system characterised by anarchy “Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1948; 
Waltz 1979; 4 Mearsheimer 1994/5”) “Grieco (1988a, 1888b, 1990) has challenged the institutional theorists by 
claiming that they have not adopted all the central assumptions of realism. That is, state leaders will accept any 
accord that makes the state better off regardless of the gain achieved by any other state. However, power is by 
definition a relative concept (Dahl 1957). According to realists, any increase in power by the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War translated into a decrease in the power of the United States. Grieco argues that concern 
over relative gains greatly restricts the number of possible agreements because all gains must be distributed in a 
manner that exactly preserves the pre-existing balance of power. Realists assume that state leaders are primarily 
concerned with relative gains; liberal institutionalists claim that under many, but certainly not all circumstances, 
state leaders focus on absolute gains.” 
 
190 Ibid.  
 
191 “According to realists, states worry that today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy in war, and fear that 
achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe 
in the future. As a result states must give serious attention to the gains of partners (Grieco 1988a, 118; also see 
Waltz 1979, 105).” 
 
192 “Powell (1991) argues that if the cost of using military force is low, concern over relative gains will be 
heightened. For example, in a world in which offensive technology dominates defensive technology, wars tend 
to be quick and cheap. Powell contends that leaders in this era become very sensitive to small shifts in relative 
power and therefore focus on relative gains. In contrast, in a defence dominant world the importance of relative 
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issue, as consistent with a structural realist order. However, given that the cost of war is 
sufficiently high states realize that it is foolish to attempt an absolute gain, and cooperation 
again becomes possible, which is in line with neoliberal institutionalism. 193  
Neorealist assumptions about state behaviour 
To sum up, we get the following distilled set of assumptions and predictions about state 
behaviour from neorealism. The first assumption is states or powers interact with each other in 
an anarchic environment, which is a lack of hierarchy therefore with no authoritative 
overarching authority or ‘international policeman’. The second primary assumption is that 
powers are self-protecting and the systemic rule they follow is one of self-help.  Self-help in 
this sense means states or powers look and watch out for their own security and tend not to rely 
too much on other powers for their wellbeing, and state or power behaviour is mandated by 
what they perceive to be in their interest. The third assumption is that there is always an ever-
present threat to survival for every state, due to systemic anarchy, and lack of the 
aforementioned overarching authority. The fourth assumption explains that even though states 
are presently the notable component of the system, neorealist theory is essentially group-
centric. For example, a power could have been a kingdom, empire, states, or any other actors 
depending on the system in which their operating. It will not necessarily change the way the 
system behaves or constraints. Neorealists do not deny non state actors, as other variables; they 
simply do not consider them to be significant, considering their relative weakness to alter the 
system. 
The predictions regarding state behaviour are, in neorealism, states decide and act according to 
what they perceive in their external environment. According to neorealism, states tend to 
balance rather than bandwagon, even though bandwagoning happens occasionally. In times of 
weakness, states might choose to bandwagon, but in times of relative strength, it is likely that 
a state will choose to balance. Bandwagoning occurs when allies are unavailable, but when 
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hierarchy implementation of cooperation is difficult although not impossible, and secondly the system gives 
states options if they would want to use their relative gains for their own benefits, or to do harm on the 




there is someone to support materially or strategically, balancing is the norm. When a security 
dilemma gets intense, and when the states find preventive or pre-emptive wars more 
advantageous, offense takes priority. When a war is short, quicker, and decisive, wars are more 
common. States still, however, prefer relative gains, rather than absolute gains. 
This gives a template to judge Russian behaviour. How much did Russians perceive NATO to 
be a threat after 9/11, and how much did it intend to bandwagon with NATO? What influenced 
the intention of Russia, and how much of it was relative gains, while dealing with its own 
Islamist problems in the Caucasus, how much of offence-defence theory influenced the Russian 
short war with Georgia and why did Russia invade Ukraine and how much was the strategic 
interests like a naval port in Crimea, defensive terrain in Georgia, bases, supply chains and 
markets, in both Ukraine and Georgia, are among the cases to be studied in light of the 
abovementioned assumptions. 
Can Neorealism be employed as a theory of foreign policy? 
The theoretical question on which the thesis hinges, is whether neorealism can even be a theory 
of foreign policy, and a legitimate theoretical framework for the purpose of judging the 
behaviour of a great power. The short, accepted answer by scholars is yes, although it has been 
a topic of considerable debate. Waltz, himself expressed his doubts on the viability of his theory 
being used as a testable theory of foreign policy. According to him, what he designed was a 
theory of international politics, rather than a theory of foreign policy. Theory of International 
Politics, presents a systemic theory, as discussed earlier in the beginning of this chapter, which 
effectively means it can predict broad systemic patterns in world politics, rather than be 
employed as a theory of foreign policy of individual states.  
Waltz’s scepticism was twofold. He tried to limit his theory to a systemic theory of 
international politics and said it can only act as a theory of foreign policy when added with unit 
level variables. Secondly, Waltz argued, that despite the disclaimers, structural theory is 
sometimes judged as a theory of foreign policy and found wanting. Put simply, Waltz claimed, 
his theory is a theory of international politics, which is a systemic theory, where states act, 
regardless of their regime types, domestic or other unit level variables, and there are broad 
patterns visible.194 Waltz explained that the difference between the theory of international 
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survive. One of the main tasks of the theory is, then, to explain how variations in conditions external to states 
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politics which he formulated, with a generic theory of foreign policy would be similar to the 
distinction between a theory of macroeconomics and any theory of finance and firms. While 
the macroeconomic theories will predict broad generic patterns in the global economic market, 
a theory of firms will predict how an individual firm will operate in such a scenario. The two 
are complementary, but not the same. However, upon further scrutiny, this claim about non-
employability of neorealism as a theory of foreign policy, falls flat. Subsequent scholars 
including Walt, Fearon, Telhami and Elman discarded this non-employability argument.  
Colin Elman states four objections to neorealism being used as a theory of foreign policy.195 
The objections are as follows; that as a result of the internal logic of neorealist arguments fails 
to produce a single behavioural prediction; due to the interference of unit level variables, a 
single systemic behavioural prediction cannot be achieved; the theory is Darwinian and 
evolutionary, and therefore cannot be used predictively; the variables are too poorly 
conceptualised, making behavioural predictions difficult. 
Elman argues that international relations theories can make different type of predictions, 
irrespective of unit level variables, or the behaviours of all the units. So, the claim that a 
multipolar system will be less stable than a bipolar system, is a type of prediction, just as 
bandwagoning will lead to loss of autonomy is another type of prediction. Elman notes, that a 
neorealist theory can predict one, without predicting the other, for example, a neorealist theory 
can predict the outcome, without predicting the individual consequence. Simply put, in a 
situation wherein a security dilemma is increasing, a neorealist theory can predict, that an arms 
race will increase between two states, with or without predicting how an individual state in that 
situation will act, offensively or defensively. “While such a theory can also use predicted 
consequences as a basis for making behavioural predictions, it may be agnostic about which 
course of action the state will follow.” To be deemed as a theory of foreign policy, a theory 
needs to make behavioural predictions. 
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Elman states that although neorealism starts with a set of common assumptions, it might vary 
in secondary assumptions, and as a result the predictions might also vary. To simplify this 
statement, neorealists will agree that the system is anarchic, but might disagree on whether a 
state is revisionist, or a status quo power, and therefore employ different estimations. 
Consequently, it might predict different outcomes.196 However, that does not mean the 
predictions are not valid. Elman discards the criticism stating that while secondary assumptions 
might lead to different predictions, neorealism is still a “big tent” theory, and therefore as long 
as the predictions are compatible with the core tenets of the theory they will be regarded and 
considered as valid predictions about foreign policy. The criticism of a single, individual 
neorealist theory failing to provide a single prediction of state behaviour is also dealt with. All 
neorealists assume that states seek primarily to survive, however, they differ as to what strategy 
to employ in order to survive. Therefore, offensive realists prescribe a strategy of maximizing 
power gains; and defensive realists argue that minimizing power loss is a more prudent option. 
However, Elman states that such logical ambiguity is a result of poor specification of variables. 
To put it simply, this criticism is not a criticism of employability of neorealism as a theory of 
foreign policy but rather of the ambiguity of different neorealist theories coming out with 
different predictions, based on different assumptions and variables. 197 
An example of this is when neorealists differ on state motivations; even when the general 
consensus is that states primary motivation is to survive in an anarchic system, how to achieve 
that survival and the strategies employed as such might differ between an offensive realist and 
defensive realist. As a result, different neorealist theories might generate different distinct 
predictions, about state behaviours and outcomes. Elman states that the criticism of neorealist 
theory using domestic variables and therefore not being a theory of foreign policy is also 
flawed. Neorealist scholars have used domestic level variables, they have produced 
probabilistic theories which exclude domestic level variables, and analysed policy adding some 
domestic level variable. To give an example, Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory itself 
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uses variables like “offensive intention”. Other scholars like Waltz himself have used 
probabilistic predictions to explain actions by a state. Elman also states that Waltz himself is 
ambiguous about whether his theory employs a rational choice, or is based on evolutionary 
Darwinian logic, but Waltz in his later part of scholarship depended heavily on rational choice, 
and draws heavily on statesmen, being “sensitive to cost”, and thereby provides a platform of 
predictive behaviour. 198  
Stephen Walt adds that a theory, even when flawed is noted more when it has some form of 
foreign policy implication and has good prescriptive as well as predictive power. While 
maintaining that a theory primarily should be logically consistent and empirically valid, Walt 
mentions that a theory is also expected to rightly or wrongly have some form of explanatory 
power. A theory therefore is important as much as providing a causal connection, as well as 
explaining the said connection. Theories are therefore expected to provide patterns in 
perplexing phenomena. Walt exemplifies the theory of deterrence as one such theory, where it 
might seem counterintuitive to feel that a country might be safer if it can threaten a peer rival, 
but it is however proven to be so. Walt discards the notion that a theory needs to be perfect in 
predicting. He argues, ‘thus, a compelling yet flawed explanation for great power war or 
genocide is likely to command a larger place in the field’. 199 Fearon also agrees to this point 
stating, ‘But if a sparse and elegant theory manages to get some things mostly right, or often 
right, about some important dimensions of states’ foreign policies, this is a major achievement 
in social science’. 200 Waltz’s claim that a systemic theory cannot and is not a theory of foreign 
policy, was also disputed by Fearon. Fearon mentioned that any action that a structural theory 
seeks to explain, like balancing and bandwagoning, or the probability of a great power war, are 
either foreign policy choices and actions affecting foreign policy. Fearon argues, ‘When we 
say, “a theory of X,” we normally mean “a theory that explains the existence, occurrence, or 
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199 Walt, SM (2005) ‘The Relationship between theory and policy in IR’ Annual Review of Political Science, pg. 
23-48. 
 
200 Fearon, J.  D. (1998) ‘Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, pg. 289-313.   
67 
 
variation in X.” In this natural sense, then, systemic and neorealist theories emphatically are 
theories of foreign policy.’  Waltz argues that a systemic theory explains only political patterns, 
but as explained above, patterns lead to direct foreign policy choices and even when it is 
explaining tendencies and regularities; these are tendencies or regularities which result in direct 
foreign policy choices of states or their resulting effects. Therefore, even systemic theories 
have predictive value as theories of foreign policy, even when they are probabilistic and 
systemic in their predictions. Waltz’s counter of Elman’s thesis by stating systemic theories 
only explain how states behave in a systemic pattern is discarded by Fearon, who mentions that 
state behaviour is what falls under the core foreign policy assumptions, and therefore systemic 
theories are also foreign policy theories in its core sense. Telhami also states that even when 
structural realism is narrowly about outcomes in global aggregate behaviour, it is still a theory 
of foreign policy as it leads to predictions about the global behaviour of states. Neorealism 
explains the motives of states, and that in turn is what shapes its drive to attain security and 
relative power while pointing out the state’s motives. These motives then give a backdrop of 
the state’s foreign policy. According to Telhami, even by Waltz’s own narrow standards, 
simple assumptions of state behaviour, like self-preservation can be inferred. These inferences 
highlight and predicts some directions to how a state might behave, for example, when they 
are threatened, they might balance, or when relative economic and military balance is altered, 
it might influence new alignments among states. Also, when poles, superpowers, affect smaller 
states, some general foreign policy predictions can be safely made as to how the smaller states 
might react, as well as the relation between the powers and the poles can also be safely analysed 
and predicted. 201  
All these are broadly foreign policy predictions, and in all these situations, it is observed 
neorealism is successfully used as a theory of foreign policy. Telhami states that the theories 
of international politics even when systemic, can give us valuable insights in understanding 
how foreign policy of a state works. 202 While structural realism is essentially a theory of 
structures and international outcomes it can be used for inferring state behaviour, because 
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neorealism even in its systemic levels, explains the motives behind the behaviour of a particular 
state, which in turn helps us analyse the state’s foreign policy. 203  
To sum it all up, the biggest difference between using neorealism as Waltz visualised it and 
using neorealism as a theory of foreign policy is that Waltz thought to use this as a theory of 
international politics, which will only predict broad patterns. Over time, the basic ideas of that 
theory got modified, with some realists like Stephen Van Evera and Robert Jervis adding 
domestic and other unit level theories to modify its predictive power, other neorealists like 
Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, forming and expanding the neorealist theories to a more 
exhaustive theory which deals with specific aspects of state behaviour, like balancing and 
alliance formations for example. Considering the basic tenets of neorealism are similar, they 
can subsequently make very different predictions, due to the fact that they employ a substantial 
number of secondary assumptions which covers a wide range and are occasionally 
incompatible. What appears to be an internal logical ambiguity, is essentially different 
predictive results, due to different secondary assumptions. The logical ambiguity can either be 
cured by recognizing or adding more variables. Christensen and Snyder added variables from 
Jervis’s theory of a Security Dilemma to solve Waltz’s inability to analyse the causation of 
chainganging or buckpassing in a multipolar order. Elman noted that the fact that there can be 
different predictions due to different variable assumption does not necessarily mean that the 
theory can make no prediction at all. 
The accuracy of the prediction is not a debate here, the debate is if the theory of neorealism 
can be even used to predict state behaviour. Elman also states that firstly Waltz never practiced 
what he preached, himself making a number of specific foreign policy predictions. Secondly 
Waltz never critiqued other neorealists making such foreign policy predictions, notable 
examples being Stephen Walt, Barry Posen, and John Mearsheimer. 204  
Therefore, from the above discussion it can be argued that neorealism can be employed as a 
theory of foreign policy to analyse, determine, and predict both systemic patterns as well as 
individual state behaviour, and to prescribe policy in certain situations.  The theory of 
neorealism, which Waltz solidified on the platform of classical realism, took the primary tenets 
of anarchy as a lack of hierarchy in the global order, and a systemic structural theory to explain 
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the international politics. It is however, also understood, that the same theory of international 
politics might be safely used as a theory of foreign policy as well. It gives us a structure and 
the systemic constraints that come along with it, thereby helping us infer what tentative state 
behaviour might happen, which is essentially a measure of that state’s foreign policy. The 
theory also gives us various subsequent doctrines, with different set of variables, which also 
are used deductively to interpret and analyse various great power behaviours. While accepting 
the premise that there are unit level variables and domestic policy which might influence state 
behaviour, one can still safely reject the conclusion that the theory of neorealism is unsuitable 
to be employed as a theory of foreign policy and can be used to make both probabilistic and 
deterministic predictions based on individual cases. In fact, Waltz himself used it, in his last 
major analysis of the Iran Nuclear deal. 205 And I will attempt the same in this project when it 
comes to analysing recent Russian behaviour. 
The logic of balancing 
Thus far, this thesis outlined the basic tenets of realism as an international relations theory and 
argued that neorealism can be used as a testable theoretical framework to test foreign policy of 
a great power. This thesis rests on the organizing principle of balancing. In order to understand 
what that is, a brief explanation is necessary.  
The logic of balancing is canonical and accepted in every school of Realism.206 Hans 
Morgenthau explained that the simple logic of balance of power is to achieve equilibrium, 
which is not only inevitable but also essential as a stabilizing factor in international anarchy.207 
The periodic inability of achieving such equilibrium and balance in the international system is 
due to temporal conditions and peculiar factors, like hubris, miscalculations, and imperial 
overstretch, but over time, the equilibrium is achieved. The logic is predicated on the simple 
notion that the main actors, (empires, or modern nation states and great powers) seek to survive 
as independent entity, in the anarchical global system, and avoid becoming subservient to the 
will of an adversarial state or rival empires. Anarchy in turn, compels power consolidation, and 
often results in power imbalance and preponderance of an actor, or a coalition of actors. This 
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in turn leads to weaker states to flock together or align with bigger powers for their security. 
The strategies of balancing involve external balancing and internal balancing. External 
balancing is primarily the formation of alliances as coalitions, but also threats, redistribution 
of resources and on rare occasions, preventive wars. Great powers which are secure and capable 
with a preponderance of power often resort to external balancing. Internal balancing is simply, 
build-up of military capabilities and the economic and industrial foundations of military 
strength and comes from a position of defence. 208 In simpler terms, the balance of power is an 
arrangement of affairs so that no state shall be in a position to have absolute dominance over 
others.209 Michael Sheehan defined it as a system, which involves a particular distribution of 
power, within the system, that there’s no single state or alliance which possess an 
overwhelming and preponderant amount of power.210 Because hegemony is difficult to aspire, 
and even more difficult to achieve and continue, states, which are the primary actors in the 
international system, always find a way through alignments and alliances to balance the 
potential aggressor.211 
The rising hegemon or coalition often seek to eliminate threats from weaker rivals. Threatened 
states in turn could adopt different balancing strategies, whether internal balancing or build-up 
of military strength and capability and stronger defence, or external balancing, that is aligning 
with a bigger power against common threats. Balance of power theorists suggest that the power 
preponderance of a single state or of a coalition of states is highly undesirable as it usually 
leads to aggressive behaviour and hegemonic aspirations.212 By contrast, balance of power 
theorists suggest that peace is generally preserved when an equilibrium of power exists among 
great powers. 213  
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Ideally in a balanced state, or equilibrium, no single state or coalition possesses overwhelming 
power and incentive to wage war, as the power parity in an equilibrium prevents the idea of a 
quick or limited war and victory. Weaker actors usually flock together against a potential 
hegemon, or rapidly militarize and re-arm, to dissuade a potential hegemon from aggressive 
action. In a system, where there is no universal hegemon and there are various powers, some 
actors play the part of a balancer, by hedging for a weak state against a rising and strong 
adversary. For example, Britain balanced against Napoleonic hegemony by supporting 
Austrian and Prussian duchies and balanced against Imperial Germany as well as Nazi 
Germany by backing France. Winston Churchill explained this logic by stating famously that 
for five hundred years British foreign policy was primarily focused on opposing the strongest 
and most dominating power in continental Europe and join weaker powers to oppose a military 
tyrant.214 Similarly, during the Cold war, the United States exploited the Sino-Soviet rift. Henry 
Kissinger said it is always important to choose the weaker side in any balancing.215 As 
mentioned by Stephen Walt, the logic behind this is simple and two-fold. States can never be 
sure of an adversary’s intentions, so backing the stronger power could lead to the stronger 
power crushing the weaker one, and then turning on the balancer. Secondly, supporting the 
weaker state against a stronger rising threat implies future influence and say in the affairs of 
the weaker state.216  
Neorealists developed the logic of balance of power further, as Kenneth Waltz said that 
balancing is a sensible behaviour as the victory of one coalition over another leaves weaker 
members of the winning coalition at the mercy of the stronger one.217 Waltz predicted that 
states engage in balancing behaviour anyway, regardless of whether the balance is achieved. 
States according to Waltz are fixated on survival and stability, therefore it does not matter if 
the balance once achieved will be maintained, but what matters is states constantly will seek to 
balance and restore equilibrium.  While Waltz maintains that states should not try to pursue 
hegemony, because it goes against the logic of rational behaviour in a systemic theory, the 
logic being, the moment one state will seek hegemony, and the other states will be forced to 
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choose to balance against the rising hegemon. He also argues that despite that, sometimes states 
do seek hegemony and end up being balanced by other states or being punished by the system, 
overreaches and perishes, examples being Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan, as well as 
Nazi Germany. ‘The first concern of states’, he maintains, ‘is not to maximize power, but to 
maintain their positions in the system.’218 Of course, as mentioned above and earlier, balance 
of power often fails, due to various factors, hubris, or expansionism, or overstretch, but since 
the system is Darwinian, the aggressor is often balanced or in extreme circumstances, punished 
by rival coalitions.   
In sum, a balance of power is a natural equilibrium, as the international system is one of 
anarchy, and power and actors who aspire for hegemony begs to be balanced. 219 The logical 
argument for Moscow would be to balance against powers, whenever it feels relatively inferior 
to a peer-rival, to ensure stability and equilibrium. If Moscow feels comparatively weaker 
compared to any rival power, great powers or alliance networks alike, Moscow would 
compulsively resort to either external or internal balancing. The balancing would be 
omnidirectional, and observable against any peer rival. Russia, according to this logic, would 
balance against China, United States, NATO, EU, or any power which seems to threaten 
Moscow’s position in the balance of power.  
The logic of balance of power provides us with the broad understanding of how states behave 
in an overarching system, even when it falls short in predicting or explaining specifics of 
foreign policy, or the variables which influence cooperative or competitive behaviour. 
Naturally, it does not help us with any particular set of predictions, regarding balancing 
behaviour. These simple hypotheses focus on the overarching threat of hegemony over the 
system. But by that logic, Moscow’s balancing should be equally observable against both 
China, as well as the West. Second, states react to threats even when the threat is not from a 
potential hegemon, but also from aggressors and states which are deemed threatening. Simple 
balance of power hypothesis is therefore limited in its explanatory power, as it does not go into 
details with regards to whether states display balancing behaviour only the strongest power or 
against threats as well. In that regard, Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory, is a modification 
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to the balance of power logic explained above and gives a fuller picture and is therefore the 
theoretical framework employed to study the cases, in this thesis.  
Balancing against Threats 
Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory, which is used in this thesis, adheres to the basic 
realist assumption that states dwell in an international anarchy, which follows and assumes the 
primary realist tenet that there is no hierarchy in the international system and no central agency 
or institution to act as a global police force. 220 The ultimate aim of a state in such a system is 
survival and security. 221 States usually do not act aggressively and try to maximise power, but 
rather maximise security.222 The distinction is important here, as Offensive realists argue that 
states maximise security by maximizing their relative power, whereas Defensive realists, 
including Walt, argues that states simply maximise security, or simply to maintain their 
position in the balance, or upholding the status quo. An offensive realist power would try and 
maximise its relative power and would take advantage of anarchy to increase its relative power. 
A defensive realist power would simply return to, or uphold the status quo, as long as it is 
satisfied with the threat perception. 223 
Foreign policy decisions, as a result, naturally rely upon the perceived threat environment. 
Balance of Threat theory here acts as a modification of the standard balance of power logic in 
realism. While the balance of power theory suggests that states balance against power, and 
therefore respond to changes in the distribution of capabilities, Walt suggests that the logic 
lacks an explanation in answering the question as to when states balance against their 
adversaries, and when states bandwagon with a stronger rival.224 Facing a significant external 
threat, great powers choose to either “balance” or “bandwagon.” Balancing is defined by Walt 
as allying with other powers against the greater threat, whereas bandwagoning refers to 
aligning with the source of danger. 225 Walt theorizes that balancing behaviour is much more 
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common than bandwagoning, simply because bandwagoning tends to reward the belligerent 
behaviour of great powers and leaves smaller powers at the mercy of the greater threat. Walt 
further states that powers are inclined to use force if they assume that others will be unlikely to 
balance against them. The conditions favouring either balancing or bandwagoning, are 
dimensions of threat, the availability of allies, and the security climate. Weaker states are more 
likely to bandwagon rather than balance. That is because weak states can do little to alter the 
hegemonic ambition of a greater threat and might choose to bandwagon. Stronger states, in 
contrast can take the risk of balancing. Secondly, Walt argues that states will choose to 
bandwagon more if there are no allies available.226 If there are, they might pursue balancing 
behaviour. Finally, Walt argues that states balance more during peacetime when the survival 
of the nation is not at stake. In wartime, more bandwagoning behaviour is visible, especially 
among weaker states, as states sometimes take fewer risks and/or choose to tactically align with 
the winning and aggressor power.227 
Unpacking the abovementioned hypotheses, gives us some key assumptions, and indicates 
some key behavioural patterns. Walt argues that states do not balance against power alone, but 
against threats, and the following key factors, aggregate power, geographical proximity, 
offensive military power, and offensive intentions, affect state behaviour. 228 Accordingly, 
states actually respond to perceived threats, which are a combination of different factors. First, 
“aggregate power”, or the power to compel adversaries, which depends on the combination the 
state’s total resources which include population, industrial and military capabilities, affect such 
perception. Walt suggests that the greater the aggregate power, the greater is the threat 
perceived by a peer rival. An example of how aggregate power shapes the foreign policy of a 
state is shown by Walt in the example of George Kennan and Walter Lipmann’s suggestions, 
who defined what US grand strategy would be in the early days of Cold war.229 According to 
Kennan and Lipmann, the aim of US grand strategy should be to continue that US aggregate 
power be superior to the total industrial resources of any peer rival in the entire Eurasian 
landmass. In practical terms, that means the US would ally against the state which was poised 
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to dominate Eurasia. Similarly, British grand strategy from Lord Castlereagh to Sir Edward 
Grey justified the concern for aggregate power across Europe and to intervene whenever that 
balance appears to be lost. 230 
Second, “geographic proximity”. Walt states that the ability to project power declines with 
distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away. 231 States are 
more threatened, if the threat originates nearby than faraway, especially if not separated by 
buffer states or high seas. Walt draws examples from British balancing against Germany and 
American interventions in Latin America.232 Germany and Japan started growing to a great 
power and armament program around the same time, during the late 19th century, but the fact 
that British balancing behaviour was towards Germany and not Japan, was influenced by 
German proximity and perceived threat. Similarly, American interference in Latin America 
against Marxist regimes during the Cold war was influenced by a similar line of thinking. 
Geographic proximity influences threat perception. Alternatively, it also explains the 
phenomena of spheres of influences. Sometime when a small state feels threatened by a great 
power and expects no help from other great powers further away, it chooses to bandwagon 
rather than balance the threat, purely to survive, which results in the formation of a sphere of 
influence. 233 
Third, “offensive power”, which is somewhat related to aggregate power, in the sense, if a state 
is more powerful it is supposed to invite a balancing alliance against it. Offensive power is, 
however, different from aggregate power. More specifically it means the ability to threaten the 
territorial integrity or sovereignty of a state at an acceptable cost. In simpler terms, the 
implication is that when a state views the threatening rival’s offensive power to be 
overwhelming, there are chances of bandwagoning, otherwise states balance. For example, 
prior to the first world war, heavy German armament forced Britain to bolster her own naval 
fleet in an internal balancing action, whereas the same action forced other European powers to 
consider accommodating German potential hegemony, as resistance was seemingly futile.234 
                                                             











This, Walt states is another reason why “spheres of influence” emerge, as great powers like 
buffer zones, and smaller weaker states usually bandwagon with a threatening neighbouring 
great power. 235 
Fourth, “offensive intention”. The perception of intent greatly influences alliance choices. A 
powerful state with a benevolent intent might not be considered threatening, as Germany under 
Bismarck, maintained the necessary equilibrium.236 However, after Bismarck, the continuous 
and increasing German aggressive intentions helped start the Triple Entente. If a state is 
believed from its actions as unusually aggressive, then the potential target state will seek to 
actively redress the threat intent, by balancing or bandwagoning actions. 237Walt explains this 
by showing how the combination of aggregate power, geographic proximity and the perception 
of offensive intention caused Western European states to balance against Soviet Union but not 
United States.238 Walt’s theory therefore suggest that states are reactive and not assertive, and 
that states do not just balance against powerful states; rather, they balance 
against threatening states.  
Walt further states some hypotheses with regards to state behaviour based on these 
assumptions, as simple state behavioural patterns can be deducted. Since states balance based 
on threats, naturally the greater the aggregate power, the greater the chance of a state to balance 
against the powerful state.239 However, if a state is further away, as geographical proximity is 
a factor in the perception of power, states will likely balance more if the threatening power is 
nearer. A strong state will also likely balance against a near peer rival, which is superior, but 
depending on other factors. While states are attracted to strength which is why bandwagoning 
occurs, usually, the greater the perceived threat, the greater the chances that states will seek a 
balancing behaviour. 240Walt states that balancing behaviour has historically been more 
common than bandwagoning behaviour. The reasoning for this is simple. In a bandwagoning 
world, the smaller power which seeks to bandwagon with the greater more threatening power, 
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will essentially have to depend on the well-meaning and mercy of the bigger power. Walt notes 
that both Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany underestimated and miscalculated the cost of 
aggression as they believed states will bandwagon to power alone, when states started to 
balance against them, due to their hegemonic intention.241 Since states can never be sure of 
another great power’s intention, they tend to balance more than bandwagon. Bandwagoning 
increases the chance of a power becoming more threatening. Because perceptions in the best 
circumstances are unreliable, balancing behaviour is more common. The second hypothesis is 
that the weaker the state, related to the strength of the peer rival, and the threatened aggressive 
intention, the more chances of a bandwagon than a balance. The reason is when the weaker 
state realizes that it will not be able to anything to affect the outcome, it chooses to bandwagon 
rather than balance. The interest of the weaker state lies in its immediate periphery. Third, 
states usually bandwagon when there are no available allies. This is not just a tautological 
statement. Walt explains that it indicates how states when they feel lonely in the international 
arena, and have no choice of any balancing alignment, tend to bandwagon with the bigger 
threatening power.242 For example, the Shah of Persia bandwagoned with Russia as the British 
empire withdrew from Afghanistan. Finally, during peacetime, there is a tendency to balance. 
But during certain war, or imminent conflict, and when the outcome seems almost certain, there 
is a tendency to bandwagon more. During wartime, weaker states are tempted to defect and 
join the winning side. Bandwagoning occurs usually in those times. For example, both 
Romania and Bulgaria initially aligned with Nazi Germany, and then joined the Allies during 
the latter part of the war.  
To summarize, the hypothesis of when states balance and when states bandwagon, Walt 
outlines the following.243 In general form, in peacetime, states when they face a threatening 
power, tend to balance against that power. The greater the power of the threatening state, the 
faster the balancing behaviour and the greater the offensive capabilities and aggressive 
intentions, the more the chances of a balancing behaviour from rival powers. However, two 
significant changes occur, when the threatening state is a lot more powerful, the outcome of 
belligerence is predetermined, and when there are not many allies to tactically align with, 
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bandwagoning behaviour might be the behaviour seen. Walt mentions that from these general 
hypotheses, we can conclude, that in general balancing behaviour is more common and more 
predictable and natural than bandwagoning behaviour. 
Considering the abovementioned assumptions, logically Russia would balance against threats 
and not powers, and not bandwagon with threats. Russian threat perceptions would be 
dependent on aggregate power, and offensive capabilities, as well as perceived offensive 
intentions. The greater the perceived threat, the greater the balancing action observable. And if 
Russia is a defensive realist power, acting per Balance of Threat theory, then Moscow would 
act as a security maximiser. Moscow would take all necessary balancing actions, as long as the 
threat remains, and would resort to upholding the status quo, where Moscow is the dominant 
player in the balance. Lacking a perceived threat, or when the threat is neutralised according to 
Russia, Moscow would move back to a status quo position. Moscow would not take advantage 
and press on with any balancing or aggression as long as it is satisfied the perceived threat is 
neutralised.  
External factors influencing threat perceptions 
While we have an idea how states might or might not react while facing a threat, there are some 
other minor factors which influences state behaviour. Individually these factors are often not 
enough to tilt great power behaviour but combined with the threat posed by a rival power or 
alliance, these factors become important in predicting behavioural patterns. Walt highlights 
three factors, ideology, foreign aid, and transnational penetration, and the hypothesis for each, 
which are described below.  244 
Ideological solidarity is often considered to be one of the bases of alliance formations. Liberals 
especially think sharing political and cultural traits allows or compels states to align together. 
Democratic Peace Theory, or the fact that Liberal Democratic states usually do not clash or go 
to war with each other, is one key example of such line of argument. Walt admits that ideology 
is a factor, but states that it comes secondary to other more strategic interests, and it never 
forms a solid bond necessary for alliances.245 While ideological solidarity is important in 
alliance and balancing behaviour, security considerations take precedence over ideological 
preferences, and often ideology-based alliances falter, when security interests differ. The Sino 
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Soviet rift is one major example, when geostrategic and territorial interests in Asia prevailed 
over communist solidarity.246 Walt postulates, that states will follow ideological preference as 
long as they are secure and not threatened, and when faced with danger will take whatever 
allies they get. 247 In sum, security considerations take precedence, over ideology, and 
ideological alliances survive longer when interests align.  
Similarly, Walt explores foreign aid and transnational penetration as other minor factors that 
influence alliance behaviour.248 It is regarded that foreign aid creates effective allies, because 
it communicates favourable intention, as well as evokes gratitude that the recipient is in debt 
of the donor. Walt states that while it is true, it is more complicated. The dependence of the 
recipient is a factor in establishing how much the alliance will be on solid grounds. For 
example, if the client state faces immediate threat and the donor state is secured, then the 
importance of the latter increases with the former. Similarly, Walt terms transnational 
penetration as a factor determining balancing behaviour. Transnational penetration can be 
either public officials with divided loyalties, or foreign lobbyists altering public perceptions, 
or foreign propaganda. Such penetration according to Walt is more effective against open 
societies than closed societies. Walt states that the greater one state’s access to the political 
system of the other one, the greater the tendency of these two to ally.249 Therefore, if there is 
more communication between two states the chances of rivalry decrease. Alternately, the more 
closed a state gets, the chances of alliance decreases and balancing increases. Penetration is 
also more effective when objectives are limited. 250 
 
Revolutions in the neighbourhood and heightened security competition 
Finally, Walt utilizes his balance of threat theory to explain how revolutions affect the 
international system, and how it might lead to heightened security competition and increased 
threat perceptions. The reason why this is important to outline, is because it is a model of the 
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utilisation of balance of threat theory, as an explanatory theory of revolution, and will help us 
explore Russia’s behaviour with regards to the colour revolutions in its neighbourhood. Walt 
uses the balance of threat theory and states that the foreign policy decision of a state is 
dependent on the perception of the external security environment of the state. 251 The level of 
threat is affected by the changing balance, as the incentive for a state to use force against its 
adversaries increases when the state is weak. In other words, weak states invite aggression. 
Walt states that revolutions are serious games which result in the shake-up of the whole system 
and the region. In two ways, revolution can shake up the security environment. First, as a result 
of a revolution, an aggressor state can might sense the weakness of the revolutionary state, and 
in turn choose to attack the state which was toppled by the revolution.252 That is 
straightforward, and it usually results in territorial annexation and war. Second, when a power 
becomes concerned about a revolution in a neighbouring country, or its sphere of influence, or 
an allied state, it seeks to improve its own position, as it is concerned that a rival power will 
take advantage, either to obtain the spoils, or to prevent a rival power from staking out a claim. 
It results in a heightened security dilemma spiral, inviting powers which essentially have no 
stake in the fray. 253 
A revolution, in this case can mean a sudden shift in a regime, and the old ruling elite replaced 
by a new ruling elite, which could be either by violence or peaceful overthrow. Revolutions in 
the neighbourhood can cause major short-term disruptions, like a shift in the balance of power, 
international alignments, and inviting opportunities for other states to improve their position. 
A revolution changes the internal dynamics of a state, and leaves it weakened. Revolutionary 
elites are often poorly prepared to run a government, or manage diplomacy, and old regime 
members either flee, instigating reaction from abroad, or are purged.  
Four changes occur in the system due to a revolution. First, a revolution brings to power a 
regime which is opposed mostly to the old regime, which results in states allied to the old 
regime becoming naturally suspicious and even antagonistic. Neighbouring states, and great 
powers, especially the ones allied to the old regime views the disruption and changes as 
potentially destabilizing and dangerous to their own interests and stability. Second, any further 
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action of the revolutionary state exacerbates the security dynamic in the region. A revolutionary 
regime is unsure of the other state’s intentions, and simply because it has no direct experience 
of dealing with such a situation, essentially acts or takes steps which exacerbates the situation. 
The revolutionary state also inevitably falls back and relies on ideology, thereby blaming every 
other allies of the old regime as naturally hostile to the new regime. Revolutionary regimes 
also harbour suspicion based on historical animosity, and the chances of small diplomatic 
disturbance leads to broader ramifications. Revolutionary regimes also assume the worst in 
other great powers and former states which were allies to the previous regime and interpret 
ambiguous or inconsistent policies as hostile. Third, the former allies of the previous regimes 
and adversarial great powers are also almost certainly sure to be ambiguous at this stage as they 
do not know how to respond to the revolutionary regime and or know their intention. The elites 
of both the revolutionary regime, as well as the deposed regime and the great powers exaggerate 
the threat emanating from the other side. The revolutionary regime tries to exploit the threat to 
rally for nationalist or ideological causes and justify harsh measures.  
Finally, and most importantly, foreign powers contribute to the spiral of conflict and hostility. 
As revolutionary states emphasize on past injustices, foreign interference leads to a breakdown 
of communication and a negative spiral. Foreign powers also inevitably intervene the moment 
a new regime’s domestic program is supposed to affect their interests. While revolutionary 
states are inherently weak and insecure, they try to portray strength within often aggressively, 
which affect the strategic interests of other powers. Revolutionary states also overreact to threat 
disproportionately, simultaneously acting overconfident and insecure, and giving mixed 
signals to rival powers. The revolutionary state feeling vulnerable often overreacts, which can 
encourage balancing behaviour, in different powers. Powers opposing the revolutionary regime 
might feel that the revolutionary state wants to expand, as they are weak, and the only means 
to expand is to export the revolution and encourage it in neighbouring states.  
A revolution in the neighbourhood, therefore, creates the perfect situation to test a balance of 
threat theory, and creates the perfect conditions when a great power can feel threatened, without 
any active hostility from other powers. All the above-mentioned factors boil down to the fact 
that a great power watching a revolution unfold, is not sure of the intentions of the state where 
the revolution is happening, or other powers which might take advantage of the situation, 
thereby creating a perfect security dilemma. A revolution encourages all concerning parties to 
believe that the other presents a grave threat and alter the sense of reality and increase the 
perception of threat. Furthermore, these perceptions naturally encourage third parties to step in 
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or intervene, either to eliminate potential threats or to gain an upper hand over strategic regional 
rival. In simpler terms, a revolutionary state provides the ideal situation for a security dilemma.  
 
Methodology 
Determining causal influence is always difficult, especially in a time-barred project, where 
first-hand accounts are scarce especially when the subject of study is an authoritarian great 
power. The applicable methods are mostly mixed methods, which employ both process tracing, 
and case studies, with cross-process counterfactuals. Theoretical studies that this thesis draws 
upon, are remarkably light on their methodology section as well as data collection methods. 
That is because the security studies subfield of International Relations, under which this thesis 
belongs, are not historical projects, nor are they similar to other political science or history 
projects. They are more a hybrid of history and international relations, where studies mostly 
are drawn on established historical studies to derive theoretical assessments or refutations, or 
to find historical patterns of narratives, instead of in-depth area studies with primary sources. 
254  
Neither Walt’s book The Origins of Alliances, or his book on Revolution and War devotes too 
much time in discussing the data collection methods.255 Jack Snyder’s Myths of Empire uses 
process tracing but is also light on which documents it uses as data. In that regard, these works 
on which my thesis is based are light on their methodology part and are mostly broad brush. 
However, it is observed, that the authors rely on secondary sources such as established research 
papers, as well as a handful of primary source materials like archival methods for their studies.  
There are serious and enduring epistemological and methodological differences between the 
various disciplines, and there are reasons why the traditions are different and have significant 
individual distinctions. E H Carr argued that construction of historical knowledge is in itself a 
social process, where various contexts are studied to produce one historical 
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knowledge.256 Carr, for example, saw that historical knowledge in itself dilutes the 
understanding of interpretations, and rather present facts to be studied from various sources. 
Scholarship is then dependent on those facts. Historians are therefore fine process tracers and 
are proficient in sequencing events. Social scientists, especially in the security studies subfield, 
on the other hand derive connections within historical events.   
Security Studies in International Relations therefore rely on historical events, to build 
narratives, and document observable patterns. Recent scholarly works demonstrate a similar 
methodology, of pattern recognition from various historical events, mostly for either theory 
building, or theory testing. They are also mostly reliant on case study methods. As Bennett and 
Elman wrote, qualitative case studies methods have considerable advantage in studying 
complex phenomena and finding patterns for theory testing purposes.257 Most prominent 
studies involving war and great powers often involve various structural and agent-based 
variables, a lot of which rely on secondary sources and interpretations. A lot of those involve 
agents with strong incentives to bluff or deceive other actors. A case study therefore has 
characteristic strength in negating some of those issues with a combination of observational 
methods and interpretations based on established scholarly literature.  
Case study method, in security studies subfield is therefore accepted with the caveat that the 
data will be reliant on accepted interpretations. 258 That should not raise questions on the 
validity of the project, simply because the project is a theoretical study, which relies on 
historical interpretations to make a theoretical case. The data by definition is assessed and 
corroborated alongside observable evidence. For example, if Russian troops move out of a 
region, or return to status quo ante, while there were opportunities to advance further, the 
inference from that can be clear, as a sign of Russian retrenchment, or at least a proof of Russian 
disengagement, or intentional pullback. Now, whether that is due to structural causes, or 
ideational causes is irrelevant, to the purpose of a thesis which seeks to understand an event in 
grand strategic terms. If again the Russian troops are pulled back, and that is corroborated with 
a desired intention in a military journal, or a statement by someone in the upper echelons of the 
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Russian military or civilian chain of command, then that can be considered further evidence in 
proving or disproving a hypothesis.  
A challenge and criticism of such method is that it can lead to atheoretical and disjointed 
studies. However, as previous similar studies showed, there is a way to go around that problem. 
As Elman noted, combining cross-case and cross-time comparison can help a research design 
generate considerable inferential leverage. 259 That helps in time barred situations. For a single 
case, two different outcomes, coming from similar situations, can be studied, against one 
another, over a single time period, or across various time zones.  
Stephen Walt’s Revolution and War uses this research design, where Walt studied why states 
undergo a revolution, often after a war. Walt studied the foreign policies before and after they 
underwent revolutions, in turn to study how revolution affected foreign policy. Elaborating that 
individual case to a broader project, Walt compared across revolutionary states to see then 
which instances had similar reactions, and which did not, and what variables were present or 
absent. The study allowed Walt to have various comparisons, by studying three cases in details. 
Another such example is Randall Schweller’s Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on 
the Balance of Power, which studied balance of interests, in three different cases, across 
different timelines. All these studies replied on secondary literature as established historical 
analyses, to understand and elaborate on a more theoretical understanding of causality. As 
Elman et al argues, “One example of conceptual development following from detailed 
knowledge of cases is how IR scholars have spent considerable effort debating the ways in 
which states generate military power and then how changes in relative power influence foreign 
policy choices and international political outcomes. Qualitative IR scholars, mainly political 
realists and their critics, have addressed various parts of this research. Collectively, these 
scholars have developed more complete theoretical accounts covering and connecting the ways 
in which states produce and react to power.” 260 
Case study methods are also conclusive, as various individual cases make up different parts of 
the study to form a conclusive whole, which would otherwise make no sense. Causation, is 
established through causal mechanisms in various hypotheses, none of which are similar, or 
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directly comparable. One case for example, can be a broad study across time, and the other 
case can be a detailed study of a place or region. Only taken together, they may allow analysts 
to draw conclusions about whether the analyses are adequately explanatory. Case study 
methods can be both inductive or deductive, for both theory building and theory testing. Case 
study methods in inductive research might have various cases, studied to find a single theory. 
Conversely, in a deductive study, such as this thesis, a theory is already in place, which is then 
tested alongside various cases, to see if the theory accurately explains the case.  
Likewise, this thesis employs a positivist, qualitative and deductive approach of case study 
research. 261 Qualitative methods have been equally important in IR subfield as quantitative 
approaches, and every major program in the IR subfield has benefited from the application of 
case study methods. As Bennet and Elman notes, “Qualitative approaches, especially the 
intensive study of one or a few cases, allow for the development of differentiated and more 
closely focused concepts.” 262 
The central data collecting approach employed in this thesis is qualitative. Case study methods 
rely heavily on comparative case studies of cases which are relatively similar, as a way of 
evaluating claims about causal processes. The two-sensible way of avoiding the allegation of 
selection bias is to firstly select cases that best serve the purpose of the inquiry, and second, to 
select cases which maximise the strength and number of tests for the theories and hypotheses. 
While in depth single case studies offer strong studies of single events, a more comparative 
method is applied in a systematic analysis of a small number of cases, to test competing 
hypotheses or theories. It also helps in a controlled, structured, and focused analysis, especially 
in the field of security studies. Theories, according to Walt and Mearsheimer, should mirror 
reality. 263 The ways of theory testing include covariation, and process tracing. 264 Covariation 
is where tests determine if the hypothesised cause is present, but also to see whether the 
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outcome is different when the cause is absent. 265 In process tracing, the aim is to determine, if 
the predictions of the theory are applicable by checking if the causal mechanisms are similar 
to the manner it depicts. 266 Process tracing indicates that if A leads to B, there would be 
evidence from A to B, and it would be possible to collect and gather evidence from the cause 
to the effect. 267  
There is, however, data limitation when it comes to research on Russia, especially on Russian 
foreign policy.268 While it is easier than Soviet times, archival research as well as process 
tracing is difficult, simply because archives and evidence are difficult to access. A scope and 
time limitation of PhD thesis also does not allow for a longer period of detailed process tracing. 
That said, process tracing will be used in parts, whenever necessary. Process tracing can 
involve both inductive and deductive study of events and sequences within a case, as Elman 
notes, and depending on the theory being tested, exploring intervening events within a case 
leads to finding if the theory is an accurate explanation of the case. 269 
Previous research which relies on testing balance of threat, like those mentioned above, are 
also somewhat light on methodology.270 But those studies include secondary sources which 
already researched actions and particular state behaviours, with the theory. This thesis will 
mostly rely on secondary sources, of already research that is done on the cases I seek to explore. 
A key data source for this thesis is the collation and analysis of documents related to the 
Russian relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and NATO. These are already readily available 
secondary sources, including policy papers and their analysis, as well as research papers 
analysing specific phases which will be studied. Secondary source documents that are available 
in online archives will be studied. Primary sources like available online Kremlin archives, 
Russian defence doctrine papers and other white papers, will also be studied, when required 
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per the need of the thesis. Documents such as newspaper articles, think tank reports and specific 
policy-focused scholarly literature will be thematically analysed. The thesis will employ a 
study of collected and archived analysis which aims to rigorously interpret a range of 
documentation to analyse the variables affecting the behaviour of Russia.  
There are three potential methodological and conceptual barriers and limitations which I faced, 
and which I tried to neutralize, and the rest I justify here. None of them are opposed to the 
overall thesis findings and make this project invalid. But all of them need to be addressed. 
While I have discussed the methodology, the one issue which stands out is the quality of 
evidence studied. For example, a statement by Vladimir Putin, or Sergei Lavrov might be 
targeted for domestic consumption or international consumption, it is difficult to understand 
the intention behind the rhetoric. No analyst or scholar can justify and guarantee that much 
objectivity. Overall, any historical analysis and research takes statements at face value, and 
considers them to be reliable, and to question intention behind each and every sentence of any 
political written or oral statement, will start discussions that will never be satisfactorily solved 
in this thesis, or lifetime. The reliability of a rhetoric is always therefore a cause of concern for 
any research project.  
This thesis attempts to bypass that problem by relying on “observed” evidence. This is not an 
“area studies” project. Most of the evidence studied are secondary sources, which are then 
connected with news and other available resources to primarily infer, and then construct, a 
historical argument, which corroborates the theoretical questions at hand. For the most part of 
research, whether it is Russian balancing actions or lack thereof after a specific phase of NATO 
enlargement, or Russian military operational procedure in Georgia, or the details of the logistics 
and supply chains of Russian military in Eastern Ukraine, are based on observable evidence, 
news, secondary scholarship, and military literature, and any political rhetoric so much that it 
is even used, are only there to add extra weight to an argument. The central arguments of this 
thesis hang and falls on the question of Russian actions, and not political rhetoric or military 
literature, and from what has been studied so far, the conclusion will not change either way.  
Second, this thesis might be accused of being Euro-centric. That is a fair point and acceptable 
argument. The question why China, for example, is not studied as a case, is discussed in details 
in this thesis. The simple reason is this. For the purpose of this thesis, two requirements needed 
to be fulfilled; one, a need for a state or alliance, which is considered a strategic threat in 
Moscow, and two, against whom Russia has displayed both aggressive balancing behaviour or 
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military aggression, as well as periods of cooperation and rapprochement. Ukraine and 
Georgia, as well as NATO falls under that category, as well as avoids selection bias, one being 
an institution and two nation states. China fails to meet those criteria. 
The only other case, which could have supplemented or used instead of any of my cases, is 
Syria. While Syria itself was not considered a threat by Moscow, Russia nevertheless 
intervened in Syria, clearly feeling threatened from something, whether it was a worry of losing 
a warm water naval port in the Mediterranean, or the threat of another client state and friendly 
regime toppled, or the threat of jihadists originating from Russia. Those are valid lines of 
academic enquiry, and quite possibly supplement the findings of this research. That being said, 
this project can be called Euro-centric research. That does not diminish the value of this 
research, or its applicability in policy formulations in the Euro-Atlantic statecraft, given the 
retrenchment tendencies in the UK and the US, as well as the push for further fiscal and military 
consolidation of European Union, which will inevitably lead it to a potential competition with 
Russia. It also leaves option for further research, to replicate the findings in other parts of the 
globe, or with other great power. The thesis, while focused on a specific geographical region, 
still remains externally valid and generalizable. 
Finally, this thesis does not claim to answer all theoretical questions. The intention of the thesis 
was to provide a theoretical understanding of Russian foreign policy, simply because no such 
attempt has been made, with multiple cases, over a given period of time, under different 
Russian regimes and leadership. At the time of writing this thesis, there are two conflicts Russia 
is involved in, in Syria, and Ukraine, with the United States reneging on INF treaty, and 
possibly the START treaty as well, there are protests going on in Moscow, and NATO is 
increasing funding under constant pressure from Washington DC. 
Like Walt himself wrote in the opening of The Origins of Alliances, I am also primarily relying 
on secondary sources in investigating a theory rather than building one, and the assessment is 
based on the scholarship provided by the area specialists and military theorists. Within the time 
frame or this thesis, and limitations of durability, funding, and primary source research, I have 
tried as best as I could to provide a study which somewhat helps in answering certain broad 
theoretical questions and help formulate policy. The aim of this thesis is not to provide a 
definitive history of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, or even my own magnum opus, but 
rather to test a theory to see if Russia can be termed as a realist power, which in turn will help 
Western policy makers to decide and debate on a future grand strategy moving forward. 
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That realism is not just a grand-theory of international relations, and that it can be used as a 
theory of foreign policy to study particular states and great powers, and there are theories within 
the framework of realism, which could be used to explore foreign policy behaviour of a state 
or a great power, has already been discussed in detail. I highlighted that I chose the theory of 
Balance of Threat to understand Russian phases of cooperative and antagonistic behaviour. 
Balance of threat was chosen because as discussed above, it gives a broader spectrum of causal 
variables, that includes structural factors like aggregate power, territorial integrity, industrial 
and military capabilities, which might constitute as threat to a country, as well as factors like 
offensive intention of a state or alliance.  
Walt used his theory to study alliance formations and balancing behaviour in the Middle East, 
and came to the conclusion that nation-states balance against the most threatening state rather 
than the most powerful state. 271 The theory was further tested in other studies testing alliance 
behaviour and threat perceptions in Middle East.272 Recently, Bock et al explored the Ukrainian 
crisis, which was at the time of the study still in its nascent state, through the lens of balance 
of threat.  273 In all these studies, two factors were explored, namely, the source and the intensity 
of the threat, and how it affects the behaviour of the state or great power. The reaction of the 
dependent variable was studied, and documents and policy briefs, as well speeches were used 
as evidence. I try to use that template for this thesis.  
The theory explored above gives an idea of what might constitute a threat for a great power. 
The challenge is to distil the assumptions and form testable predictions to see if Russian 
behaviour attests to the theory, and to find suitable cases to explore the theory. The logic of 
balance of threat suggests that Russia balances against threats and not just other powers. So, 
the logical question that comes are, what then are perceivable threats for Russia, and if Russia 
reacts as per the theory suggests when the threats increase, and accordingly, when the threats 
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decrease? Second, when Russia does not react in the way, a great power is supposed to in the 
face of a threat, is that due to the absence of one or many causal variables stated in the theory? 
These factors and assumptions combined can form, several independent, mutually enforceable 
mechanisms, and gives rise to several different hypotheses depending on the variables. 
Following Walt’s theory, Russian foreign policy and behaviour would have some simple 
patterns that would be observable. To start with, the Russian state, regardless of regime type 
and era, might feel threatened by any power or coalition with overall greater aggregate power 
than Russia. That would include great powers, alliances, and coalitions. That threat perception 
would incrementally increase if the source of the threat moves closer to the Russian landmass 
and decrease if it moves away from the Russian landmass. That would ideally be reflected in 
Russian defensive behaviour, including defence doctrines, and force positioning. The threat 
perception would also increase if Russia perceived the source of the threat is having offensive 
power or remain low if Russia perceives it lacks offensive power. Therefore, logically Russian 
behaviour towards different states at the same time, might vary, even if they are both 
adversarial states; the one which displays offensive power would make Russia feel threatened 
more, than the other state which is investing on defensive power and weaponry. For example, 
at any given time, if two neighbouring state are engaged in an arms build-up, the one with more 
investment in offensive firepower would threaten Russia more. Russia might identify both 
states as sources of threat, however, be more antagonistic to one state and more cooperative or 
indifferent to the other state, depending on offensive power. Finally, Russian behaviour 
towards different states might vary depending on what it perceives as offensive intention. If 
Russia identifies that a great power or an alliance is having enormous offensive power as well 
as aggregate power, but no offensive intention, it might display different behaviour, than when 
it perceives the state or great power or coalition is displaying offensive intention. Similarly, if 
Russia perceives that the source of a potential threat is moving close to Russian landmass, but 
not displaying any offensive intention, Russia might not display balancing behaviour.  
Similarly, combined with the above hypotheses, external factors would also influence Russian 
behaviour. If at a given time, Russia identifies two differing simultaneous sources of threat, but 
finds common ideological solidarity with one, then Russia will display bandwagoning or 
cooperative behaviour or tactically align with that source of threat, and balance against the 
other, greater source of threat, regardless of how powerful a potential threat that great power 
or coalition might be, with which Russia is bandwagoning. However, the bandwagoning or 
cooperative behaviour will only last as long as Russia’s own security interest is not affected. 
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In other words, no amount of ideological similarity will guarantee a continuous cooperative 
behaviour if security considerations differ. For example, two states might have ideological 
similarity, like China and Soviet Union, but other security concerns, like territorial disputes or 
encroachment, will lead to aggressive behaviour. If Russia feels that a source of threat has 
offensive intention, and if Russia feels that there is a possibility of transnational penetration, 
that might lead to Russia to believe that any foreign propaganda is an attempt to destabilize 
Russian regime and is a threat to Russian interests.  
Finally, a revolution or regime change in the neighbourhood, added with existing threats might 
lead to all-out war, or security dilemma and spiral. In any given situation, revolutions in 
neighbourhood raises the possibility of conflict or security dilemma spiral, and if that is added 
with other assumptions, then the chances of conflict increase. If Russia feels other powers or 
coalitions are taking advantage of the revolution in its neighbourhood, it might lead to 
balancing behaviour towards the other powers and coalitions. If Russia perceives that the 
coalition or power is advancing towards the Russian landmass, then balancing will increase. 
However, if offensive power and offensive intention are added to this volatile mix, then the 
chances of balancing behaviour might change to pre-empting a conflict. The greater perceived 
threat will be towards Russian territorial integrity, security, and strategic interests, as well as 
Russian economic interests, the higher the chances of Russia taking aggressive action. These 
are some of the simple testable hypotheses in general form that one might conclude from the 
earlier espoused theories.  
When Russia faces a threat 
Accordingly, as discussed above, the assumptions that we gather from the theory, helps us 
identify how Russia might behave. To begin with, there is aggregate power, which is a 
combination of state’s total resources, which include population, industrial and military 
capabilities. Higher aggregate power in a peer rival, might alter the perception of threat, and 
might result in internal balancing and arms race or search for allies. If the theory is correct, the 
political debates within the dependent variable in such a situation is supposed to acknowledge 
the high or rising aggregate power in a rival state or alliance. There would be an 
acknowledgement of the need to internally balance against peer rivals.  
Geographical proximity is the second variable, which claims that if a source of threat with 
extremely high aggregate power, is within a close geographical proximity of a state or great 
power, without any territorial buffer state or high seas in between, the threat perception rises. 
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There will be noticeable actions and policies undertaken in the behaviour of the state in 
question, whether it is internal balancing actions, like defensive actions like military 
expenditure, repositioning of armaments or weapons systems, or external balancing actions 
like cultivating alliances in buffer zones or both. A closer threat with increased or increasing 
aggregate power, will result in greater concern and elevated threat perception in a state or great 
power, which will influence its balancing or bandwagoning behaviour accordingly, and it will 
reflect in the policy decisions and speeches. The threat perception rises even more, if the 
aggregate power is also coupled with offensive power, that is the power to physically threaten 
the existence of the regime, government, infrastructures, economic and territorial integrity of 
the state. Historical animosity or ideology in this case could be important factors in deciding 
whether a power is or will be considered offensive by its rivals. In such a situation, we would 
see that there are urgent balancing actions that will take place. In Salavatian’s study for 
example, the period highlighted was when Ahmedinejad was elected in Iran. 274The immediate 
reactions were a revision of war doctrines in Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia tactically aligning 
with Israel against Iran.275 There was observable evidence of this tacit cooperation between 
Israel and Saudi Arabia, against Iran. Likewise, I point out below, in the eventuality of Russia 
facing such a threat, there will be certain observable actions and policies in place. Most 
importantly, if a state believes that these factors are combined with offensive intent, that is the 
intention to harm state interests, either economically or strategically, that will imply the great 
power or state would think the source to be existential and would behave accordingly. While 
Walt claims all these factors are equally important, it is the offensive intention of a peer rival 
that matters the most for the dependent variable. 276 
Three external factors, combined with the above assumptions, also alter threat perceptions. 
Ideological solidarity can lead states to temporary tactical alignments, but security 
considerations usually trump over ideological preferences. Often ideology-based alliances 
falter, when security interests differ, alternatively, ideological differences do not stop 
alignments if there is a great threat in the horizon. In Hossein Salavatian’s study of Iranian-
Saudi balancing, for example, the ideological difference between Israel and Saudi Arabia didn’t 
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stop them aligning together against the common threat, Iran, especially during the time when 
under Ahmadinejad Iran was promoting Shia militias in Iraq as well as concentrating on nuclear 
weapons development.277 Likewise, in the case of Russia, as per theory, ideological differences 
or similarities, wouldn’t have much influence, as long as other territorial, security or economic 
interests are in play. Open societies invite more transnational penetration than closed societies 
from their rival powers, and great powers feel threatened with more transnational penetration 
especially like foreign propaganda, which they think is detrimental to their stability. In Russia’s 
case, if Russia’s neighbour lean more towards NATO, it would result in Russian threat 
perceptions increasing, and the concern will reflect in Russian official records.  Russian policy 
makers will be worried about Western penetration and propaganda in Russian society, and 
measures will be taken to counter it. There will be evidence of Russian actions, against what 
Russia might consider as agents of penetration. Finally, revolutions are key external events, 
which influence and heighten a security dilemma and threat perception of a neighbouring state 
or great power. In two different ways, again depending on other external factors, all else being 
equal, a revolution can straight away invite aggression from a neighbouring state or power, 
which was previously aligned to the toppled regime, or otherwise can instigate a prolong 
security dilemma and spiral of conflict and confrontation. The theory will be supported if 
there’s heightened security competition between Russia and NATO, and it leads to a conflict, 
with the Russian casus belli indicating that Russian actions were taken to either pre-empt or 
prevent the perceived threat from growing. Alternatively, in a similar situation, if one of the 
factors that leads to increased threat perceptions listed above are absent, and that did not lead 
Russia to decide the situation to be threatening enough to warrant a conflict, that would support 
the theory as well.  
Case selection  
That leads us to a selection of cases to explore the theory. For this thesis, I chose to explore 
three cases, namely Russia-NATO relations, Russia-Ukraine relations, and Russian-Georgia 
relations, and analyse, for each case the different phases of cooperation and balancing. In each 
of these cases, I will study when Russia balanced against each of these actors, and when Russia 
cooperated. Then I will explore if the theory and the hypotheses presented in this chapter below, 
matches the evidence.  
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The reason for choosing these particular cases are as follows. To test the hypotheses presented 
in this chapter, there was a need to find cases which would meet two qualifications. One, they 
should be regarded as strategic threats by Russia, whether it is an individual state or an alliance. 
Two, Russia must have displayed phases of both cooperative and antagonistic behaviours 
towards these threats in the last twenty years. Ukraine and Georgia are two countries, with 
which Russia displayed both cooperative and antagonistic behaviour. They are both considered 
part of Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, and both underwent tumultuous colour 
revolutions where the old guard were toppled. Russia has also committed aggression and waged 
war against Georgia and dissected and annexed part of Ukraine and is currently engaged in 
active destabilisation of the region by means of proxy war. NATO on the other hand, is not a 
great power or a country, but an alliance led by great powers. The reason to choose NATO and 
not United States is simple. It avoids the question of selection bias. The theory of balance of 
threat suggests that a great power reacts to sources of threat, which could be either another 
great power as well as an alliance. While NATO is led by United States, it is a multinational 
alliance, and it has been expanding ever closer to Russian territory, which allows us to explore 
if Russian cooperation and antagonism towards NATO fulfils the assumptions mentioned 
above.  
Which leaves us with China as the only other great power which could have been used as a 
case. Both United States and China are two predominant powers of the globe. Nonetheless, 
despite the Sino-Soviet history of competition and rivalry, Russia has not shown much 
antagonistic behaviour towards China in the last twenty years. That could be for several 
different reasons. Maybe Russia perceives Chinese offensive power is not targeted towards 
Russia, or that China lacks offensive intentions towards Russia. Maybe because Chinese 
foreign investment in Russia is paramount, or that Russia seeks tactical alignment with China 
as a counter-balance to United States, especially since the Iraq intervention which Russia 
considers is a sign of American global hegemonic aspirations. These are important questions 
to ponder for further research, nonetheless it leaves out China as a case to study further, given 
the scope of this thesis.  
Each of these cases will consist of a chapter of this thesis. To distil the theory, Walt’s theory 
suggests that states will balance against threat. In each of the cases, Russia should balance 
against threats. Walt’s theory also suggests that the decrease in the perceived threat, due to a 
lack of any of the variables, or the neutralisation of the threat, would result in a return to status 
quo. Russia, accordingly, should therefore visibly display an instinct towards upholding, or 
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returning to status-quo. As John Mearsheimer pointed out, regardless of the intention of the 
West (NATO/US), ultimately “it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide 
what counts as a threat to them.” 278   
As per the general hypothesis, Russian relations with NATO is supposed to reflect Russian 
relative military inferiority, and that would reflect in Russian decision making and policies. 
According to Walt’s theory, if Russian policy makers realised that they were weak and helpless 
with regards to NATO expansion in Central Europe, or NATO intervention in Kosovo, that 
would be reflected in Russian decision making. Being a comparatively weaker power, there 
could be two different possible reasons of muted Russian response in both the situations. Russia 
could either calculate, that NATO expansions in central Europe either did not involve offensive 
capabilities like positioning of permanent troops or weapons system which would threaten the 
balance of power and territorial integrity, or any offensive weapons on the part of NATO. 
Either way, Russian policy documents, speeches, public debates, and papers would reflect such 
concerns. Similar documents during Russian NATO cooperation both before and during the 
Afghanistan campaign would be studied to see, if Russian policy makers bandwagoned with 
NATO because Russian policy makers calculated that NATO forces did not have offensive 
intention in Russian neighbourhood. Incremental expansion of NATO towards East would 
result in incremental change in threat perceptions. If the difference in Russian behaviour in 
similar circumstances, can be explained by the absence of any assumption listed above, the 
theory will be supported.  
Ukraine and Georgia will be studied separately. Russian relations with Georgia and Ukraine, 
before and after the colour revolutions will be studied, especially during the build-up to 
Georgian war, as well as the build-up of Ukrainian crisis which would reflect in Russian threat 
perceptions. Russian military doctrines as well as policy briefs would reflect that change in 
threat quotient. The theory will be considered supported, if during the build-up phase of both 
the crisis, there is evidence of Russian actions which might be considered as cultivation of 
alliance with the pre-revolutionary regimes. Similarly, the theory will be considered supported 
if Russia, fearful of post-revolutionary Georgia moving away towards NATO, therefore 
Russian intervention in Georgia could be either pre-emptive war, to stop Georgia’s move 
towards NATO, or a strategic operation in creating a buffer zone in the regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. Georgia and Ukraine are not great powers. By definition they are not supposed 
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to post any strategic threat to Russia on their own. Per Walt’s theory, therefore, Russia will 
only feel threatened if Georgia or Ukraine turns to be a source of threat. But both the countries 
can be considered sources of threat, if they align with adversarial great powers or alliances, if 
they have increasing offensive power or offensive intentions vis-à-vis Russia, or if and when 
there is a revolution which subverts the domestic order, topples the friendly regime, and invites 
adversarial powers as a counterbalance to Russia. These threats should reflect in Russian policy 
documents and public debates, as well as military doctrines.  
 
To sum up, here are some hypotheses that are explored in light of the theory, in the following 
chapters. 
1. Higher aggregate power in a perceived strategic threat will alter threat perception in 
Russia, and will lead to internal balancing like arms race, or external balancing, in 
alliance behaviour. That will reflect in the debates within Russian policy making circles 
as well as Russian actions.  
2. Russian state, regardless of regime type and era, might feel threatened by any power or 
coalition with overall greater aggregate power than Russia. That would include great 
powers, alliances, and coalitions. Russia would balance against those threats.  
3. The threat perception will incrementally increase, if the source of threat moves closure 
to Russian landmass and decrease if it moves away. The threat perception will also rise 
if offensive power increases and will decrease if offensive power is replaced by 
defensive powers. These changes will be acknowledged by Russian policy makers and 
there should be a record and reflection of that in debates and discussions.  
4. A geographically closer threat with increased or increasing aggregate power, will result 
in greater concern and elevated threat perception in a state or great power, which will 
influence its balancing or bandwagoning behaviour accordingly. Russia’s reaction to 
NATO expansion, will be explored, to see if the causal variables are present in the 
events of a forceful reaction, or one or more of them is absent in the instances of muted 
reaction.  
5. Finally, any altered security dynamic which threatens Russia’s privileged position in 
its neighbourhood, would result in Moscow’s balancing behaviour, and even use of 
military force, in extreme. Alternatively, the perceived threat, when neutralised or 
balanced, would result in Moscow moving back to status quo. This would also prove 
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that Russia acts as a security maximiser, and not a power maximiser. Or in other words, 
Moscow is a status-quo and defensive realist power, and not a revanchist offensive 
realist power.  
In sum, the thesis will seek to explore Russian reaction, and balancing to threats, in the 
following cases. If NATO expands, Russia will feel threatened. If it reacts per the theory, and 
if Russian balancing increases with each NATO expansion, then the theory is supported. 
Alternatively, if Russian reaction is muted, during phases of NATO expansion, in the absence 
of any causal variable, then the theory is supported. Likewise, Russia ideally should not ideally 
feel threatened and react to either Georgia or Ukraine. But if Russia reacts to the colour 
revolutions, or any Georgian or Ukrainian push towards further integration with NATO, then 
the theory is supported. Alternatively, if Russian reaction is muted, even in the scenario of 
Westward push by Ukraine and Georgia, in the absence of any causal variable, then the theory 
is supported. Exploring each of these cases individually would help us understand, if Russia 




Chapter 4: Russian balancing against NATO 
 
The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union remained a major issue between Russia and the West. As recently as in 2015, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin tied Russia’s annexation of Crimea to NATO’s expansion in 
former Soviet spheres of influence. 279 Neorealist theories dictate that Russian behaviour would 
be determined by structural forces, like military balance, power, territorial factors, more than 
values and ideology. Accordingly, Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory was chosen as a 
theoretical framework to test if Russia behaves as a realist great power. In the previous chapter, 
I highlighted a set of hypotheses. 
  
First, higher aggregate power in states of alliances considered adversarial by Russia would 
cause Russia to perceive a higher level of threat. That would result in balancing behaviour by 
Russia, which could be either internal balancing like arms build-up, strategic changes, force 
positioning or alliance behaviour. Second, the Russian state regardless of regime type or era 
will feel threatened by any power or coalition with an overall aggregate power greater than 
Russia, a threat perception which will incrementally increase as the source of threat moves 
closer to Russia. Third, the threat perception of Russia will also rise if offensive capability or 
offensive intention of the adversarial coalition increases and will decrease if Russia perceives 
a lack of offensive capability or intention. The changes of such perception will be reflected in 
Russian policy debates, as well as speeches by political and military leaders. These set of 
hypotheses would be tested in three phases of NATO enlargement. The first phase, when 
central European countries, which were once part of Warsaw Pact, but not part of Soviet Union 
joined NATO. The second phase, when East European countries, as well as some former Soviet 
states, joined NATO and the final phase, when NATO decided to invite Ukraine and Georgia 
to join NATO. Russian reaction in each of these phases will be explored. 
  
Balance of Threat theory implies Russian relation with NATO should reflect Russian relative 
military inferiority, which will be evident in strategy documents, as well as public speeches by 
military and political elites. Both Russian political and military elite, will be, by default 
opposed to NATO enlargement. If NATO expands, Russia will feel threatened. If it reacts as 
                                                             




per theory, and if Russian balancing increases with each NATO expansion, then the theory is 
supported. Alternatively, if the Russian reaction is muted, during phases of NATO expansion, 
in the absence of any causal variable, then the theory is supported. The Russian reaction to 
NATO enlargement or NATO’s capability would, therefore, follow the hypothesis in the 
following way. One, it will be reliant on the perceived source of a threat moving closer to 
Russia, and the Russian reaction would continue to be more and more aggressive with each 
phase of NATO enlargement. Two, the Russian reaction to NATO’s increased offensive 
capability would result in increased aggressive posturing from the Russian side. Three, if 
Russia perceives NATO has an offensive intention, there would be balancing behaviour 
evident from the Russian side. Alternatively, if Russia does not act aggressively with each 
phase of expansion, there would be an absence of either offensive capability or perceived 
offensive intention from NATO’s side. Either way, there would be documented evidence of 
Russian actions and justifications, in official political and military speeches and strategic 
literature. It is difficult to judge the behaviour or Russia in isolation, without understanding the 
whole strategic reality, which is why this study intends to use three separate cases to test the 
idea that Russia acts according to the dictates of the balance of threat theory. The picture will 
be clearer after exploring Russian behaviour with Ukraine and Georgia. This chapter provides 
one piece of the puzzle, the Russian reaction to NATO enlargement. 
  
In this chapter, a brief history of NATO enlargement is given, key Russian interests are 
explored, followed by a detailed study of NATO enlargement in three phases. The section on 
the push for NATO enlargement helps in explaining the broad ideas and justifications behind 
NATO enlargement from the Western side, which in turn helps in further understanding 
Russian perception about the enlargement. Key differences of opinions, semantics and 
definitions also become prominent in this section, which forms the baseline of studying Russian 
reactions in the phases of NATO’s enlargement, and the sources of Russian insecurity 
regarding NATO. In each phase of enlargement, the events would be explored briefly followed 
by Russian political reactions, military and political statements, relevant documents, and 
speeches to see if Russian behaviour is influenced as per the abovementioned hypotheses, 
followed by a summation. As mentioned in the previous chapters, this chapter itself is just one 
part of the three case studies explored in this dissertation, which together with the other cases, 
help us understand if Russia acts according to the dictates of Neorealism, and the theory 





The push for NATO enlargement 
This section, charting the brief history of this period, between the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the first phase of NATO enlargement is important, as it gives a baseline to understand 
subsequent Russian understanding of the process. It also helps understand that the process of 
NATO enlargement, from the Western side, was an ideological as well as strategic choice, 
whereas from the Russian side, it was perceived as purely strategic and territorial expansion. It 
also highlights that the Russian perception of NATO expansion remains coloured, as it starts 
from what Russia perceives to be a betrayal, a territorial expansion, aimed at balancing Russia. 
This section also highlights why the words NATO expansion and enlargement are used 
interchangeably. From the western perspective, it was an enlargement, which was decided after 
careful debate and implied agency and choice to the Central and Eastern European states. From 
the Russian perspective, it was an expansion, for strategic and territorial reasons. 
American debate over NATO 
Russian opposition to NATO expansion had been a constant source of animosity, even when 
the intensity fluctuated. These tensions are more than policy disputes, as they reflect opposing 
worldviews. The Russian geopolitical perspective is different than the Western ideological lens 
or liberal internationalism and liberal institutionalism, and as a result Russia views NATO 
through the lens of a strategic adversary in European security.280 As Dmitry Trenin wrote, the 
Russian view of Europe remains steeped in geopolitics and great power rivalry, even when the 
European lens changed to a more liberal internationalism. Russia’s refuses to accept the 
continued hegemony of the US. And this is the key difference of Russia from other European 
powers. 281  
The western debate over NATO was highly contested. George F Kennan said in February 1997 
that it was the “most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.” 282 The 
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warning was repeated in 2014 when John Mearsheimer debated the reaction of Russia and 
Russian annexation of Crimea as a direct response to NATO expansion in the 
East. 283 Scholarly opinion is divided on whether there was a no-expansion pledge from NATO, 
or whether it was a serious miscommunication and misinterpretation from both sides.284 
According to the latest declassified documents, there were a series of verbal assurances and 
pledges from the Western side to Mikhail Gorbachev.285 The US Secretary of State James 
Baker’s assured “not one inch eastward” to Gorbachev, on February 9, 1990, alongside other 
series of assurances. Baker went on to assure Gorbachev that Soviet territorial interests would 
be kept in mind, and if Gorbachev wanted then a united Germany would be outside NATO 
without any US troops present.286 Assurances from Western leaders on NATO began on 
January 31, 1990, with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher making clear 
that “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to 
an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’287 And ruling out NATO ‘expansion of its territory 
towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’ NATO Secretary-General Manfred 
Wörner stated that the alliance is not looking to any shift of balance or extending military 
borders to the east.288 This pledge was repeated subsequently by Helmut Kohl, Margaret 
Thatcher, James Baker, Douglas Hurd, Francois Mitterrand, and George H W Bush. Margaret 
Thatcher said to Gorbachev in NATO’s London summit in 1990, “We must find ways to give 
the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured…. CSCE could be an umbrella 
for all this, as well as being the forum which brought the Soviet Union fully into discussion 
about the future of Europe”, a pledge repeated by President Bush, and subsequently by British 
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PM John Major, who personally assured Gorbachev, as late as in March 1991, saying “We are 
not talking about the strengthening of NATO.” Subsequently, when asked by Soviet defence 
minister Marshal Dmitri Yazov about East European leaders’ interest in NATO membership, 
he repeated, “Nothing of the sort will happen.” 289 In sum, during the final days of the Cold 
war, as well as the first few years after the Soviet collapse, Russia was under the impression 
that there was a Western pledge of no territorial enlargement of NATO towards Russian 
borders, which will alter the strategic balance in Europe. 
European debate about NATO 
In Europe, the debate about NATO expansion was mixed. The reunification of Germany was 
followed by relative calm, and questions about the future of NATO was not debated much in 
the US, during the last two years of the George H W Bush’s presidency. The initial push came 
from the Central European countries, sceptical of Russia’s influence, around June 1990.290 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia reached a joint strategy known as the Visegrad process, 
in response to Moscow’s economic pressure to sign bilateral agreements of future security 
arrangements. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yulii Kvitinskii proposed a backdoor 
arrangement, which pushed the Central Europeans to be under a Russian security umbrella, 
which was known as the Kvitinskii clause, and was thoroughly rejected by the Central 
Europeans countries, even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, highlighting Moscow’s 
relative loss of coercive power.291 By November 1990, the Soviet Press started to report that 
Hungary was willing to join NATO, and by early 1991, Moscow seemed resigned to the idea 
that all Visegrad countries share the goal of joining NATO and by April 1991, Izvestia 
proposed that Moscow might join NATO itself. By July 1991, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. 
NATO also offered Moscow to join the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), as US 
Secretary James Baker suggested that NAAC would be an important part of Russia’s 
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engagement with European security structures. From the Russian side, there were broad hints 
that Russia is willing to consider joining NATO as a long-term political goal.292 
 
The push for enlargement  
From the Western side, the first hint of NATO enlargement came with Secretary General 
Manfred Wörner’s declaration in March 1992, that NATO’s doors are open. NATO’s 
enlargement policy was not a concerted effort initially, but organically developed throughout 
the early 1990s, and gained momentum under the Presidency of Bill Clinton, whose 
administration tied it to the changing grand strategy of the US. It was also a matter of serious 
debate within the US administration, the main driver of the expansion claim. While the Central 
and Eastern European states were wary of Russia and wanted to be under the security umbrella 
of NATO, they were rebuffed initially, for fear of Russian reaction. It was not until Bill 
Clinton’s presidency; this idea was mulled seriously in Washington. 293 In April 1993, Clinton 
met Lech Walesa of Poland, Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, and Arpad Goncz of Hungary 
who argued that NATO should expand. Clinton’s foreign policy was predicated on the idea 
that peace is promoted with trade and free market, and democracies rarely go to war with each 
other, otherwise known as the democratic peace theory. 294 NATO expansion and the spread of 
liberal institutions was, therefore, a means to this policy. 
The idea of expansion was vigorously debated within the alliance.295 Primary arguments made 
for expansion were that it would help communist states transition to democracy, and enhance 
continent-wide security, and prevent a security vacuum in large swathes of territory and prevent 
the rise of ethno-nationalist harmful elements.296 While superficially sympathetic to Russia, 
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NATO expansion was primarily a security endeavour, and NATO was unwilling to let Russia 
have any say on the process. 297  
Further push for NATO expansion came from Germany, under German defence 
minister Volker Rühe. Rühe said that German stability would be threatened if its new eastern 
frontiers are not further moved east. 298 In the United States, NSC speechwriter Jeremy Rosner, 
leading the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, alongside Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright lobbied for Senate Approval for NATO’s geographic expansion, and coined the term 
“enlargement” as opposed to a more aggressive sounding “expansion”.299 The idea was, 
however, a territorial expansion and spread of institutions and American support for democracy 
promotion, as opposed to a narrower Cold war era idea of Containment. 300  
The opposition to this Clintonian NATO expansion came from certain circles. The Pentagon 
was opposed to NATO expansion, and supported the Partnership for Peace, to allay Russian 
fears that would arise. Strobe Talbott, then adviser to the Secretary of State cautioned saying 
‘The key principle, as I see it, is this … An expanded NATO that excludes Russia will not 
serve to contain Russia’s retrograde, expansionist impulses; quite the contrary, it will further 
provoke them.’ 301 The idea that Russia would inevitably be provoked by territorial 
enlargement was also furthered in academic arguments. 302 Nevertheless, the Clinton 
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administration was committed to expand NATO and democratic peace. 303 In January 1994, 
Clinton stated in a speech in Prague, that ‘The question is no longer whether NATO will take 
on new members, but when and how.’ 304 It was followed by Clinton’s speech in Poland, calling 
PFP ‘a first step toward expansion of NATO’. By 1995, the process was inevitable. 305 There 
are scholarly disagreements on this pledge on two accounts. One, the pledge was made to the 
Soviet Union, which disappeared and there were no similar promises whether written or verbal 
to Russia, and that promises are invalid as they are not codified in a treaty and is therefore not 
legally binding.306 It was also stated that none of these pledges or promises were with regard 
to Central European countries specifically and only pertained to NATO troops in East 
Germany. 307 Second, there were no actual pledges, but conciliatory statements open to 
interpretation. 308 NATO’s argument was that the central European states were free to choose 
their own alliances, a contingency that was not discussed during the German reunification 
talks. 309  
Russian perceptions of NATO’s intentions 
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There is significant evidence that Gorbachev went back to the Soviet Union during the final 
days of USSR, assuring his countrymen and hardliners that there would be no expansion of 
NATO.310 That was one of the pledges on which the unification of Germany was agreed upon. 
Archival and documentary evidence charting the speeches and memos of Western and Soviet 
leaders during the time period shows that Western leaders considered and rejected the Central 
and Eastern European membership of NATO and were satisfied with only German unification. 
The documents also reinforce the claim by several Realist scholars as well as CIA Director 
Robert Gates’s criticism of pressing ahead with an expansion of NATO eastward, during the 
mid to late Nineties, even when Russians were led to believe that the eventuality would never 
occur. The controversy regarding this issue subsequently rose several times when the Russian 
government regardless of regime or leader accused the West regarding NATO enlargement in 
1997—1999, and again in 2001—2002 when NATO invited several countries to join, as well 
as in 2005 and in 2008. In September 2008, after Georgia and Ukraine were invited by NATO, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov insisted that in the 1990s the United States had ‘‘made 
a commitment not to expand NATO’’ and had ‘‘repeatedly broken this commitment’’ in the 
years since. It can be argued that there is some truth in that, and that this idea of “betrayal”, 
colours Russian judgement of NATO. 
  
Russian reaction to the first Phase of NATO enlargement 
By December 1996, the North Atlantic Council meeting announced a summit in Madrid in July 
1997, which decided to set the course for the Alliance to move towards the 21rst century, 
consolidating Euro Atlantic security. 311 On 10 December 1996 NATO invited Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic to apply for membership at the Madrid summit. The first phase 
of the enlargement process was expected to take two years to complete, and by 1999 NATO 
was ready for new members. Because of its size and its geostrategic location, Central Europe 
was strategically valuable for NATO. 312  
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Russian reaction to NATO expansion is difficult to chart as they are also in phases. Initially, 
neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin felt threatened by the NATO alliance, as firstly, both these 
leaders were under the impression that NATO is not expanding territorially, and both wanted 
to work with NATO, under the impression that NATO could provide some strategic stability 
in Europe, and secondly, both were under no illusion that the former Warsaw pact countries 
were no longer under Moscow’s direct command. A RAND Corporation study highlighted that 
Russia always considered the following five components to be its areas of interest. 313 They 
are defence of the territory, sphere of influence in near abroad, Russian status as a great power, 
Russian equal platform with other great powers, and sovereignty and non-interference in 
domestic affairs. Russian strategic ideas are partly shaped by Russian history, lack of natural 
boundaries and buffers, consistent foreign invasion, and interference in Russian domestic 
affairs by other great powers. 314 The consensus in Russian foreign policy circles and elites is 
that NATO enlargement results in the diminishing security buffer between Russia and West 
and makes the defence of conclaves and strategic chokepoint like Kaliningrad 
difficult. 315 Russian defence minister Grachev, for example, did not see a NATO expansion in 
the horizon, and the Russian military doctrine in 1993 was designed to foster an era of 
“partnership and cooperation”, even though it did mention any territorial enlargement of any 
alliance moving towards Russian borders as a potential military threat, in future, should it ever 
happen.316 Since 1994, Atlanticists and liberals in the Western sense, have not acted as a unified 
political force within Russia. 317 The Russian ruling elite, as well as opposition, whether 
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communist or ultra-nationalist, were consistently sceptical of NATO enlargement, as were the 
Russian military elite. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in 1993 also referred to 
NATO as the “biggest military grouping in the world that possesses an enormous offensive 
potential.”318 As late as 1994, there was no expectation in Russia that NATO was going to 
expand. At the end of 1993, Kozyrev confirmed to Russian lawmakers that ‘the greatest 
achievement of Russian foreign policy in 1993 was to prevent NATO’s expansion eastward to 
our borders.’ 319 There was a surprise in Moscow, with the launch of the NATO enlargement 
study in 1995, prompting Yeltsin to declare that the Cold war has been replaced with Cold 
peace. 320 The democrats in Russia felt betrayed and disappointed.321 Public opinion also 
turned against further Atlanticism. 322  
Even though, neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin felt threatened by NATO, they both made it clear, 
that NATO expansion would be a constant source of animosity with the West. Ambassador 
Vitaly Churkin’s comments in Belgium also mentioned the threat to Russian interests would 
be NATO’s materiel and infrastructure in the former Soviet sphere. 323 Therefore, even before 
there were any official statements from the United States about NATO expansion to the east, 
any territorial enlargement of an old alliance in former Soviet sphere was regarded warily from 
Moscow, a sentiment that was openly conveyed to the West. 324 Yevgeny Primakov, at that 
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time the director of the Foreign Intelligence, said in November 1993 that material and territorial 
expansion of NATO is dangerous for Russian interests, as Russia will be compelled to redeploy 
troops to the West. 325  
The Russian military and political elite were somewhat cognizant of Russian relative material 
inferiority compared to the Western alliance, immediately after the Cold war and the resultant 
diminished stature. The addition of central European states only increased that gap in aggregate 
power. However, two concessions from NATO’s side helped in allaying Russian fears. Russia 
participated in Partnership for Peace in exchange for special status within North Atlantic 
Council. The partnership for peace program meant that there was a visible reduction of force 
posturing from the Western side. NATO’s new security doctrine resulted in substantial 
reduction of conventional as well as nuclear forces. 326 The forward presence of the United 
States was reduced from 325,000 to 100,000 troops, and European members cut their troops 
by more than 500,000. As Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to NATO, 
the land sea and air units were reduced by 30-40 percent, and 35 percent at readiness level 
compared to 1990. Theatre level nuclear weapons were reduced by 80 percent. These 
reductions were clearly visible and denoted the lack of offensive power or offensive intention 
on NATO’s part. 327 Despite the rhetoric, therefore there were conciliatory efforts from both 
sides. 
The Russian foreign ministry’s condition was that Moscow would agree to NATO enlargement 
in Central Europe, as long as there are “no deployments of nuclear weapons or allied combat 
forces on the territory of new member states”, both conditions agreed by NATO. 328 Russian 
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Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov also considered PFP to be damage limitation.329 NATO’s 
acceptance of Russian conditions happened around the same time when Russia was also invited 
to join the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and to endorse the Dayton accords. 330 The 
“NATO Russia Founding Act,” which was signed by both parties in May 1997, led to the 
creation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which allowed Russia to establish a mission at 
NATO. Yeltsin, in return, officially accepted the first round of NATO enlargement, to Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary as inevitable, while making it clear that the Russia has strong 
opposition to NATO expansion to the Baltic countries, or the former borders of the Soviet 
Union. This new ‘red line’ was repeated throughout the remaining years of Yeltsin’s 
presidency.331  
In sum, there were visible Russian rhetorical posturing that increased with NATO’s eastward 
enlargement. But it could be argued that Russian reaction remained limited, due to a clear 
reduction of NATO’s offensive capabilities, as well as perceived lack of clear offensive 
intention. 
  
Russian reaction to the second phase of NATO enlargement 
The second phase of NATO enlargement started with the joining of more central European 
members as well Baltic states which formed the Soviet Union, to their membership in 2004, 
one year after the Iraq invasion. The period also saw the Russian strategic calculus change after 
the Kosovo war, as well as a change in Russian leadership. Even though Russian military 
doctrines started to reflect the changing dynamics, the Russian leadership showed flexibility in 
aligning with NATO after Kosovo and after the September 11th terror attack. 
Tensions between Russia and NATO escalated again during the conflict of Kosovo, and Russia 
warned in the first PJC meeting to caution against the unilateral use of force without 
authorisation from the United Nations. NATO ignored the warning, and the centrepiece of 
NATO’s new relationship with Russia, the Permanent Joint Council, broke down during the 
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war in Kosovo.332 The war in Kosovo highlighted that NATO was not serious about Russian 
“consultation” nor was NATO unaware of Russia’s diminished military clout.333 Around the 
same time, another significant change happened, as NATO started to discuss the possibility of 
moving one of its headquarters in Rendsburg, Germany to northern Poland – a stated redline 
for Russia and something NATO explicitly promised not to do earlier.334 The Russian Defence 
Minister, Igor Sergeev, in a trip to Rendsburg in 1998, warned that such a territorial move 
would lead to a military confrontation. 335 There was no military confrontation during the 
move, but Russia suspended ties with NATO and withdrew its representatives from NATO 
headquarters in March 1999. Russia did return to the NATO table for talks eventually within a 
few months, but with a clear interest that Russian troops remain part of peacekeeping in the 
Balkans. 336 By the end of 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned, and Vladimir Putin was President. 
The Kosovo campaign triggered the debate within the Russian military and strategic planning 
community on NATO’s hidden goals, and subsequently triggered Russian military doctrines to 
be adjusted reflecting its defence policies.337 The first time since Cold war, Russian strategic 
planners had to deal with the scenario of NATO forces projecting power, within a weakened 
Russian territory, in the name of human rights.338 Around the same time, right after NATO 
enlargement in Central Europe, the Russian military updated Russia’s military doctrine, which 
focused on Russian economic inferiority, the gap in military capabilities, and the need of a 
multipolar world. Russia abandoned its no first use policy of nuclear weapons against an 
overwhelming conventional attack from a great power or alliance, in 1993. That was continued 
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in this new document. 339 NATO on the other hand, maintained no change in its nuclear 
posture, reiterating no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons in new member states. 340  
Vladimir Putin was initially less hostile to the idea of NATO itself, even when Russian strategic 
doctrines continued to consider NATO a threat. He accepted that NATO enlargement agreed 
under Yeltsin was a fait accompli and at least publicly stated that he wanted to rebuild relations 
with NATO. In his meeting with NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, Putin stated that 
there is need to resume Russia-NATO contacts and compare the military doctrines and strategic 
concepts of Russia and NATO.341 Putin continued with the mixed messages, saying he is 
willing to theoretically consider the possibility of being a member of NATO in future, in a 
BBC interview, while stating in a meeting with NATO in February 2001, he mentioned Russia 
is willing to coordinate with the US to form a European wide missile defence system, instead 
of a NATO missile defence in Europe and willing to send Russian experts to Brussels to discuss 
the possibility, explain Russian and American cooperation on technology and test public 
interest. 342 For the first time since the Kosovo crisis, Russia announced a full meeting with 
NATO, even when NATO was reticent about commenting on Russian membership. 343  
The September 11th attack in the United States changed the strategic dynamics of Europe. 
Russia was undergoing its own problems with the Chechen insurgency. Immediately after the 
attack, Putin said, ‘If NATO takes on a different shade and is becoming a political organization 
... we would reconsider our position with regard to such expansion, if we are to feel involved 
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in such processes.’344 Within two weeks of the attacks, Russia declared that it will assist the 
United States in operating out of central Asian airbases, typically used and operated by Russian 
air force and considered under Russian spheres of influence, as well as unilateral closure of 
espionage centre in Lourdes, Cuba and a naval base in Vietnam.345 In December 2001, the 
United States unilaterally pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was 
simply called a mistake from the Russian side, but nothing else was done about it. 346  
There were significant changes on the side of NATO as well. The 11 September attacks 
changed NATO’s own reasoning about enlargement from “democracy promotion” of the 
Clinton era to an alliance determined to pull efforts to tackle international terror. In the 2002 
Prague summit, this new line was communicated by President George W. Bush, as he stated, 
“Expansion of NATO also brings many advantages to the alliance itself. Every new member 
contributes military capabilities that add to our common security. We see this already in 
Afghanistan—for forces from Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia and others have 
joined with 16 NATO allies to help defeat global terror.”347  
This reframing of NATO resulted in further cooperation and made NATO enlargement more 
palatable to Russia for the time being. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov confirmed Russian 
understanding of NATO’s new position and said ‘Russia no longer considers NATO 
enlargement to be a menace because the alliance has undergone a radical transformation from 
a cold war instrument to a defence against global terrorism and other 21st-century 
threats.’348 When NATO planned to invite seven new countries to join the Alliance at its Prague 
summit in the fall of 2002, the position was repeated by Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, 
regarding NATO expansion in the Baltics as Ivanov stated ‘Russia is not planning to get overly 
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dramatic about the situation.’349 During the Rome declaration of May 2002, Russian 
understanding was that NATO and Russia will act jointly and equally as a side of twenty, 
instead of the previously agreed 19+1 formula, and would focus on international terrorism and 
reaction to crises.350  
As evident from the sequence of events, Russia was initially sceptical of NATO enlargement, 
in the second phase when for the first time, actual member states in the Baltic region which 
formed parts of the Soviet Union, were invited to be part of NATO. NATO hardware and 
outpost also moved east in a breach of a previously declared redline, and the Kosovo war was 
viewed in Russia as a direct attempt to claw away at the Russian sphere of influence. The 
Russian military elites also consistently saw NATO enlargement as a serious threat to Russian 
security and interests. Previously, in the 1990s, certain sections of Russian military viewed 
NATO enlargement as German expansion and continuation of German grand strategy in East 
Europe. 351 During the early 2000s, NATO enlargement started to be considered as an 
American plot to move inexorably eastward and a continuation of American hegemony. While 
NATO was not part of the Iraq war, it did not have any discernible difference in Russian 
military thinking, as evident from the statement in 2003, after the Iraq invasion, by Russian 
General Yuri Baluyevsky, who stated that the world needs to be multipolar, as otherwise it 
breeds instability. 352 The Russian political leadership’s view of NATO showed greater 
flexibility. That could be attributed to a change in NATO’s reframing of its cause of existence, 
focused more on counterinsurgency as well as fighting Islamic terrorism, something, just as 
Russia was facing a Chechen insurgency, the Russian perception of NATO’s offensive 
intention underwent a change, which led to a temporary alignment of interests. The Rome 
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declaration of 2002 further changed the relation between Russia and NATO as procedurally 
Russian administration gained the framework of NATO-Russia Council, and perceived that 
NATO’s primary motivation shifted to counter-terrorism. While Russian military doctrine 
remains unchanged, the political speeches highlighted that Russia did not consider NATO a 
threat, but rather a partner against Islamic terrorism, in a changing global security scenario. 
Russia did not perceive any offensive intention and NATO’s declared offensive capability did 
not increase. Russia’s perception of threat, from NATO therefore remained neutral. NATO’s 
declared force posture with no new weaponry in the new member states, added with NATO’s 
focus on counterterrorism, led to Russia perceiving a distinct positive change in the NATO – 
Russia future. 
  
Russian reaction to NATO invitation to Ukraine and Georgia 
The third and final phase of NATO enlargement, is explored in this section, before relations 
with Russia broke down permanently, and Russia, for the first time, went to war with another 
sovereign state in Europe. After the second phase of NATO enlargement, in 2004, relations 
with Russia quickly broke down due to the animosity with the United States over the Iraq 
invasion, around the same time when colour revolutions rocked Russia’s neighbourhood 
(discussed in separate chapters, on Ukraine and Georgia). This is also the time when Russian 
military doctrines changed, and Russian redlines on NATO’s further territorial enlargement 
continued. Russian political statements and military doctrines reflected this change of 
perception. 
When asked on further NATO membership plans regarding Ukraine and Georgia, Vladimir 
Putin said, Ukraine should take the plan independently but stated categorically that Russian 
position regarding territorial expansion remained unchanged, a hint at the Yeltsin era red 
line. 353 Russia maintained that the only way Russia would find further NATO expansion 
acceptable was if NATO transforms itself into a political organisation, which needless to 
mention NATO had no intention to. NATO meanwhile was transforming and enhancing its 
military capability as individual NATO members were preparing for a war in Iraq as part of 
the “coalition of the willing”, something which Russia opposed earnestly, and joined forces 
with France and Germany to stop. During the war, NATO supported Poland with 
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communication and logistics, and on the request of Turkey, NATO took precautionary 
measures to install missile defences in Turkish territory, even when NATO was not taking part 
in the war as an organisation.354 Russia continued to maintain that it has concerns in further 
NATO expansion including territorial and infrastructure and would change Russian military 
doctrines accordingly. 355 Asked specifically about Ukraine again, Russia repeated that Ukraine 
is free to choose its future, within EU, as long as it does not join NATO. 356  
As NATO continued with plans of another round of expansion, a territorial red line for Russia, 
NATO also began F-16 patrols over the Baltic sea and Baltic territory around 2004, a 
significant new development in offensive capabilities, infuriating Russia. Putin immediately 
demanded that any new NATO member state accede and ratify the Conventional Forces Treaty 
to avoid any sort of a “strategic grey area.”357 By the time there were massive transformations 
within Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), which added on to Russian understanding that 
NATO is behind the crisis and is trying to encircle Russia and encroach even further. By this 
period it was also clear that the Russian intention (and Putin’s dream) of a “transformation” of 
NATO into a political institution instead of a primarily military one, with Russia being an equal 
member was not going to be fulfilled anytime soon, and that was mainly because majority of 
NATO’s members, especially the former Warsaw pact countries, who were disinclined to allow 
Russia any decision making powers. 358 NATO’s focus on democracy promotion and nation-
building in Iraq, corresponded with Western support of revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.359 
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Finally, in 2006, at Moscow State University, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, 
“we firmly raise questions about the transformation of NATO, the Alliance’s plans for 
enlargement, the reconfiguration of the U.S. military presence in Europe, the deployment of 
elements of the American missile defence system here, and NATO’s refusal to ratify the CFE 
treaty. The future of our relations largely depends on what direction the transformation in 
NATO will proceed in after the Riga Summit, and the extent to which the security interests of 
Russia are going to be considered.”360 The rhetoric from Moscow also was not just directed to 
NATO but also at Ukraine and Georgia. Lavrov further warned that any move from Ukraine 
or Georgia towards NATO would mark a “colossal geopolitical shift” for Russia. 361 The pitch 
continued to rise, with President Putin’s Munich speech in 2007, where he said that ‘I think it 
is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the 
Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious 
provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.’. 362 Same month, the US planned to talk 
with Poland and Czech Republic on placing missile defences, a significant permanent weapons 
system, which Russia considered a clear threat. 363 At NATO’s Bucharest summit in 2008, 
Putin warned ‘We view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders ... as a direct 
threat to the security of our country.” 364 Russian military generals started threatening war with 
Ukraine if NATO expands eastward. 365 In 2006, Russian military journal stated that it would 
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be short-sighted for Russia to ignore the fact that NATO extension might be central to the 
ambition of the United States striving to achieve unipolarity.366  
  
On August 2008, after Russia’s war with Georgia, NATO’s foreign ministers declared that 
Russia’s military action had been disproportionate and that cooperation in the NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC) was suspended until further notice. Around the same time, NATO conducted 
an exercise in Georgia from 6 May until 1 June 2009, which was perceived in Russia as a clear 
indication of NATO’s design on Russian borders. A 2009 essay from the journal Military 
Thought stated, “As previously, the Americans will continue actively to foist their values on 
the rest of the world relying on all the force and assets available to them”, a charge repeated in 
2010 after analysis of ongoing wars of choice by the United States. 367 It stated “The armed 
conflicts of the late 20th and early 21st centuries have been a graphic demonstration of the 
United States’ desire for a unipolar world and its determination to solve any problems by force, 
ignoring the opinion of the world community.”368 During the Arab Spring, the Russian military 
was certain that the instability and events in the Middle East were to promote American 
unipolarity.369 In most of these cases, NATO is considered an arm of broader American grand 
strategy. Regardless of which it is, it is in all the cases, considered a threat to Russian security. 
At any rate, enlargement plan with Ukraine and Georgia were the final territorial red lines and 
completely unacceptable at any rate, and that was made clear from Russian side repeatedly. 
NATO continued to be ambivalent about it and offered Georgia and Ukraine a path to 
membership, suggesting that membership of NATO was not a matter of whether, but when. 
The NATO declaration stated that 
 “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for 
membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become 
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members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance 
operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and 
look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP 
is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. 
Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. 
Therefore, we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a 
high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their 
MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment 
of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the 
authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.” 370 
In August, Russia and Georgia went to war over South Ossetia. Dmitry Medvedev later stated 
that the war stopped NATO expansion. 371 Ever since the 2008 war, Russia came out with new 
military doctrines stating NATO expansion as the biggest threat and Defence Minister Sergei 
Shoigu identified NATO expansion as one of the top three threats to Russia. 372 On 5 February 
2010 President Dmitry Medvedev approved the Russian Federation’s new updated Military 
Doctrine, which was being drafted since 2005, right after another phase of NATO expansion 
in 2004.373 This text supplemented the Russian National Security Strategy of 2009. The most 
serious threat was the attempt to “to attribute global functions to NATO in breach of 
international legal norms” and the NATO infrastructure moving closer to Russian territory. 
“The deployment (build-up) of troop contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the 
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territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies and also in adjacent 
waters”, the text mentioned and maintained that the way to solve the threat is a European 
security initiative and the changing of NATO into a political union. 374 A more recent revision 
of the military doctrine was published on 26 December 2014, also maintained the threats of 
NATO expansion as well as military infrastructure and large-scale military exercises and 
deployment and build-up of military contingents of foreign states or alliances, in the territories 
of the neighbouring states of Russia. 375 The Prompt Global Strike concept of NATO, was 
mentioned as a military danger, but within a context of interstate rivalries. With regards to 
NATO, “an abrupt exacerbation of the military-political situation in interstate relations”, “a 
show of military force” through exercises in Russia’s neighbourhood or “obstructing” state and 
military command and control, by means of a “global strike”, were considered a 
threat.376 Russian National Security Strategy, of December 2015, also cites NATO troop 
deployments, and induction of former Soviet-allied states as the top threat to Russian security, 
adding that NATO missile defence plans are destabilizing especially for Russia to protect its 
natural resource and maritime interests in the Arctic Sea. 377  
In sum, NATO’s increased air patrols over the Baltics, and exercises with newer member states, 
as well as NATO’s invitation to Georgia and Ukraine, after the colour revolutions, were 
considered by Russia as a significant change in the status quo. It was a proof of NATO’s 
increasing offensive capability in the region, as well as signs of NATO’s intention to move and 
encroach upon Russian spheres of influence and move towards Russian borders. Two 
significant changes happened in this phase. One, Russian politicians and military leaders were 
finally convinced that NATO had no intention to listen to any Russian concerns about any 
territorial red lines unless met with force or active deterrence. Two, Russian political leaders 
and military leaders were convinced that NATO’s intentions were to exploit instability around 
                                                             
374 The Russian Federation’s Military Doctrine, Robert Śmigielski, No. 28 (104)  February 18, 2010, 2010  
© PISM, also Text of report by Russian presidential website on 5 February ["The Military Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation" approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on 5 February 2010] 
 
375 Sinovets, P. & Renz, B. (2015, July) ‘Russia's 2014 Military Doctrine and beyond: threat perceptions, 
capabilities and ambitions’ Research Paper. Rome, IT: NATO Defense College, Research Division, p. 117 
and Tomé, Luis José Rodrigues Leitão. 2000. “Russia and NATO`s Enlargement.” Final Report for NATO 
Research Fellowship Programme 1998-2000. 
 
376 Putin, V. (2015, January 5). Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Retrieved from 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/251695098/Russia-s-2014-Military-Doctrine#scribd 
 




Russian borders, and NATO’s offensive capabilities would continue to increase. As a result, 
Russian political statements, as well as military literature and doctrines started to reflect this 
altered perception, which continues to this day. 
  
Summary 
In the previous chapters, the thesis hypothesised, that Russia would feel threatened with NATO 
moving eastward, and that threat perception will be constantly increasing with every single 
phase of expansion. However, there will be variation in Russian behaviour, towards NATO, 
depending on NATO’s offensive capability and force posturing, as well as Russia’s perception 
of NATO’s offensive intentions. 
From the evidence observed, the Russian military elite, as well as civilian leadership, were 
always opposed to NATO territorial enlargement, however, the prospect was not taken 
seriously in the initial days after Soviet collapse and was considered implausible even during 
the early years of the Yeltsin administration. NATO’s first intention of enlargement resulted in 
Russian alarm, and Russia only agreed to NATO’s expansion if two conditions were initially 
fulfilled, that there would be no new troops or offensive weapons system in the new member 
states. NATO agreed with the conditions, and Russia NATO partnership resulted in further 
alignment during the Dayton accords. The NATO Russia Founding act led to the creation of 
the permanent joint council and Moscow accepted NATO enlargement in central Europe. 
During the build-up to NATO operations in Kosovo, NATO discussed the possibility of 
moving its headquarters from Germany to Poland, thereby moving allied troops in the 
territories of the newly joined nations. That happened around the same time, NATO intervened 
in Kosovo, and Russia intervened in Pristina airport, resulting in a long drawn cold peace 
between NATO and Russia which only thawed when Vladimir Putin became President. Putin 
perceived that a transformation of NATO from a strictly military alliance inexorably moving 
eastward to a political alliance, might treat Russia as an equal partner, and during the war on 
terror, that was materialised momentarily, with George W Bush reframing the alliance as an 
organisation determined to face global terror. That thaw gave way to another round of chill 
with NATO patrols over Baltics, and NATO plans of missile defence shields over central 
Europe. This flow of offensive capabilities eastward added with support for democracy 
promotion in parts of the globe, resulted in new Russian doctrines which reconsidered NATO 
as an enemy organisation determined to encircle Russia. 
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Each of the instances of NATO enlargement, resulted in a Russian reaction, even when the 
reaction was varied. Prior to 1993, before serious plans of enlargement were afoot, Russia felt 
threatened by the aggregate power of NATO as evident from the strategy documents and 
military doctrines, which were designed to foster an era of peace and cooperation but also noted 
Russia’s relative weakness. Russian nuclear posture changed, and Russia discarded the Soviet 
Era No First Use policy, which had been a bulwark of Soviet nuclear posture, signalling 
Russian elite’s acknowledgement of Russia’s diminished relative power. When expansion was 
planned, Moscow’s shock was palpable, and that resulted in Yeltsin declaring that a Cold peace 
has taken over a Cold war, as charted above. Russian Atlanticist policy also changed under 
Primakov during that time. However, the key factor that stopped Russian balancing behaviour 
wasn’t Russian relative weakness. Russia is still at present, relatively weaker than NATO. It 
could be argued that Russian response was muted due to an agreement of non-deployment of 
combat troops or nuclear weapons on newer NATO territories. That agreement signified an 
absence of offensive intention on NATO’s part, which reflected in the NATO-Russia founding 
act and Russia reactions remained relatively muted. Primakov’s threat of redeployment of 
Russian troops in the West wasn’t followed through, as lack of NATO’s troops, hardware or 
permanent infrastructure in newer NATO countries signified absence of offensive capability 
build-up, and NATO-Russia founding act was perceived as lack of offensive intention from 
NATO’s side. From NATO’s enlargement in 1999, to NATO’s enlargement in 2004, the ties 
between Russia and NATO continued to simmer. 
The second phase of NATO enlargement happened during the time, Russia under Vladimir 
Putin was starting to move away from the West. As charted above, during President Putin’s 
first few years, there was an evident desire for a rapprochement from the Russian side, 
especially during and after the 9/11 attacks, due to a combination of various factors. From the 
Western side, after President Bush’s speech in 2002, NATO seemed like a political 
organisation to Russia, with Moscow as an equal partner. The reframing of NATO’s purpose 
negated any perceivable offensive intention on NATO’s part, as NATO seemed like an ally 
against the broader struggle against Islamic jihadism. However, after the actual expansion in 
2004, events moved quickly in Europe. Other than the colour revolutions in Ukraine and 
Georgia, which will be separately studied in the next chapters, there were NATO patrols in the 
Baltics, which was a territorial red line for Moscow. This marked a remarkable shift in NATO, 
which up until then nominally respected Russia’s wishes. The post 9/11 unilateralism of the 
United States as well as a shift of balance of power with NATO, which resulted from NATO 
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firepower permanently over the territories that Russia considered under its direct sphere of 
influence. NATO offer of eventual membership to Ukraine and Georgia after the colour 
revolutions also was an unmistakable breach of a Russian red line and a sign of a source of a 
threat moving inexorably closer to Russian landmass. It could be argued that Russia perceived 
a change in both offensive capability and offensive intention on NATO’s part, and that reflected 
in Russian military doctrines, as well as Russian political leadership, and led to the Munich 
security conference speech of 2007. By the time the next phase of expansion took place in 
Albania and Croatia, NATO Russia relation has broken down and there has already been a war 
in Europe between two nation states, over territory, for the first time since the Second world 
war. Russian military doctrines also changed by 2010, to reflect the new geopolitical reality. 
All the aforementioned evidence demonstrates that Russia behaves per the theory of the balance 
of threat, when it comes to NATO’s aggregate power, territorial proximity, offensive 
capabilities, and intentions. The behaviour of a great power is rarely explained by mono-
causality, and therefore the next chapters would explore Russian relations to Ukraine and 




Chapter 5: Russian balancing in Ukraine 
 
In the previous chapter, this thesis summarised, how the Russian reaction to different phases 
of NATO enlargement was predicated on Moscow’s threat perception. According to the 
dictates of the Balance of Threat theory, Moscow was supposed to feel threatened by a growing 
military alliance, inexorably moving towards the Russian borders, what Moscow considered 
an encroachment on its own sphere of influence. The theory also explained why Moscow’s 
threat perception might diminish, if any one of the variables were lacking, or absent, for 
example, if Russia did not perceive “offensive intention” on NATO’s part, the threat perception 
would be reduced. Evidence observed illustrated that overall, Moscow follows the dictates of 
Balance of Threat, regarding NATO enlargement.  
But what about other threats? In the last ten years, Moscow actively participated in two 
conflicts in the European theatre. The Russo-Georgian war in 2008, and the Russian annexation 
of Crimea and the ongoing civil war in Ukraine, help test the theory further. For example, if 
Moscow is a defensive realist power, it will not engage in continuous expansionism. Moscow 
will engage only in warfare when it seeks to offset some challenges and would return to status-
quo once it feels the threat to be neutralised. Likewise, Moscow’s strategic motivations would 
only be limited and structural, and related to material and military considerations, as opposed 
to ideological or imperial considerations. Finally, Moscow’s reactions would be based on 
perceived threats, which Russia would seek to balance. This chapter on Ukraine and the 
following chapter on Georgia explores these predictions.  
Russia considers Ukraine to be vitally important for geopolitical reasons.378 A large borderland 
territory, Ukraine serves to protect Russia from potential military intervention by Western 
powers and is considered by Russia to be in its sphere of influence.379 Ukraine shares borders 
with Poland and Romania and is the edge of the European Union and NATO frontiers and is a 
geopolitical buffer to Russia. Even the name Ukraine, which roughly translates to borderland, 
defines its geopolitical character. 
                                                             
378 Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy Updated April 29, 2020, Congressional 
Research Service 
 
379 For a historical overview of Ukrainian Russian relation, see Wilson, A. (2014) Ukraine Crisis: what it means 
for the West New Haven: Yale University Press; and Charap, S. & Colton, T. J. (2017) ‘Everyone loses: The 
Ukraine crisis and the ruinous contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia’, IISS, Routledge Security Studies. 
125 
 
Ukraine is considered a case study for the purpose of this thesis, for two reasons, as mentioned 
previously.380 First, Ukraine, is a nation-state, compared to NATO which is an alliance. 
Balance of Threat theory dictates that Russia should balance against a threat, as opposed to 
power itself, then Russian reaction to the threats originating from Ukraine and NATO would 
be similar. Russia would display balancing behaviour if the threat increases and return to the 
status quo if the threat subsides or is offset by balancing action. The choice of NATO, Ukraine 
and Georgia, therefore, makes theory testing for the purposes of this thesis more robust. 
Second, Ukraine provides a case where a similar type of political situation and threat scenario, 
resulted in two different outcomes. The Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2003 resulted in a 
change in government and altered the scenario significantly, but unlike the Euromaidan protests 
of 2014, did not result in an actual conflict. The question is, why?   
This chapter explores two sequences of events and seeks to explain the difference in Russian 
behaviour. As per general hypothesis, ideally, caeteris paribus, Russia should not feel 
threatened by Ukraine, given Russia’s enormous superiority in aggregate power. Ukraine’s 
pro-EU or pro-NATO tilt and as well as any revolution in the neighbourhood would, however, 
alter the security and strategic scenario and that would reflect in statements and speeches by 
politicians, as well as debates in the Russian military and civilian elite circles. But that still 
ideally would not be enough to go to war. Russian goal would be to balance, or in this case, 
presumably offset any Ukrainian move towards NATO or EU or any system or order in 
alignment with Western security interests, which are perceived as threatening to Russia. 
Moscow would only therefore actively seek conflict, if it either feels suddenly threatened by 
the security scenario on it border, in an eventuality, which perceived from the Russian lens, is 
existential to Russia’s strategic position.  
Put simply, Moscow would use military force, if it feels it is losing its privileged position in 
the balance and would try and offset it. If and when Moscow feels satisfied about neutralizing 
the said threat, it would revert back to a status quo position. Moscow would not, be imperial 
and continue on with expansion. In reality, Moscow’s military aims would be limited in nature.  
What can one observe here in this given scenario? If the theory is correct, and Russian reaction 
is dependent on aggregate power and offensive capabilities, Russia’s perceived threat from 
Ukraine, would be material and would have an economic and military dimension, instead 
of just a simple perceived threat to regime stability. First, there would be a distinct material 
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threat to Russian military capabilities and the loss of Ukraine, from the Russian sphere of 
influence, or Russian control over Ukrainian politics, region, and capabilities, should be 
considered an existential threat in Moscow. Russian reaction to the revolutions in both the 
phases would indicate the theory is supported; and alternatively, if Russian reaction is muted 
due to the lack of any causal variables, then the theory would be considered supported. If 
Moscow is satisfied that Ukraine’s westward tilt is thwarted, and the situation falls back to the 
status-quo, then the theory would be supported. Likewise, if Ukraine’s tilt towards NATO-EU 
security and economic structure is incremental, Russian actions to offset that move would be 
visible, and if need be violent. 
To sum it up, Ukraine’s move towards NATO/EU would be considered threatening by Russia 
and would be seen as an encroachment by NATO/EU from Moscow. There must be a distinct 
perceived material/strategic loss, which would be existential to Russia. Russian balancing 
action would continue for as long as those threats remain, and would cease, when from 
Moscow’s perspective, the threat diminishes or is offset.  
In this chapter, a brief background of Ukrainian and Russian strategic relation is followed by 
an exploration of two sequences of events, namely, Russian reaction to the colour revolution 
in Ukraine in 2003, and Russian reaction after the Euromaidan revolution. The evidence 
explored in this chapter suggests that Russia reacted in a similar fashion after both the sudden 
changes in the balance of power in the region. The loss of Ukraine to NATO and/or the EU, 
was considered a huge strategic loss, an existential threat to Russia’s status as a great power in 
the European balance. The Russian balancing actions after 2003, reflected this urgency, but 
Russia did not resort to military action, as the original situation changed back to a status quo. 
The second time, however, the situation did not change back to a status quo, and Russia resorted 
to military action, which resulted in annexing Crimea, a region considered by Moscow of 
strategic value. Moscow’s further interference was limited in regions where direct strategic 
interests were located. Either for lack of will, or capability, which is not clear, Russian actions 
demonstrate that it refused to occupy or annex the whole of Ukraine, and therefore throws open 
the question of whether Russia is an expansionist power or a reactive power. Evidence studied 
mostly rely on military journals and visible Russian actions, rather than political rhetoric, 





Russian strategic motivations in Ukraine 
Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there were two primary points of 
contention between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine was left with one third of Soviet nuclear 
arsenal, the third largest in the world, as well as the means of production and designs of the 
weapons systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy bombers as well as 
approximately 1700 warheads in Ukrainian territory.381 Ukraine had physical, but not 
operational control of the weapons as they were dependent on Moscow’s command and control 
system. 382 In 1992, Ukraine voluntarily agreed to remove over 3000 tactical nuclear weapons, 
and signed the Budapest Memorandum Agreement on security assurances, with the UK, the 
US, and Russia, as well as similar agreements with France and China to join the Treaty of Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 383Russia's guarantee of Ukraine's territorial integrity in 
return, in the 14 January 1994 Tripartite Agreement was a precondition to Ukraine's unilateral 
nuclear disarmament. 384 Nevertheless, Russia’s military remained dependent on Ukrainian 
military-industrial strength, located mostly along eastern Ukraine, for manufacturing, and 
maintenance of the supply chains for the Russian military. 385  
The second and greater disagreement was about the future status of Crimea and 
Sevastopol.386 Crimea as a region was administered by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
since 1954. The city of Sevastopol was the base of the Black Sea Fleet. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet of Russia voted to reclaim the city in 1993, claiming that 
the port was of strategic importance for the Russian black sea fleet. 387 The Russian Ukrainian 
summit on the status of Crimea was cancelled from Russian side several times due to a lack of 
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common grounds. Despite Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's ruling in April 1992 
nationalising the naval components Soviet infrastructure, the Sochi accord in 1995 highlighted 
division of the fleet. 388 The subsequent Ukrainian constitution declared that no permanent 
military base would be permitted on the territory of Ukraine, but allowed the use of existing 
military bases for temporary stationing and lease. The signing of three inter-governmental 
agreements on the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) on 28 May 1997 by Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin and then Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko resolved both the issues.389 
A joint Russian-Ukrainian Commission, co-chaired by Chernomyrdin and Lazarenko, agreed 
to establish a sub-commission on state borders, and in October the demarcation of the Sea of 
Azov was finalised.390  
 
The Orange Revolution, and Russian reaction 
Russian relations with Ukraine were more or less stable, up until the colour revolutions in the 
region. Several simultaneous developments changed the security dynamic of the region, some 
of which were discussed in the previous chapter. To briefly recap, NATO enlargements, the 
moving of hardware to former Warsaw pact countries, the intervention in Kosovo, and the war 
in Iraq frayed the relations between Russia and the West. Of that, the colour revolutions in 
Ukraine and Georgia two countries where Moscow had privileged interests, were the most 
important developments. The colour revolutions in both Ukraine, discussed in this chapter, and 
Georgia discussed in the next chapter, therefore, heightened the security dilemma in the region, 
at a time, when Russia was already opposed to what it considered American hegemonic 
tendencies and “hyperpower” after the Iraq invasion.  
In 2004, Ukraine underwent a “peaceful revolution”, also known as the Orange revolution in 
common parlance, after a fraudulent election. 391 The original election result immediately prior 
to the Orange revolution was renounced by the opposition, and the colour revolution took place 
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with the backing of domestic opposition, NGOs, as well as supportive statements from the EU 
and the US. 392 For example, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as 
Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute 
helped fund the election monitoring by the European Network of Election Monitoring and were 
critical of the 2004 election. Other NGO’s like George Soros’s Renaissance Foundation, as 
well as Western embassies, and advisors of former President Bill Clinton, were in touch with 
the Yushchenko campaign in advisory and supportive positions. The new President Viktor 
Yushchenko committed to gaining membership in NATO, and accordingly, foreign minister 
Borys Tarasyuk stated that Ukraine is determined to start negotiation for joining NATO by 
2008. 393 The Riga summit in 2006 ensured that Kiev’s defence and security policy remained 
unchanged and irreversible towards an eventual course of joining NATO, a course, that was 
made clear by Russia to be seen as a threat to the national security. 394 
Russian balancing action to Orange Revolution 
Moscow stated originally that Ukraine and Georgia are red lines and their joining of NATO 
could lead to a colossal shift in the European balance of power.395 Russian reaction after the 
Orange revolution, reflected this acknowledgement of the shifting balance of power in the 
region.396 In the previous chapter it was highlighted why the colour revolutions in Ukraine and 
Georgia made clear that the post-Soviet space right on the borders of Russia, which Russia still 
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considered to be an area of privileged interest was starting to move away from Russian orbit. 
Russia was not willing to lose Ukraine and Georgia to NATO and considered these two 
countries as regions of strategic interests between Russian borders and an ever-expanding 
NATO and EU.397 Russia also viewed Ukraine as vital to national security interest not only due 
to Ukraine’s location and historical ties with Russia, but also due to the Ukrainian supplies to 
the Russian military as well as Moscow’s naval supremacy in the Black sea due to the Russian 
navy base of Sevastopol.398 The closer NATO approaches to Russia, the more acute therefore 
the perceived threat is. When added to the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO the threat 
becomes existential from Russia’s perspective. The question of Ukraine actually joining NATO 
was irrelevant from Russia’s perspective, as logically Russia could not afford to lose the 
Ukrainian military supply chains, and its privileged position in the Black Sea, and the idea of 
Ukraine joining NATO was naturally an anathema to Russian policy makers, disconcerting 
enough to warrant a muscular response. 399  
The Orange revolution in Ukraine and Yushchenko’s victory, accordingly, was a shock to the 
Kremlin.400 Russian officials accused the United States and NATO were fomenting unrest in 
Ukraine and renewed efforts to pressure the government of Ukraine. Russian reaction to the 
installation of a pro-Western regime in Ukraine was a combination of both political and 
economic coercion. Russian political rhetoric got harsher every day. 401  
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Politically, Russia was critical of what it considered Western meddling in Ukraine, through 
NGOs and civil society groups. 402 After the colour revolution in Ukraine, NGOs and civil 
society organisations were considered as Western agents attempting to destabilize the region, 
from Moscow. 403 The National Security Concept of 2000 highlighted that the main security 
threats to Russia included any weakening of Russian political or military influence, by 
strengthening of military unions or blocks and weakening of the integration process of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 404 For Russia, the possibility of Ukraine in NATO or 
EU’s orbit would put Russian operations and control of its Black Sea fleet in jeopardy, and the 
Russian imperative was to stop the “conveyor belt” of Kiev moving towards NATO. 405  
Throughout this period Moscow hinted at red-lines and displeasure about the idea of Ukraine 
joining NATO. 406 Putin, for example, claimed that Ukraine’s visa free movement in the 
European Union would create problems for Russian speaking people in Ukrainian territories 
with ties to Russia.407 It was a broad hint that Russia was not ready to accept Ukraine as part 
of EU, and Russia sees Ukraine’s joining of the EU as no different than joining NATO, and 
Russia judges it from a territorial perspective.  
The displeasure about Ukraine’s prospective turn towards the EU and NATO was across the 
top tier of Moscow’s political elite. Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin 
                                                             
402 See, Wilson, A. (2006) ‘Ukraine's Orange Revolution, NGOs and the role of the West’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 19/1: 21-32; and Oleinikova, O. (2017) ‘Foreign funded NGOs in Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine: Recent restrictions and implications’, Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: an Interdisciplinary Journal, 9/3: 
96-105; Traynor, I. (2004) ‘US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev’ (26 November, 2005) The Guardian; 
‘Ministry of Economy: America did not finance Yushchenko’s campaign’, 30 December 2004, 
,http://hotline.net.ua/content/view/9823/37/; US Department of State (2003) US government assistance to and 
cooperative activities with Eurasia’’ https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/37672.htm 
 
403 Kuzio, T. (2004) ‘NGOs and civil society under attack in Ukraine’, Ukrainian Weekly, 18 July; and McFaul, 
M. (2004) ‘“Meddling” in Ukraine: democracy is not an American plot’, Washington Post, p. 21 
 
404 Presidential Decree No. 24 of 10 January 2000. The National Security Concept of the Russian 
Federation, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768; also, Trenin, Dmitri, Reading Russia Right, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, Special Edition 42, October 2005 
 
405 Trenin, D. (2006) ‘The Post-Imperial Project’ (15 February) Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
 
406 Ambrosio, T. (2007) ‘Insulating Russia from a Colour Revolution: How the Kremlin Resists Regional 






refused to accept that Ukraine has any separate identity. In various interviews around this time, 
Chernomyrdin, provocatively said that “Ukraine and Russia have never lived as two sovereign 
states. Ukraine has never been a sovereign government. Now we have to learn how to perceive 
her as such” and “Russia was always an independent state. Ukraine never was. There never 
was such a country.”408 In January 2006, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence Sergei Ivanov wrote in Wall Street Journal that Russia’s top concern is the “stability 
of the internal situation in some members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and 
the regions around them”. 409  
US associated supporters of the Orange revolution included the Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the National Democratic Institute of the Democratic Party (NDI), and 
the International Republican Institute of the Republican Party (IRI) as well as NGOs like 
Freedom House and the Open Society Institute, which provided funding to activists during the 
colour revolutions, as well as assisted with training and PR. 410 Russian intelligence and 
Russian government increasingly started to view and referred to foreign NGOs as agents of the 
US and NATO and started to view all foreign organisation and efforts in security 
terms. 411 Moscow claimed that domestic actors in Ukraine also did not act alone, as they 
received funding and training from NGOs and organisations, and were trained in civil 
disobedience, as agents of the West. 412 The EU monitors were brought in during elections were 
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regarded with utmost scepticism in Moscow. 413All these external supports were used by Russia 
to frame the Orange revolution as illegitimate Western-backed coup, and to drive out Russia 
from the Russian sphere of influence. 414  
Economically, Russian-Ukrainian relation after the Orange revolution was already marred by 
energy disputes, and Russia used energy prices as a weapon to coerce the new Ukrainian 
government.  Added to the political rhetoric, Russian economic pressure on Ukraine started to 
increase. Ukraine had an unbalanced trade relationship with Russia, relying on Russian energy 
and on Russia as a key consumer of Ukrainian exports, whereas Russia could bypass Ukraine 
and still sell energy to Europe. After the Orange revolution there were major shifts in Russian 
energy policy towards Ukraine. 415 For example, Gazprom and energy companies controlled 
by Moscow, threatened to rescind their deals with Ukraine, and cut off Ukraine’s energy supply 
unless Ukraine pays higher prices. Pricing disputes continued, until 2006, when Gazprom did 
cut off the energy supply to Ukraine, convincing Ukraine to bow to Russian pressure. The 
prices were discriminatory and arbitrary and the existing agreements, which established gas 
prices of $50 per 1000 cubic meters were increased to $230 per cubic meters. Russia also 
blocked the transit of Turkmen gas shipments to Ukraine. Russian energy companies also used 
their profits to purchase equity stakes in Ukraine increasing their control further of Ukrainian 
energy markets. The prices were not reduced until the Yanukovych government agreed to 
reduce the prices after a compromise with Russia in exchange for a 25-year extension on the 
lease to the naval base in Sevastopol. Russian government officials suggested that the energy 
prices were political rather than economic.416 The 2003 Energy Strategy of the Russian 
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Federation to 2020 stated that the country’s fuel and energy complex is “an instrument for the 
conduct of internal and external policy. The role of a country in world energy markets largely 
determines its geopolitical influence.” 417 During the peak of the gas crisis, Russia for the first 
time threatened about annexing Crimea. When the Yushchenko government warned that 
Ukraine will be forced to revise the treaty on rent of the Sevastopol, the Russian defence 
minister stated that it might lead to the revocation of the 1997 Ukrainian-Russian friendship 
treaty which recognised the 1954 boundaries, including Crimea to be a part of modern 
Ukraine. 418 Simultaneously, Russia started funding and advising Yanukovych’s election 
campaign. 419  
In December 2005, Russia Ukraine energy dispute ended with the termination of gas deliveries 
by Gazprom. 420 The two sides carried on negotiation so that Ukraine continues to get a 
subsidised price in exchange for a low transit fee. Putin reminded in 2006 that “over the last 
15 years Russia subsidised the Ukrainian economy by a sum that amounted to $3 to 5 billion 
each year,” and “each year we raised the issue of whether we should change to the European 
regime for determining prices”. 421 In December 2008, Russia turned off the energy deliveries 
to Ukraine, and the entire Ukraine, as well as East Europe, suffered without gas. Ukraine was 
undergoing domestic divisions and Putin in his capacity as the PM of Russia negotiated directly 
with Ukrainian PM Yulia Tymoshenko, who was running for Presidency and wanted a détente 
with Russia.422 In January 2009, a new ten-year contract and energy deals were signed. The 
rhetoric from Russia, however, continued to be harsh, and in 2009, Russia denounced Ukraine 
for pursuing anti-Russian policies by supporting Georgia during the 2008 war as well as 
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interfering in the movements of the Black Sea fleet in and out of Sevastopol.423 Ukraine’s 
constant attempt for membership of NATO was also repeatedly taken up by Russia, and by 
August 2008, it looked like the plans for further NATO expansion were stalled, as Russia 
continued to criticize OSCE/NATO to create a security system in Europe which attempts to 
create new lines of division between nations with a common history. Russian use of oil and gas 
as a weapon and the terms of the settlement of the gas crisis damaged the Yushchenko 
government, whose party took third place in the 2006 elections. By late 2006, Russia’s 
favourite candidate, Ukrainian PM Yanukovych was negotiating a settlement more in line with 
Moscow’s demands. 424  
To sum up, the Russian reaction to the victory of Yushchenko in Ukraine was severe. Moscow 
considered the shift of Ukraine towards the West to be a geostrategic calamity and felt 
threatened by the EU and NATO move eastward. It crossed a long-held red line. Moscow also 
blamed the Orange revolution as a Western-backed coup and considered NGOs and other civil 
society movements as western agents, funded and trained by NATO, the US and EU to 
destabilize Russian spheres of influence and eventually push Russia out of it.425 Ukraine’s 
relation with Russia destabilised so rapidly following the Orange revolution, that almost half 
of the Ukrainian population believed that there could be a war with Russia. After Orange 
revolution, Moscow adopted an antagonistic approach towards Yushchenko’s presidency. In 
2008, Kiev protested Russian distribution of passports to Ukrainian citizens by the Russian 
consulate in Simferopol, around the same time Russia was in a war with Georgia to “protect 
Russian citizens.” 426  
From the Russian side, the main animosity was against the Ukrainian government’s political 
support of Georgia, and rhetoric against the Black Sea fleet, which Russia considered as vital 
to force projection. Ukraine’s position that there is no alternative to join NATO and NATO’s 
Bucharest summit in 2008 which welcomed Ukraine and Georgian aspiration to NATO 
membership was another red line. Russian nationalist think-tanks, which reflect the position of 
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Russian political and military elite, openly started to sound war drums over Crimea. 427 It might 
be likely that the plan for an annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol was already developed by 
the Russian general staff, in the event Kiev joins NATO and Moscow was on the verge of 
losing Black Sea Fleet port. The rhetoric was certainly moving in that direction. 
But, the aggression was however unnecessary as Yanukovych won. 428 While the economic 
pressure on Ukraine coupled with the rift among the leaders of the Orange revolution, which 
started almost immediately after the election in December 2004 and continued. Yulia 
Tymoshenko’s tenure as a Prime Minister lasted until September 2005, and in March 2006 the 
Orange revolution coalition collapsed as the pro-Moscow Party of Regions, led by Viktor 
Yanukovych won. In contrast to the 2004 election, where Russia openly supported 
Yanukovych, in 2010 Russian advisors worked behind the scenes to promote his candidacy. 
Moscow was relieved with the outcome, as Yanukovych made improvement of ties with Russia 
his main theme and was strongly opposed to Ukraine’s membership of NATO, in support of a 
neutral, non-bloc status and in April 2010, in exchange for a reduced price on Russian gas, 
agreed to extend the lease for the Sevastopol naval base, for the next 25 years. Yanukovych 
also reversed Ukraine’s previous position on opposing Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. 429  
 
Euromaidan, and Russian reaction 
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Russia returned to status-quo behaviour and overt hostility decreased, as the threat of Ukraine 
rapidly moving towards NATO-EU security architecture was stalled. For example, despite 
Ukraine’s declared neutrality, Yanukovych’s reversal of previous Orange revolution position 
made Russia assume that Ukraine is on the course to join Russia led Eurasian order and CSTO. 
In 2010, reflecting that, President Medvedev noted that ‘Life does change, and if Ukraine 
decides to join the CSTO in the future, we would be happy to open the door for you, and 
welcome you into our ranks.’430 Earlier, in May 2009, the launch of the Eastern Partnership by 
the EU was considered a geopolitical challenge to the further integration of CIS states, by 
Russia. 431 Russian characterisation of the EU’s geopolitical agenda was no different than 
NATO or the West in general. 432 But relations improved in 2010 following a change of 
government, as the two sides agreed to extend the lease on Russia’s Black Sea fleet for the next 
25 years in exchange for a reduced gas price, and in 2011 Russia proposed the formation of a 
new Eurasian union, attempting to solidify a Russian sphere of influence in the face of renewed 
NATO and EU push eastward. Russia formed the Customs Union in 2010, including Belarus 
and Kazakhstan and formally invited Ukraine to join in 2011, with another offer of reduced gas 
prices. The Union became operative in 2012, and Putin pledged Ukraine another $15 Billion 
in aid. 433 Since his election in 2010, Yanukovych had blocked Ukrainian bid towards further 
NATO accession, and in 2013 signalled Ukrainian moves towards the Russian led customs 
union, and Russian offers of Customs Union membership in place of EU’s Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement seemed final. At the EU summit in Vilnius, the Ukrainian President 
announced his decision to postpone the Association agreement with the EU. By 2014, the 
relation between the Russian government and Ukrainian government seemed positive, even 
when Russian rhetoric continued to accuse NATO and EU. 434  
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 Around this stage, the Ukrainian opposition, critical of the direction their country is taking, 
and diplomatically supported by the EU and the US, started to protest in and around Kiev. 
Ukraine slid into lawlessness, as Western support for the protesters increased. 435 Yanukovych 
refused to accept the opposition’s demand, and the EU brokered agreement collapsed in 
February 2014 and Yanukovych fled to East Ukraine and then to Russia. The Ukrainian 
uprising happened in and around the Sochi Olympics, and the strategic situation rapidly 
reversed in the region as Ukrainian President Yanukovych fled Kiev. 
 
Russian balancing action to Euromaidan 
From the Russian side, this was considered an “unconstitutional coup” in Kiev, which changed 
the strategic situation of the region and established new rules on the ground.436 Russian worry 
of Ukraine joining the EU had an economic dimension, as Ukraine with 45 million people was 
an important market of Russian exporters.437 Any association agreement would hamper 
Russian exports as Russian products do not match the safety standards of the European Union. 
But the primary concern was geopolitical.438 The association agreement also included clauses 
which would integrate Ukraine to the EU’s common security and defence policy, which 
reinforced Moscow’s idea that the EU is not just a political union, but an extension of NATO 
ambitions in the East. The European Union was considered a great power in the making, 
influencing the geopolitics of Russian sphere of influence, and pushing Russia out. 
By 2009, Russia was warning against EU influencing and destabilizing Ukraine. Sergei Lavrov 
stated that “We [the Russians] are accused of having spheres of influence. But what is the 
Eastern Partnership, if not an attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence”. 439 Konstantin 
Kosachev, the chairman of the Russian parliament’s foreign policy committee, described the 
EU as an emerging “hyper-power, which, like a gigantic whirlpool, is slowly but surely sucking 
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in our neighbours”. 440 By August 2013, senior Russian presidential advisers were warning that 
Ukraine should not cede sovereignty to the EU and should join Russia led customs union, and 
if Ukraine joins the EU, Russia consider Ukraine as a strategic threat. 441 Moscow 
simultaneously launched a trade war against Ukraine in 2013, whereby Russia restricted the 
import of Ukrainian goods while offering a generous package of economic and financial 
assistance on the condition that Yanukovych complied with Russian demands and turned down 
the association agreement. Russia also pledged US$15 Billion in low-interest loans and 
discount on natural gas. Yanukovych rejected the agreement with the EU a few days before the 
“Eastern Partnership” summit in Vilnius at the end of November 2013.442 After three months 
of violent protests rioting and mass demonstrations, President Yanukovych was toppled in 
February and fled to Russia. The new leadership in Kiev made it clear that Ukraine’s future 
lies in the West and Ukraine is determined to sign the EU association agreement.443 With the 
rise of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Moscow was certain that Crimea was going out of hand and Russia 
would lose the base for the Black Sea fleet. A pro-Western government in the doorstep of 
Russia, determined to join with the EU and NATO along with Russian loss of Baltic naval base 
was unacceptable to the Russian military and political elite. Within days, Crimea was annexed 
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by Russian soldiers without insignia. They were Russian soldiers as identified by the hardware 
they used, although at that time, it was denied from Moscow. 
In the six weeks following the Euromaidan revolution, Crimea was annexed, while 
continuously being denied by Russia that Russian soldiers were involved.444 After the 
annexation of Crimea, Russia demanded that Kiev initiate new constitutional changes that 
guarantee the protection of Russian speakers and decentralised leadership of the region. Russia 
also amassed over 30,000 troops on Ukraine’s border and retracted the energy discount and 
financial aid for Kiev. In April 2014 however, Putin stated that Russian servicemen backed the 
Crimean self-defence forces, and stated that Russia created conditions, “with the help of special 
armed groups for the expression of the will of the people in Crimea and 
Sevastopol”. 445 Regarding the conflict that broke out in parts of Eastern Ukraine, Putin 
continued to initially deny that there were any Russian forces or instructors in South-
Eastern Ukraine. Later, however, with the scale of Russian intervention, weapons, hardware 
and mercenaries involved, it was clear that Russia intervened in the conflict. 446 Putin further 
argued that the Russian troops in Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet face a direct threat to their 
security and appealed to the Russian Federation Council to allow the use of the Russian armed 
forces in Ukraine referring to the threat of Russian military forces. On March, Putin referred to 
the declarations of Kiev about Ukraine joining NATO would mean that NATO’s navy would 
be right in the city of Russia’s military glory and threaten the whole of Southern Russia. He 
said Russia would be practically ousted from the Black Sea, ending up with a diminished 
coastline of only 450 kilometers. In June, the Russian president stated that the “anti-
constitutional coup” in Ukraine would mean EU and NATO infrastructure directly towards the 
Russian border and that must be stopped at any cost. 447 Russian defence minister Sergei 
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Shoigu also stated that the danger of seizure of the Russian military infrastructure by extremist 
organisations in Crimea required tightened security at Russian military facilities in 
Crimea.448 The political rhetoric emanating from Moscow was solely directed at EU and the 
US. For example, Putin on the eve of the Crimean referendum said, “And with Ukraine, our 
Western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear [sic] and acting irresponsibly and 
unprofessionally.” 449 Similarly, the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said, “Brussels 
told Ukraine to choose between the West and Russia. Everybody knows the root causes of the 
crisis: we were not being listened to, Kiev was forced into signing arrangements with the 
European Union, which had been drafted behind the scene and, as it eventually turned out, 
were undermining Ukraine’s obligations on the CIS free trade area. When Viktor Yanukovich 
took a pause for a closer look at the situation, the Euromaidan protests were staged. Then there 
followed the burning tires, the first casualties and an escalation of the conflict.” 450 The 
swiftness of the takeover suggested that the contingency plans had been in place for a while. 
Analysis of Russian balancing 
So, why did Russia get involved in a conflict after 2014 and not after 2003? According to 
Balance of Threat theory, and the hypotheses listed above, Russian aggression would occur in 
the situation when Moscow is under the impression that its independent standing as a great 
power is threatened due to either loss of control over the buffer region which it considers under 
sphere of influence, or when Moscow appears to understand that its military balance is 
under threat or both simultaneously. Alternatively, if Moscow regains control over the region 
without resorting to conflict, then the status quo would be maintained. The most plausible 
explanation for the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2011, is therefore rooted in security 
relations and relative power which establishes that Russia intervened in Ukraine to establish a 
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geopolitical fault line between West and Russia. To achieve this aim, of stopping Ukraine 
falling in Western orbit, Russia need not always resort to offensive action. The key issue since 
1991 is that Ukraine is considered vital for Russian interests and without a pro-Russian, or at 
least neutral Ukraine, Russian status as a great power is questionable. Russia not only will lose 
its biggest territorial buffer, but also major resources vital for national security, as well as a 
privileged position in post-soviet economic space. While Russia could not force Ukraine to 
join a pro-Russian security order, it can make Ukraine toxic for NATO and EU, and deny its 
Westward move. Ukraine’s integration into Western structures would shift the strategic balance 
in Europe, ending any Russian hope of a sphere of influence and a buffer zone, as well as a 
neo-Soviet hegemony composed of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
The history between Russia and Ukraine suggests a pattern. Whenever there is a distinct 
possibility that Ukraine would join the Western security arrangement, whether, through the EU 
or NATO, Russia ratcheted up the pressure. Both during the 2003 Orange revolution and the 
2014 Euromaidan revolution, this pattern was followed. The difference is the scale of Russian 
aggression. Foreign policy analysis is rarely monocausal, and while it is difficult to understand 
and theorise Russian reaction without a complete picture after studying all the cases for the 
purpose of the thesis, analysing Russian reaction vis-à-vis Ukraine suggests two alternative 
possibilities. Chaos in Ukraine would be considered a ploy by the rival alliance or 
power centre to push Moscow from its sphere of influence. As Walt suggested, discussed in 
detail in chapter 3, that a revolution in the neighbourhood is viewed by a great power as a chaos 
where rival powers try to take advantage, to push the dominant power out of its sphere of 
influence. If Russia acts per balance of threat theory, then as mentioned above, Russian 
considerations would be primarily material, economic and military. The perceived threats in 
Moscow would be related to a Russian independent existence as a great power, and the loss of 
Ukraine would be existential to Russia’s standing in European security scenario. The 
alternative scenario is that Russia fears that if Ukraine is destabilised, the effect would spread 
to Russian neighbours, and eventually to Moscow. The cause of threat, therefore, would be a 
threat to regime stability, and not a threat to Russian standing as a great power due to a 
decrease in aggregate power and military capabilities. 
It is evident in the case of Ukraine, that Russia considered Ukraine to slip away from Moscow’s 
orbit. In the first instance, economic pressure and internal collapse of the revolutionary regime 
of Yushchenko meant that Russia did not have to resort to using overt or covert force. In the 
second instance, the threat was much more serious, and rapid, leaving Russia no option other 
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than using force to create a fait accompli in the region, as well as stall Ukraine’s permanent 
shift to the Western orbit. 
To use Zbigniew Brezinski’s terminology, without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian 
empire.451 While that might be a bit too rhetorically far-fetched, it is true that if Russia controls 
Ukraine, even as a satellite, it will continue to have access to an enormous territorial buffer, a 
market for Russian products, as well as strategic resources, and access 
to Black Sea. 452 Russian actions in Ukraine, in both after the Orange revolution and after 
Euromaidan, has been therefore one of strategic denial. Great powers, whether defensive 
realist, of offensive realist, according to realism, do not give up their privileged position in the 
balance on their own.  
The Russian military heavily resources dependent on Ukraine. Prior to the annexation of 
Crimea, Ukrainian firms produced over 3000 components and armament systems, for the 
Russian military, including the components for manufacture as well as maintenance of the 
primary Russian nuclear deterrence, the RM-36 (NATO designation SS-18 Satan) 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) designed by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and 
manufactured by the Yuzhmash industrial complex in Dnipropetrovsk.453 According to the 
Russian deputy PM Dmitry Rogozin, Russia is incapable of acquiring such products anywhere 
else. 454 Ukraine also produced the guidance systems for the SS-25 mobile missile launchers 
and SS-19 silo-based strategic missiles in eastern parts of Ukraine, in Kharkiv. 455  
Likewise, the Russian navy is mostly built and maintained in Ukraine.  456 The Mykolaiv oblast 
was the key shipbuilding centre since the Soviet times, and continues to produce parts for 
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Russian navy’s capital ships including its flagship, the aircraft carrier Admiral 
Kuznetsov. 457 Eastern Ukraine and black sea coast, therefore, remains crucial for Russian 
naval deterrence. The Russian air force uses air to air missiles produced in Eastern Ukraine, 
and maintenance of the hydraulic system for Russian fighters like Su-34 is also done in Eastern 
Ukraine. Russian transport used jet engines made by Antonov factory in Ukraine. Almost all 
Russian modern tank components are built in the Kharkiv Locomotive 
Factory. Ukraine’s military-industrial complex is almost entirely located in Southern and 
Eastern Ukraine, due to logistical and trade reasons, and is now currently the scene of heavy 
rebel activity. Critical Ukrainian components and their servicing make up for up to 80% of 
Russia’s strategic missiles forces, and without Eastern Ukraine, Russian nuclear deterrence, 
and naval forces collapse. 458 It is also no coincidence that the heavy fighting around the city 
of Kramatorsk is over the control of the NKMZ industrial complex, which produces hardware 
like mining equipment, steel mills, etc for the Russian military. The Russian control of Crimea, 
for example, added 13 Ukrainian defence companies and 18 defence companies located 
between Donetsk and Luhansk are also under de facto Russian control. These are of invaluable 
importance to the Russian plan of massive military rearmament, and Russian independence 
deterrence depends on the maintenance of these supply and logistics chain.459  
The gains to the Russian military after the annexation of Crimea were historic and substantial 
in terms of strategic capabilities and potential. Russian annexation of Crimea and acquisition 
of assets created a new fait accompli and resolved the issue of uncertainty about Russian basing 
rights. The April 2010 ratification of the quarter-century lease of Sevastopol was conditional 
to whoever was in power in Kiev, and after Euromaidan, Russia could not be sure of the 
intention of a new Ukrainian government and a revision of the lease terms or rights. Moscow 
was not happy about the constraints about the type of crafts and treaty terms which prevented 
                                                             
457 See, Tolip. (2007). Admiral Kuznetsov the only aircraft carrier in the Russian Navy. Retrieved 
from http://www.militaryheat.com/39/admiral-kuznetsov-aircraft-carrier-russian-navy/ and Committee, D. ( 
2014). Defence-Committee - Third Report: Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part Two-NATO. 
Retrieved from: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence/358/35802.htm 
 
458 See, McLees, A., & Rumer, E. (2014). Saving Ukraine’s Defense Industry. . Retrieved 
from http://carnegie.ru/publications/?lang=en&fa=56282 and Jennings, G. (2015). Russian An-140 production 
halted by Ukrainian sanctions. . London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly 
 
459 Jennings, G. (2015). Russian An-140 production halted by Ukrainian sanctions. . London - IHS Jane's 
Defence Weekly; Berzins, J. (2014). ‘Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian 




any expansion of the numbers of the Black Sea fleet and was in continuous legal conflict with 
the wordings of the Ukrainian constitution, which prohibits foreign bases. All those constraints 
were essentially swept away. 460  
Russian control, retaining and scuttling of the Ukrainian fleet, meant that Russia eclipsed 
Turkey as the biggest naval power of the region. Russia captured and interned most of 
Ukraine’s twenty-five warships as well as upgraded its Black sea fleet.461 Russia also took 
possession of Ukrainian naval bases of Novoozerne and Myrnyi (Donuzlav Lake), Saky, 
Balaklava and a marine infantry base at Feodosiya, alongside Sevastopol. The Russian 
possession of Sevastopol also stopped all payments and recurring expenditure from Russia to 
Ukraine, an enormous amount of fund which was free to be used in military rearmament 
programs.462 A few days before Yanukovych fled to Russia, former Russian general staff Yuri 
Baluyevsky stated that Russia should urgently reinforce and expand the Black Sea fleet, and 
take advantage of the general situation. While there is no direct evidence of Russian military 
planning channelling this specific idea, in March 2014, the deputy Russian defence minister 
Yuri Borisov echoed the same logic asserting that the military infrastructure of Crimea was 
being developed to demonstrate to the whole world of Russian aspirations and capabilities. 
Shortly after Crimean annexation, by September, Russian forces were being deployed in self-
sufficient groups under the Russian southern military district providing 
military reinforcement and restoration of the Black sea fleet, upgrading naval weapons in 
Feodosiya, reactivating a dormant submarine base in Sevastopol, and establishing long-
range bombers in Soviet-era bases in Gvardeyskiy, Kacha, Saky and Belbak. The Russian air 
force’s strategic aviation division meant solely to deter NATO forces was planning new patrol 
routes as Russian territorial waters expanded. The Russian troop reinforcement plans included 
new coastal defence and artillery units, as well as naval exercises of attacking NATO warship 
detachments in nearby seas. The Russian annexation of Crimea also resulted in the Kerch strait 
being under the full control of Moscow, and the Russian dominion over Ukrainian continental 
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shelf and exclusive economic zone and hydrocarbon resources. The strategic significance of 
Crimea to the Russian military elite were enormous and the annexation of Crimea was 
influenced by broader strategic considerations to enhance Russian military powers abroad. 
Russian forces in Crimea were to be easily available to project force in east and south of 
Ukraine, in greater Odessa or a land bridge to Transnistria. The Russian airborne troop chief 
echoed the same planning that Crimea increases combat potential and force projection 
capabilities outside theatre far beyond Russia, similar to what defence minister Shoigu said 
about Russian military presence in key parts of the globe. 
The Russian hostility towards the Orange revolution and the confirmation of Viktor 
Yushchenko as Ukrainian president, through large-scale street protests backed up by NGOs 
and civil societies, was wholly unexpected in Moscow. It led to the belief in that the Western 
powers and rivals use competition around election process and use measures to interfere in 
foreign states to align those states to Western policy. In a way, Russia viewed the Orange 
revolution and subsequently other colour revolutions as a form of a hybrid war, which arguably 
shaped the Russian strategic thinking. 
This idea that a foreign-funded “revolution” is a means of statecraft, was embedded in Russian 
geopolitical worldview. For example, Vladimir Putin continued to claim that the Orange 
revolution was to “push the necessary candidate through at presidential elections” …making a 
mockery of the constitution.463 He repeated the same criticism, in February 2014, stating that 
the only difference between Orange revolution of 2003-04 and Euromaidan in 2014 was that 
this time, “they have thrown in an organised and well-equipped army of militants”. In between, 
this idea that any similar people’s overthrow of governments, whether in Europe or in the 
Middle East are essentially Western policy where “standards are imposed on other nations” 
leading to chaos, violence and upheaval. Russia itself faced protests in urban centres between 
December 2011 and May 2012, with thousands protesting against vote rigging, which resulted 
in Russian military elites warning against threats to CSTO states and Russian spheres of 
influence posed by colour revolution, whereby “socio-economic and political problems of 
individual states are used by outside forces under “democratization slogans”. Russian deputy 
defence minister Anatoly Antonov warned that Russia is closely watching attempts targeting 
Russia’s nearest neighbours, because in essence they are directed against Russian interests. 
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Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu was more direct and said that these upheavals are increasingly 
“devised in accordance with rules of warfare”. 
Alternative theories about Russian balancing 
The alternative scenario is the conventional wisdom in foreign policy circles. 464 To sum up, 
scholars insist that Russia is governed by a handful of cronies and the Russian regime is 
inherently fearful of major protests and considers any such protests in the neighbourhood as a 
threat. Stoner suggests that this aggressive posture at any change in the neighbourhood is 
inherently driven by a desire to remain stable internally because the Russian regime needs the 
occasional boost of nationalistic prestige. McFaul suggests that the Russian regime did not 
suddenly grow aggressive as a response to American and NATO expansion and the Ukrainian 
move towards the EU, but rather when Putin and cronies came under attack for the first time 
after the 2011 elections, with smart Russian youth protesting against stagnation on the streets 
of Moscow. 
This alternative understanding of Russian reactions being contingent to regime stability at 
home lacks explanatory power, because of two reasons. One, Putin’s popularity at home, were 
never in serious doubt. 465 There is no evidence that a hundred thousand protesters in Moscow 
(maximum), without a single unified opposition would shake Vladimir Putin, who consistently 
enjoyed overwhelming support and approval ratings, measured by the most independent of 
pollsters in Russia. Second, the idea that Russian regime is threatened by unstable 
neighbourhood because it fears for its own security is not supported because of Russian varied 
behaviour. Russian reactions to revolutions are not similar.466  
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For example, recently in Armenia, there was no Russian aggressive action, as a reaction to a 
regime change after a colour revolution. The Russian aggression in Ukraine, after Euromaidan 
also similarly remained subdued and relegated in the east and did not spread to the western 
parts of Ukraine. One line of reasoning might be that the Russian elite were fearful that their 
grip in power might slide, and their regime stability will be hampered, if there are successful 
revolutions in the neighbourhood. That is a plausible counterargument, that Russian reactions 
both during the Orange revolution and during Euromaidan were due to domestic 
considerations, but that argument has scant evidence to support it. Russia has internal problems 
and dissent, but none of them serious enough to threaten Putin’s hold. For example, Putin’s 
approval ratings were extremely high before the Ukrainian intervention, and continue to remain 
high, as latest elections show. Putin hardly needs to improve his domestic standing. By 2013, 
the Kremlin was confident of a conservative majority, which remained steady, after it studied 
social reaction during the Anti-Magnitsky act, trial of Pussy Riot band, and Russian laws 
against NGOs. Putin and Russian regime realised that their ratings remained steady, 
a confidence that was evident as Putin pardoned 20000 prisoners, the members of Pussy Riot, 
as well as long-term critic Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Many of those who were charged during 
the Russian protests in 2012, were also released and Russian Olympic hosting also boosted 
Putin’s standing. There is no robust evidence that the Russian government’s aggressive actions 
are therefore directed at domestic audience, either as a diversionary war, or due to concerns 
about regime stability. 
There is also another line of reasoning, which claims that Russian actions in Ukraine are 
determined by ideology. The theory behind this is that Russia is waging an ideological war, 
and reclaiming the territory of Novorossiya, based on ideas of Eurasianism, or conservatism 
and Eastern Orthodox Christianity. 467 A simple test of the hypothesis is the rise and fall of the 
rhetoric of the now discredited Novorossiya project. It was arguably used to justify Moscow’s 
actions in Ukraine and mobilize the Russians to rally around the flag. The project was discarded 
and stopped arguably due to the strategic objectives were achieved. 468 Had it been an 
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ideological war, it would have carried on and spread to other parts of Ukraine. It did not, and 
the Novorossiya rhetoric was quietly dropped after a while in Moscow.  
The primary driver for Russian actions, therefore, seems to be structural, influenced by 
geopolitical and strategic considerations. The aim as evident was to maintain Russian control 
over naval bases, and the military industrial centres in Ukraine. While there is no archival 
evidence which will be available anytime soon, the public discussions, statements in the 
Russian military and political circles, and the pace of annexation of Crimea suggest that the 
contingency plan was already in place for a while. After the annexation of Crimea, and 
Moscow’s rapid confirmation to upgrade the existing bases on the peninsula as well as the 
drafted plans to add new ships to the existing Fleet, Russia has extended control over the 
entirety of Black sea, specifically in the strategically important chokepoints like the 
Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. Added to that, it was a message to Kiev as well as Brussels 
and Washington DC that there will be costs, including territorial loss and violence if Russian 
interests are ignored. 
 
  




Chapter 6: Russian balancing in Georgia 
 
Georgia, like Ukraine, is considered to be of vital strategic importance to Moscow. Georgia is 
a vital supply line of Russian energy to the European heartland, and an important trade route 
for Russian exports. Georgia is also strategically significant, due to its proximity to the restive 
Caucasus region, and a source of instability in Chechnya, a cause of permanent concern in 
Russian strategic circles. 469 Russia also historically considered itself to be the net security 
provider of the region, and Georgia, alongside Ukraine, is considered in the Russian post-
Soviet traditional sphere of influence, and a redline that Moscow does not want NATO to 
cross. 470  
Georgia is selected as a case study for the purpose of this thesis, for two reasons. First, like 
Ukraine, Georgia is a nation state with which Russia engaged in a conflict recently. And it is 
not an alliance like NATO, and therefore, strengthens the evidence of Russian behaviour per 
balance of threat theory. Simply put, if Russia genuinely balances against threat, the Russian 
reaction would be similar, with regard to Georgia, as with Ukraine and NATO; Russia would 
display balancing behaviour if the threat increases, regardless of Georgia’s actual size, or 
capability. Alternatively, Russia would return to status quo, once it perceives any threat is 
reduced, or neutralised. The addition of Georgia as a case study, makes the theory testing for 
the purpose of this thesis, more robust, and gives a strong Euro-centric background to the 
overall study, which can be further tested, or replicated in future research, should a similar 
situation arise in Europe. Given that Europe (including EU/NATO) is arguably facing a 
renewed Russian factor in its strategic calculations, this would provide some policy relevance 
as well. 
Second, Georgia is important for theoretical testing for the purpose of this thesis, because 2008 
Russo-Georgian war was the first instance where Russian troops went to combat in a full-scale 
war in the European theatre, crossing the threshold of suboptimal and covert conflict, to open, 
declared, full-spectrum warfare. It was the first time Moscow threatened, at least rhetorically, 
                                                             
469 “Resolving conflicts in the Caucasus’, Strategic Comments, 3/7: 1-2; Nichol, J. ‘Stability in Russia’s 
Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus: Recent Developments’, Congressional Research Service, 
2010. 
 
470 Mearsheimer, J. (2014) ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault The Liberal Delusions That Provoked 
Putin’  Foreign Affairs 93. 
151 
 
to occupy the capital city of another sovereign state, and for the first time, crossed over from 
the controversial breakaway provinces to undisputed Georgian mainland. It was also, the only 
conflict, in Europe, where Russia was a party, and it had a fixed beginning and end date and a 
declared ceasefire. It broke the unwritten post-cold war norm of European politics, where 
Russia was expected to be intensely hostile at times, but never powerful enough to actually 
react militarily, at least within the European continent. While the conflict by covert Russian 
troops in Ukraine continues to be more militarily intense, Georgia preceded it, and along with 
the Munich Security conference speech by Vladimir Putin in 2007 marked the end of the 
ambiguity about Russia as a problematic but relatively balanced power, to an adversarial power 
and changed the strategic scenario of Europe. 
The case study of Georgia therefore serves an additional purpose. It not only corroborates the 
hypothesis of Russian balancing against increased threat established in the previous chapter, it 
also bolsters the claim that Russia is a status-quo power. That, is the purpose of this chapter, 
not just supporting the previous chapter on Ukraine about Russian overall balancing action, but 
also illuminating a theoretical question. This chapter works as a section complementing the 
previous two chapters, and explores Russian expansionism, or lack thereof, and attempts to 
debate on whether Russia acts according to the dictates of offensive realism and power 
maximising. The Georgian war of 2008, compared to more balancing actions against NATO, 
and covert war with Ukraine, with a fixed start and end date, and return to relative strategic 
status quo, provides a rebuttal to the argument that Russia is simply an expansionist power. 
Structurally similar to the previous chapter, this chapter also explores two sequence of events. 
But given the historical nature, the design of this chapter’s narrative is slightly different than 
the previous one. First, as per general hypothesis, Russia should not perceive any threat from 
Georgia, and would be satisfied with the status quo of the post-Cold war role of the net security 
provider of the region. That would change and Russia would react militarily, if according to 
balance of threat theory, Russia perceives a sudden change of strategic reality, including 
Georgia shifting towards a rival alliance which is encroaching upon traditional Russian sphere, 
or increasing Georgian belligerence, almost all of which would result in Russian strategic loss. 
Any such manoeuvre from Tbilisi would be interpreted by Moscow as a build-up of offensive 
capability, or offensive intention on Georgia’s part, which would alter the security and strategic 
scenario. Direct Russian actions to offset that would be visible, and a return to status quo would 
be only visible if Russia is confident that Georgia poses no further threat to Russian strategic 
interests anymore. Russia would therefore actively engage in conflict to offset Georgian 
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overtures towards NATO and EU, or any sudden systemic change in the order or alignments 
of the region. 
Second, if Russia is a power maximiser, it would act in a way consistent with expansionism. If 
Russia is not a power maximiser, it would be content as long as its security and strategic 
interests of the region, and the balance of power remains broadly in Moscow’s favour. In the 
former case, Russian military operations would be contingent to other occupation forces, and 
follow or attempt to follow through a process of forcible regime change. In the latter case, 
Russian operations would cease after a time, and show a narrower strategic approach and would 
be limited in nature. If Russia is a security maximiser and defensive realist power, the aims of 
Russian actions would be limited. If not, Russia would act as a power maximiser and offensive 
realist power.  
In this chapter, a brief history of Russo-Georgian relations is discussed followed by a brief 
discussion about Russian strategic interests in Georgia. That leads to the next part of the 
chapter, where the causes of the build-up to the war are discussed. Evidence of Russian 
perceptions of Georgian intention and offensive capability build-up, as well as the change in 
the geostrategic scenario which led to the war of 2008 is discussed with evidence to show what 
altered the Russian reaction, and strategic restraint and led the two countries to war. The final 
part of the chapter illustrates why Russia did not act as an expansionist power and why Russian 
reactions were contingent to security maximizing role. 
 
Historical backdrop of the current conflict 
The conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi traces its roots back to April 1989, when Soviet tanks 
put down demonstrations, leading to Georgia being the first Soviet republic to secede. 471 In 
the following sporadic conflict between Georgian central government and the South Ossetian 
autonomous oblast, the Georgians continuously claimed that South Ossetia was receiving 
financial, material and military support from North Ossetia, which was part of the Russian 
Federation. In June, 1992, for example, the Russian Supreme Soviet warned of intervention, 
and annexation of South Ossetia, to stop Georgian attacks on Ossetian civilians. Russia 
mediated Sochi Agreement in 1992, established a frozen conflict, with Joint Control 
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Commission and combined patrols of Russian, Ossetian and Georgian forces. Georgia allowed 
Russia to keep four military bases in the region, as well as allowed the use of Georgian airspace 
for Russian air force during the first Chechen war. 472  
Tskhinvali was controlled by the Ossetian separatists with no Georgian writ, and Georgia never 
viewed Russian peacekeepers as impartial. 473 Throughout the 1990s, Georgian authorities 
were ambivalent towards the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, oscillating 
between promise of a peaceful negotiated settlement and autonomy, and military threats, 
whenever the overtures were rejected. 474 While there were no direct and official military action 
from either side, proxy forces often exchanged fires, most notably in 1998, and 2001.475 In 
1998, guerrilla groups supported by the Georgian government attacked Abkhazian positions, 
and in 2001 a proxy war was led by the Chechen rebels under Ruslan Gelayev, under tacit 
support of the Georgian government. None of the proxy conflicts featured any active 
participation of Georgian or Russian forces. Throughout the 1990s, Moscow was relatively 
powerless to change the status quo on the ground, as well as occupied with its own conflicts, 
most notably in Chechnya. 476  
Russian strategic interests in Georgia 
Why is Georgia, considered so important to Russia, and why was Russia willing to go to war, 
in Georgia and not some other countries? The discussion is incomplete without an 
understanding of the strategic importance of Georgia to Russia. Russian interest in Georgia 
was strategic as well as political. Strategically, Russia sought to maintain military facilities as 
well as keep Georgia a part of the CIS, to continue a Russian post-soviet sphere of 
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influence.477 The Russian government considered Georgia to be a bulwark of stability against 
periodic instability in Transcaucasus. 478 Instability and the Chechen uprising have influenced 
the Russian decision-making process, as successive Russian governments have consistently 
argued that Russia needs a “friendly” Georgia.479 However, a section of the Russian military 
was always willing to dismember Georgia until 1993. With Georgian overtures towards Russia 
a period of stability ensued, with Russia establishing bases in Batumi, Alkhalkalai and Gidauta, 
with airborne and infantry troops presenting a lever of political influence over Georgian foreign 
policy, in exchange for Russia’s implicit support to Georgian government as a net security 
provider in the region in the face of an Abkhazian separatism and other instability. The Russian 
government at this stage, and much through the 1990s were opposed to any separatism in the 
region, fearful that it might bolster separatist movement within Russia. 480  
The Russian immediate foreign policy was focused on localizing conflicts, and isolating 
unstable elements preventing them from spill over and affect Russia’s ongoing conflict, and 
second, preventing a power vacuum in the region. 481 Russian parliamentary statements 
highlighted this line, stating that the immediate priority of Russia is “to stop the bloodshed in 
Abkhazia, not to allow the spirit of aggression and war to spread to the North 
Caucasus.” 482 Chechnya in particular was a stimulus behind Russian strategic thinking, as the 
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speaker of the Council of Federation Vladimir Shumeiko declared that the Russian position on 
Abkhazia is changing, and Russia is unlikely to accept an Abkhaz independence, as that might 
lead to other forms of separatism. 483  
While superficially, the Russian foreign policy establishment and the military had operational 
differences, the overall strategic and political objectives were remarkably similar. For example, 
the MFA was focused on political fait accompli, by placing Russian troops and “peacekeepers” 
in Georgia as a means of leveraging Russian interests, while the Russian defence ministry was 
focused on defining the strategic interests first and rejected any deployment without clear 
coordination. But both, rejected a creation of a separate independent Abkhazia, facing Russia’s 
own separatism, as well as viewed the Georgian situation to secure Russian territorial 
interests. 484 For example, in 1993, General Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defence Minister, 
stated “I will only say that this is a strategically important area for the Russian army. We have 
certain strategic interests here and must take every measure to ensure that our troops remain: 
otherwise, we will lose the Black Sea.” 485  
Accordingly, Russia and Georgia signed CIS initial documents, economic charter, and 
Collective Security Treaty, aimed at institutionalizing Georgia’s part in a Russia dominated 
security balance in the region.486 Part of that included Russian control of the port of Poti, and 
Bombara airfield, as well as three military airbases, “peacekeeping battalions” drawn from 
mostly Russian troops already inside Georgia, as well as talks between Russia and Georgia on 
developing common air defence systems. 487 Shevardnadze faced with an insurgency, agreed 
to lease military bases and ports to Russia, and were in turn guaranteed safety by Russia. 
Russian Black Sea Fleet marines retook Poti, and supported Georgian troops in countering the 
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insurgency, as the Russian government noted that a united Georgia is in Russian interest, as 
disintegrated Georgia would instigate copycat insurgencies. 488  
Russian force were not peacekeepers in the classical sense of the term, and their positioning 
was purely for geopolitical purposes.489 There were little coordination between Russian forces 
and United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, and the lack of any UN oversight on the  
Russian forces was accepted as a part of the process, by both the UN Envoy Eduard Brunner, 
who stated that Russia wouldn’t permit any control or interference over troops, as well as from 
the Russian side, with Colonel-General Kondratyev echoing a similar sentiment, declaring 
Russian troops to be free and Russian force presence being an agreement and CIS operation. 490  
Since Vladimir Putin became president, in 2000, a change of strategy, and the restoration of 
Russia’s power were evident in the region. 491 As discussed in previous chapters, the Russian 
economy improved around the same time, powered by oil and gas prices, as did rapid Russian 
military rearmament. In a similar fashion to Ukraine, and broadly Europe, Russian oil and gas 
were used as weapons of coercion in Georgia as well, as a sign of a new Russian assertiveness. 
Gazprom, Russian gas monopoly, doubled the price for Georgia from $110 a thousand cubic 
meters, to $230, the highest for any former Soviet Republics, as a response to the Rose 
revolution, while banning Georgian mineral water and wine. Georgians perceived these acts as 
political. But overall, tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi were minimal from 1992 to 
2004. 492  
Rose Revolution and Russian reaction 
In November 2003, Mikhail Saakashvili stormed the Parliament with his followers, and a 
subsequent peaceful revolution brought down the post-Soviet era leadership of President 
Eduard Shevardnadze. The revolution followed generic unrest in the region and was quickly 
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followed by the Orange revolution in Ukraine discussed in the previous chapter. Denounced 
by Moscow, worried about the changing balance of the region, this was a part of a few 
movements led by young Euro-oriented liberal leaders who were opposed to status-quo. The 
shifts after the Rose revolution and the lead up to the war presents evidence to explore the first 
puzzle. The change in the Georgian behaviour led Russia to believe that the threat to its 
strategic stability is increasing, with increased Georgian offensive capability, and offensive 
intention. That in turn led Russia to a balancing behaviour, and eventually, with Georgian 
intervention in the breakaway provinces, to war. After the short war, with the strategic stability 
restored, and the perceived threat from Georgia neutralised, Russia returned to its previous 
status quo posture. 
The major geopolitical shifts in the region, however, were already in motion, and started in 
1997, when Georgian government concluded to construct oil pipelines, as a measure of 
strategic independence, which completed in 1998 provided an alternative to Russian proposals 
of transporting oil via Russia. 493 Georgian discussions with Ukraine and Azerbaijan on 
“strategic partnerships” also blunted Russian policy towards CIS states. 494 Simultaneously, 
Georgian conciliatory policies, towards the EU and NATO were anathema to the Russian 
political and military elite. 495 EU countries were heavily dependent on Russian energy, and 
energy as a part of negotiating strategy was an essential component of the Russian external 
security policy. 
Georgian and Russian relations started to fray around the same time a new government was 
established in Georgia after the Rose revolution, and Georgia’s rebuffing of Russian desires to 
privatise and monopolise oil transport via Gazprom. 496 As a counter measure, a number of 
states and organisations started to make efforts to end Russia’s monopoly, on the transport of 
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energy supplies in the region, by creating alternative pipelines and routes, which included the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines between Georgia and Turkey, a 
NATO member, as well as the Nabucco gas pipeline between the EU, Georgia and 
Turkey. 497 This development required a change in the Russian security posture, as stability in 
the Caucasus was a vital requirement, for uninterrupted transport of Caspian oil and gas and 
the Caspian Sea region contains around 4-6 percent of the world oil and gas reserves. The 
Russian armed forces were the net security provider in the region, and that includes the task of 
protecting the energy sources and offshore platforms, as well as CIS initiated anti-terror efforts. 
With the development of the new pipelines, and with the involvement of Turkey and the EU, 
Russian strategic monopoly was threatened, as it would have been NATO’s duty according to 
new arrangement to secure the BTC pipeline, from Turkey. Simultaneously, Georgian interest 
in the United States training Georgian troops tasked with the protection of pipelines, changed 
the dynamic of the region. 498  
Russian balancing action 
The Russian reaction to these changes corroborates and follows the theory in two ways as 
discussed below. First, with the increase of Georgian belligerence, it was interpreted in Russia 
as an increase in offensive intention. Second, Georgian actions, and military and infrastructure 
build-up, as well as Georgian overt moves to shift away from Moscow towards the EU and 
NATO was interpreted in Russia as an immediate increase in aggressive power and the source 
of threat moving closer to the Russian strategic interests. 499 
Tensions started to increase with the election of President Saakashvili in 2004, who promptly 
committed his country to NATO and the EU, as well as the US led war in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
while proclaiming publicly, that his government was committed to restore central writ on 
Georgia’s “lost territories”.500 These rapid changes happened, similar to the ones that happened 
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in Ukraine, discussed in details in the previous chapter, around the same time when Moscow’s 
tensions with the US and the European Union started to rise, over the Iraq war and democracy 
promotion, as well as the colour revolutions in the Russian “sphere of influence”, an outcome 
that was watched with alarm, from Moscow. 501 Georgia’s Rose Revolution ushered in a new 
government, which was promptly embraced by the US, and the EU. 502 In turn, the new 
Saakashvili government, started a slow orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic security 
structure, including a desire to be a member of both the European Union and NATO, and also 
simultaneously started to distance itself from Moscow centric economic organisations. Georgia 
was also hailed by both the EU and the US, as a beacon of democracy compared to Russia 
which was considered corrupt. 503 The 2006 Freedom House report for example, ranked 
Georgia above Russia in seven of eight indicators of political rights and civil liberties. 504 The 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index also ranked Georgia as transparent 
compared to Russia. 505  
The Georgian government, under Saakashvili was also comparatively more assertive than the 
revolutionary regime in Ukraine. In 2006, Tbilisi arrested four Russian military intelligence 
officers in Georgia for espionage, prompting Russia to close all air, sea and land transport links 
to Georgia and deploy armoured forces in the border of South Ossetia.506 Saakashvili was clear 
about his dual attempt of changing the status quo and balance of power that existed in the region 
since the Georgian secession from the Soviet Union, one by moving his propelling his country 
towards the EU and NATO, and two by building strategic infrastructure, with an aim to 
eventually retake control of the breakaway rebel provinces.  
                                                             
501 Finkel, E. (2012) ‘Russia and the colour revolutions’ Democratization 19/1. 
 
502 Bouchet, N (2016)  ‘Russia’s “Militarization” of Colour Revolutions, Policy Perspectives, 4/2: 1-4. 
 
503 Delcour, L. & Wolczuk, K. (2015) ‘Spoiler or facilitator of democratization?: Russia's role in Georgia and 
Ukraine’, Democratization, 22/3: 459-478. 
 
504 Fortin, J. (2010) ‘A Tool to Evaluate State Capacity in Post-communist Countries, 1989–2006’  European 
Journal of Political Research 49/5: 654–686. 
 
505 ‘Freedom in the World Report. Methodology Section’, Freedom House Website, 
2013; Transparency International Corruption Index – Country Profile 
Georgia https://www.transparency.org/country/GEO 
 
506 ‘Putin fury at Georgia “terrorism”’ The BBC News, October 1, 2006; Russia Imposes Sanctions on Georgia, 
audio stream of report by BBC reporter Matthew Collin at National Public Radio. 
160 
 
Or in theoretical terms, Saakashvili proceeded on a course of “internal balancing”. For 
example, while opening a highway, he commented, “This is a historic day because for the first 
time in Georgia, in our history, a modern, high-quality, world-standard motorway is being built 
that will link Tbilisi and Tskhinvali in 2008 ... During the first term of our presidency, my 
presidency, I am planning to complete Tbilisi-Tskhinvali highway and during the second term 
finally to complete the Tbilisi-Sukhumi motorway. So, now I declare the construction of the 
Tbilisi-Tskhinvali-Sukhumi motorway open. Today is 15 March 2006. In 2008, we will travel 
to Tskhinvali by this road, and in 2010, or at the beginning of 2011 at the latest, this road will 
take us to Sukhumi…”; rhetoric that was duly noted in Moscow.507  
As discussed previously in the Ukraine chapter, around the same time Ukraine was undergoing 
rapid changes, the Rose revolution in Georgia also was a transformation which changed the 
Russian strategic dynamic. The revolutionary changes in Georgia were a dual project which 
attempted to modernize Georgia, and orient it towards the EU and NATO security architecture, 
as well as bring about forces territorial reunification. In President Saakashvili’s own words in 
2006, it was a historic opportunity to join Tbilisi with Tskhinvalli and Sukhumi, with the 
construction of modern highways. 508 While Saakashvili was noted for his bombastic 
personality, his pronouncements added to the confusion. 509 
Alongside, Saakashvili rapidly transformed the Georgian military, established two modern 
brigade level bases in Senaki, near Abkhazia, and Gori, near South Ossetia. Georgian military 
budget dramatically rose from USD 50 million in 2003, to USD 600 million in 2007, and almost 
USD 1 billion in 2008. 510 This increase, from US$50 Million during the Rose revolution, to 
US$1 Billion by 2008, was with official justification being that the defence budget increase is 
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needed to upgrade Georgian military to NATO standards. 511 US training programs were 
undertaken and Israeli weaponry, usually used for Anti-Access/Area Denial, including drones, 
anti-air systems, and military helicopters were procured for that purpose. 512 The Georgian 
government was frank about the increase of the defence budget, and the official explanation 
was to upgrade Georgian military to NATO standard, as a pathway to future intended 
membership with the Western alliance. 513  
Georgian procurement of large scale weapons, including battle tanks, artillery, Israeli drones 
and anti-air systems, American military helicopters, as well as Georgian collaboration with the 
US in training programs, resulted in a massive security dilemma, with the addition of offensive 
capability in Georgian forces changing the dynamic of the region.514 The Georgian policy 
towards the breakaway provinces changed to a more assertive and belligerent posturing, with 
sporadic incursions by Georgian forces into breakaway territories. 515 Geopolitical changes 
started taking place as well, in May 2004, right after Saakashvili took power, there was massive 
military pressure and build up, on Abkhazian border, which lasted till July when sever clashes 
between Georgian and South Ossetian forces took place with dozens of casualties. For example, 
in May 2004, a few months after the Rose revolution, Georgian troops forced a rebel leader to 
leave Adjara, an autonomous province. 516 Meanwhile Saakashvili administration pushed for 
alternative governments, and in 2006, Georgian troops raided Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia to 
remove a local rebel. The Georgian government also pushed for an ‘alternative government’ in 
South Ossetia under Dmitri Sanakoev, in an open attempt to stir up the dormant province and 
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push toward reunification, against the Moscow-sponsored government of Eduard 
Kokoity.517 In 2006, Georgian troops entered the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, during a joint 
military-police operation to remove a rebel leader, and a pro-Georgian Abkhazian government 
in exile was established there.518 Georgia also arrested four Russian army officers on spying 
charges. These were clear signals from Georgia that the intention was to not just replace rebels, 
but to unite Georgia as well as work towards integration with the EU and NATO. 519 A number 
of modern military bases were established during this period, especially two strategic ones, in 
Senaki, a chokepoint near Abkhazia and in Gori, near South Ossetia, with each brigade having 
capacity of 3000 soldiers. 520  
Moscow’s reactions reflected the changed calculus.521 Earlier in 2006, in face of renewed 
Georgian assertiveness, Russian President Putin warned there could be a "bloodbath" in its 
breakaway regions, as the issue is not limited between Russian peacekeepers already present 
and Georgia, but that it was an issue which included South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He added 
"To our regret and fear, it is heading for a bloodbath. Georgia wants to resolve the disputes 
with military action." Arrest of Russian officers prompted Putin to comment that the “initiative 
to worsen relations originated not from Russia.” 522 Former defence minister Sergey Ivanov 
accused NATO of propping up Georgia and warned against Georgian inadequate actions 
against Russian personnel.523 Russia also recalled ambassador from Georgia. 524 Chairman of 
the State Duma committee on the CIS, Andrei Kokoshin accused NATO of pulling Georgia to 
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its orbit as a means of pushing Russia out of its sphere of influence. In his statements to the 
State Duma, Kokoshin mentioned that Russia has “more than enough political, economic, and 
socio-cultural reasons to be negative about admission of these countries to NATO. Our 
military-strategic concerns are also growing.”525 Russia started to view the Rose revolution as 
a coup orchestrated by the EU and NATO, with the single strategic aim of encouraging Georgia 
to be belligerent towards Moscow, and destabilise Russia’s strategic sphere. 526  
Evidence therefore suggests that Georgia’s Rose Revolution and the rapid westward shift 
fuelled a political and strategic counter reaction from Russia. Especially, declared Georgian 
desire and actions and the orientation towards embracing Euro-Atlantic security as well as 
economic structures, and desire to substitute Russia’s troops as the net security provider of the 
region, were perceived as an emerging and sudden threat, and the pace of development 
blindsided the Russian strategic community. 527 Economic steps were also taken from Moscow 
to delegitimise the new Georgian government. In 2006, imports of Georgian wine and mineral 
waters, the two leading exports to Russia was banned, on the ground that they failed Russian 
health standards.528 Same year in October, as a retaliation of the arrest of four Russian officers 
in charge of spying, the Russian government introduced broader sanctions, suspended all 
transport and postal service links, and re-launched visa checks, and background information 
gathering of ethnic Georgians, as well as roundup and deportation of any ethnic Georgians 
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from a number of Russian cities. 529 As with Ukraine after the Orange revolution, Gazprom 
doubled the price of gas export to Georgia in November 2006. 530  
Political pressure from Moscow included Russian governments increasingly overtly supporting 
unrecognised separatist regimes in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.531 By 2006, the Russian 
state duma expressed its support for the independence aspirations of the breakaway provinces, 
under Russian peacekeepers.532 In February 2007, in one of the strongest threats, Russia’s 
ambassador in Tbilisi, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, publicly warned Georgia to adopt a status of 
political and military neutrality, which was in effect a threat implying that Georgia stands to 
lose political control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia unless it desisted from its efforts to join 
NATO.533 Simultaneously, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov declared 
the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO to be “unacceptable” to Moscow, and in a 
speech in March that year to the Russian Duma, Lavrov for the first time referred to Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, and Transnistria as “republics”.534 Soon after, Russian official documents 
started referring  to the leaders of the provinces as Presidents. 535 The evidence of Russian 
military preparedness is tricky and provides conflicting narratives. By all accounts, Russian 
military was prepared for a war, but was not anticipating a Georgian attack. For example, 
Russian 58th Army movement towards Georgian border, and in South Ossetia demonstrates a 
level of readiness that could be construed as an eventual preparation for a full-scale war, by the 
Russian leadership. In May 2008, Russian troops were deployed to repair rail networks that 
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would be in future utilised for rapid logistics and troop transport.536 In April 2008, Moscow 
deployed additional two thousand troops in Abkhazia as peacekeepers. Russia’s North 
Caucasus Military district was in a state of full operational readiness and around 8000 troops 
were stationed there to conduct exercises between July and August.537 There were also reports 
that Russia was transporting air defence components and rocket systems to Abkhazia all 
through spring.538 Repeated Russian provocations were part of a coercive strategy, including 
sending three thousand Russian troops to Abkhazia, shooting down of a Georgian drone, and 
in a pointed signal, violation of Georgian airspace by Russian jets before the visit of US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.539 The most important signal, as well as potential war 
preparation was the Kavkaz-2008 military exercise, in July 2008 a month before the war, meant 
to prepare Russian forces to launch a quick intervention and assist Russian peacekeeping troops 
in South Ossetia, from a Georgian attack.540 The exercises also came immediately after the 
joint US-Georgian war games ‘Immediate Response – 2008’.541  
Separatists in Ossetia and Abkhazia were also preparing themselves for an inevitable conflict 
with Georgia. 542 Russia also started to distribute Russian passports to a large population of 
South Ossetians, and a Russian citizen who was resident of Moscow, was elected the President 
of South Ossetia.543 Moscow controlled all the security personnel in the South Ossetian 
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administration which was seen from Georgia as a de-facto annexation by Russia. This spiral 
was accentuated by the direction by a Russian presidential decree in April 2008 which 
established direct official Russian relations with the South Ossetian and Abkhaz 
authorities.544 In NATO Bucharest summit in 2008, North Atlantic Council while rejecting the 
membership action plans for Georgia and Ukraine, agreed that eventually, both “will become 
members of NATO” and stated that “therefore we will now begin a period of intensive 
engagement with both at a high political level.”  545  
Situation deteriorated rapidly in August, as Georgian positions were targeted sporadically by 
Ossetian militias, leading to Georgia accusing Russia of being complicit in allowing Ossetian 
mercenaries and transport military hardware through the strategic Roki tunnel.546 Russia, in 
turn accused Georgia of massive build-up of troops and armour, as a preparation for war. On 
7th of August, Georgian troops started shelling Ossetian position, which led to open combat 
between Georgian forces and Russian peacekeepers.547 It was beyond doubt, the first shots of 
this conflict were fired from the Georgian side, and led to a massive, and disproportionate 
retaliation from Russia, which resulted in Georgian defeat in a short punitive war. 548  
In sum, the combined Georgian actions, and a reaction from Moscow, corroborates the theory. 
The new Georgian government after the Rose revolution categorically started to move Tbilisi 
away from Moscow towards a more Western alliance and economic and security structure. 
Georgian military build-up, import of offensive weapons capability, training with Western, and 
especially American troops, and Saakashvili’s rhetorical belligerence resulted in a rapid decline 
of strategic balance in the region. Georgian arrest of Russian spies, infrastructure build-up 
towards breakaway provinces, as well as sporadic acts of aggression resulted in Moscow’s 
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military build-up and preparation for an eventual conflict. When Georgian forces attacked the 
rebel provinces, which included Russian troops, Moscow reacted overwhelmingly to restore 
the balance. 
 
After the invasion: Russia as a status-quo power 
The second theoretical puzzle is whether Russia acted as an expansionist power, or a security 
maximiser. Current literature on the Georgian war is silent on this theoretical question. 
Evidence explored suggest that Russia was thoroughly unprepared for the eventual conflict, 
even though it had inclination that the situation might lead to conflict. Second, the Russian 
forces lacked the capability to occupy Georgia. Third, the Russian leadership chose to act as a 
status quo power, and took the advantage of withdrawing, once the perceived strategic threat 
was neutralised, and the strategic balance was restored. 
While it is accepted that Georgia was the side that initiated the actual conflict, the counter 
narratives suggest that Russia forced Georgian hand, by continued 
provocations.549 Miscalculation from the Georgian side about Western military assistance also 
resulted in further adventurism.550 However, the Russian military preparedness, operational 
process, and endgame also sheds light on Russian strategic aims, which in turn answers some 
key theoretical questions. The Russian military preparedness, during the build-up to the war, 
as discussed above, indicated that there was a certain sense of impending conflict among the 
Russian military and foreign policy circles. Despite the preparedness the timing of the conflict 
took Russia by surprise. All evidence suggest that Russia was not actually ready for the conflict 
to start, when it did, and the suddenness of Georgian assault was unexpected in Moscow. 
Evidence also suggests that the Russian military never intended to occupy Georgia. 551  
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On August 7th, 2008, after weeks of tensions, Georgian military launched an assault on the 
South Ossetian units. The Russian senior officers were simply unavailable at the time of the 
assault during the popular August vacation period, signifying a lack of anticipation, and indeed 
operational planning. The then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was attending the opening 
ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, when the first shots were fired, and the Russian news 
reported that the defence minister Serdyukov was unavailable for comment for over ten hours 
after hostilities began, as he was vacationing on the Black Sea coast.552 The senior officer corps 
were on leave, which were then subsequently cancelled and revoked. The retired head of the 
Defence ministry’s Main Operations Directorate, had to be brought back under special 
intervention from the political leaders. 553  
The Russian military chain of command also experienced unforeseen anomalies, which were 
evident from Russian operations. While the 58th Army was prepositioned, the 102nd Army 
brigade and the armour corps, and artilleries, and systems which are needed for a ground 
invasion, were not available for over a day, which suggested lack of strategic forethought, or 
unpreparedness.554 The unavailability of the senior political leadership suggests that there was 
a lack of intelligence about Georgia’s offensive intentions. Likewise, it was not a case of 
strategic deception, as that would not entail the senior leadership rushing back to Moscow, 
including Vladimir Putin, who had to cut short his Beijing trip. There were also discrepancies 
in the Russian force posture which suggests a lack of coordination, as well as planning. 
The argument that Russia was not prepared for an expansionist war, is bolstered by evidence. 
The Russian counter-attack included a mix of offensive and defensive assets, which indicates 
a confusion among the Russian military ranks regarding the purpose of the force. The offensive 
force included Russian Tu-22 Backfire bombers and Su-24s Fencer and Su-27 Flanker attack 
aircrafts, which were expected to be part of any invasion force and simultaneously conducted 
raids over Gori, Rustavi, and near the capital Tbilisi. 555 The lack of support systems, and the 
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heavy loss of Russian aircrafts as well as inability to operationalize air dominance was also 
visible. Bombing, and artillery fire especially with missile systems like SS-21 Tochka, which 
are primarily used as defensive weapons, was concentrated not just in military centres or as a 
strategy of invasion, but on areas close to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines, which were 
not related to Georgian forces, and were out of operational zones and indicated a punitive 
intention instead of establishing deterrence or continuing invasion. 556 There were no actions 
from the Russian Navy, which is unusual for an invading force or troop movements, other than 
the Black Sea Fleet hurriedly organised to blockade the coast of Poti and Sukhumi.557 The 
Russian military strategy was primarily defensive and punitive, and included setting up buffer 
zones in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were already under de facto a Russian control, 
rather than rapid thrusts into enemy territory. Crippling Russian bombing on Georgian 
command and control also indicated a punitive nature of the war. 558  
Simultaneously, there is extensive evidence of intelligence and coordination failure, suggesting 
a lack of planning. The Russian army units lacked basic kits, and the interoperability of radios 
between army and air force, unusual for an invading force.559 Russian officers had to use the 
satellite phones of embedded journalists to report to headquarters. 560 The Russian forces were 
seen to use outdated Soviet maps, and bombing targets and air fields which were operationally 
dormant and out of use, instead of new important bases. 561 For example, the newly established 
military base at Gori, only suffered damages from ground troops, and no attack from the 
Russian air force. The massive clumsy Soviet style column formations, moving slowly, and 
relying of heft instead of speed, also showed lack of newer methods and strategies, and an army 
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completely ill prepared to face what it considered ostensibly a growing enemy, and facing 
enormous casualty rate.562 While that maybe co-incidental, due to Russian slow-paced military 
reforms, it somewhat makes the existence of a plan doubtful.563 There was a complete lack of 
senior officer leadership during the entirety of the conflict, which resulted in the Russian 
armour and tanks entering battle unprepared. It led to General Makarov argue that Russia had 
to hurriedly handpick “colonels and generals from all over Russia”. 564 Likewise, Sergei 
Skokov the Chief of Staff during the First Chechen war, compared the unpreparedness of the 
Georgian war, saying, “[during the ‘problem in the North Caucasus’] there was not a single 
command and control organization, formation or military unit that had been prepared and was 
ready that instant to begin to accomplish its missions… the same again occurred in 
Georgia.”565   
Discrepancy with rhetoric: Evidence from operations 
Moscow consistently maintained that the Georgian war was defensive and retaliatory, and in 
response to Georgia’s “treacherous and massive attack” on the rebel provinces, and on the 
locally deployed Russian peacekeeping contingent, and therefore is an act of war forced upon 
Russia which it did not desire. 566 Tbilisi maintained that the Georgian government’s hand was 
forced by a Russian troop build-up and Georgia did not anticipate such massive Russian 
military counterattack, and miscalculated the Russian resolve. But that claim is debatable, as 
Georgia was repeatedly warned by the United States to not provoke Russia into a 
war.567 Russian counter-argument was that the “illegal use of force by Georgia” against 
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Russian troops violated international norms and was an act of war against the Russian 
Federation, and justified self-defence under international law.568 The justification of the war 
from the Russian side, was two-fold. Initially, the Russian President Medvedev stated that 
Russia has a right of self-defence against Georgia’s attacks on Russian troops, which were 
“gross violations, of the mandates that the international community gave Russia in the peace 
process”.569 The 58th army was called a reinforcement to the Russian peacekeeping contingent. 
As the war went on, the peacekeeping argument also morphed, and Moscow declared that 
Russian operations are “peace coercion” operations, to neutralize enemy assaults.570 Medvedev 
also asserted that ‘nobody is questioning the principle of territorial integrity’ in international 
law, but that ‘the question is one of a specific situation in a specific country’.571 Over time, the 
Russian narrative changed and mirrored western narrative of stopping “genocide” and took a 
humanitarian character. Russian leaders, including Putin and Lavrov termed the military 
operations as to prevent violations of international humanitarian laws, similar to the NATO 
rationale for intervening in the Balkans. Lavrov argued that Russian laws made it “unavoidable 
for Russia to exercise the responsibility to protect.” 572 Lavrov stated, ‘Russia will not allow 
the death of its compatriots to go unpunished … the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever 
they are, will be protected’ a statement echoed by Russia’s NATO envoy, ‘the issue of using 
military force to protect our citizens is a matter of principle’, albeit ‘within the framework of 
the humanitarian aim of saving peoples’. 573 While recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
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the Russian top leadership maintained that ‘every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible 
action which deprives peoples of their right to self-determination and freedom and 
independence.” 
But Russian actions did not reflect the bombastic rhetoric, and suggested that regime change 
or occupation of Georgia was not a plan, and that Russia was either satisfied by the objective 
of dividing Georgia, or deterred by the withering military losses. Even with the extreme lack 
of coordination, and lack of an integrated combat plan, the large Russian contingents eventually 
managed to overpower their rival forces. Russian tactic changed as the war went on, with the 
deployment of motor-rifle divisions and heavy armour and troops from beyond the North 
Caucasus Military District. The 76th Air Assault Division was brought from Leningrad Military 
District and was airlifted in a hurried fashion signifying that the exact timing of the intervention 
was not according to Moscow’s choosing. There was no visible concentration of armoured and 
airborne forces prior to the commencement of hostilities. While Russia had forces ready for an 
eventual hostility in Abkhazia, a terrain of choice for Russian military command for a short 
punitive campaign, with the Georgian retaliation, Moscow had to spread the operational theatre 
of war, to South Ossetia. An important evidence consistent with the scenario was the mission 
conducted by Russian railroad troops during the June-July 2008 repair of strategic railway to 
Abkhazia, to move armour in case of a conflict. Similar actions were not evident in case of 
South Ossetia. 
The start of the war saw Russian forces mirroring ancient Soviet strategies of massing and 
overwhelming numbers, and movement in one column which faced overwhelming casualties 
for a great power in a battle with a relative smaller power. 574 Russian air campaign involved 
over three hundred combat aircrafts, but the campaign was unable to achieve air dominance 
even on the day the war ended, as Georgian anti-air operations were not subdued.575 Russian 
troops managed to rapidly disperse over swathes of undisputed Georgian territories, and the 
conflict was not localised in just South Ossetia and Abkhazia. One can surmise that this was 
necessary as Russia had no option of clear dominance over Georgian forces but had to isolate 
and spread them in order to rely on numbers. Russia accordingly transferred over nine thousand 
                                                             
574 Ellison, B. J. (2011) ‘Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War’,  Demokratizatsiya, Elliott School of 
International Affairs. pg. 343–366 
 





troops to Abkhazia to recapture the upper Kodori valley from Georgian control alongside 
massive artillery and aerial bombardment in other parts of the conflict to keep Georgian forces 
occupied and dispossessing them of the means to concentrate defences. Russian mechanised 
troops opened up new fronts in undisputed UN security zone, opening up new fronts.576 The 
towns of Zugdid and Georgian military base in Senaki, established under Saakashvili were 
occupied, and the main roads and railways were taken under control. The Black Sea port of 
Poti was captured denying Georgia the means for any sea-based mobilisation. During the 
duration of the war, Russia fielded around forty thousand troops compared to around twelve 
thousand Georgian troops, and relied on numbers and weight to achieve theatre dominance and 
overwhelm a relatively smaller opponent.577 Russian artillery and aircraft assaults were also 
massive, and unspecified, compared to more precision strikes that are practiced by her Western 
counterparts. With no Western assistance, or force movements, or support, by the end of a 
week, even with operational problems, Russia was in the driving seat of the conflict, with more 
or less complete control of the strategic chokepoints, ports and rail routes, which are potentially 
useful for an invasion force.  
The Russian operation was officially declared to be over, on the 12th of August, after six days 
of full spectrum conflict as a six-point ceasefire was agreed under the mediation of French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy and Russian President Medvedev, which was also signed by 
Georgian leader Saakashvili after rapid negotiations spearheaded by France.578 The Russian 
president Medvedev declared that “objectives” were achieved. Moscow insisted that Russia is 
within rights to take “extra security measures” to deter future threats, which are open to broad 
interpretations. The Russian foreign minister Lavrov suggested that Russia is within its rights 
to ‘determine just which areas of Georgia must be demilitarised and placed under 
control’. 579 Accordingly, Russian forces were seen to patrol the military bases, ports and towns 
of Gori, Senaki and Poti, and Russian units took control of registering and securing surrendered 
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weapons and hardware. The ceasefire entailed Russian role as a peacekeeper and net security 
provider of the region, and accordingly, formation of “security zones”, in essence buffer zones 
between disputed territories and undisputed Georgia was unilaterally and arbitrarily determined 
by Moscow. The buffer zones of security were not concentrated on South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, but in practice was all over central Georgia, including the roads and highways 
connected under Saakashvili between the Eastern and Western parts of the country. 
The Russian military established observation posts both inside and bordering South Ossetian 
administrative zone, which were only dismantled after EU negotiations started, for the Russian 
troops to withdraw to the positions prior to the commencement of the conflict. The Russian 
ministry of defence stated that the operation which was to enforce peace, “as a means to 
promote Russian security interests and protect Russian troops” was completed successfully. 
The approval for the operation from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation was only 
sought after the conflict was over, thereby marking the unilateralism which Moscow perceives 
is the norm after Kosovo. The Russian military intelligence continued to claim that US 
instructors were directing and coordinating mercenaries from Ukraine and Georgia, without 
giving any proof, as well as noted that the US forces were continuing to arm and train Georgia 
forces. Moscow also accused the United States of sending military hardware, in the name of 
humanitarian aid, and calling for an arms embargo. 
 
Russian narrow aim of restoring a strategic balance 
In sum, here are the key findings from the chapter summarised. The geopolitical significance 
of the war was enormous, and substantially answers the two questions. First, the Russian lead 
up to the war, the conduct of the conflict, the mopping up operations and neutralizing threats 
and falling back to a position of status quo corroborates the theory of the balance of threat. On 
the second question, while direct evidence is scant, one can infer, from the Russian 
retrenchment after the conflict, that Russia was not either capable, or willing to 
occupy Georgia, or instigate a regime change. Whatever that may point at, it does not make 
Russia an expansionist power. 
The result of the conflict was that Georgia emerged as a thoroughly vanquished and diminished 
state, with its military forces completely routed, and reputation tarnished. The Rose revolution 
success story was of political reform and democracy was already under strain with 
Saakashvili’s domestic agenda, and was shattered after the war, which was blamed on Georgia 
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by the EU as it was technically Georgia who started the conflict, which resulted in a blow to 
the reliability of a Western ally, to its economy and earned the country a reputation of 
volatility.580 Georgia lost billions of dollars of investment, military and civilian infrastructure, 
deterrence potential from American training, and military equipment. 581The Rose Revolution 
led to a centralised decision making, which led to minimal checks and balances over the 
executive, giving a way out for Saakashvili’s belligerence, which led to an ill-thought-out 
military campaign, against the wishes of his Western allies, without any deliberation, prudence 
or consultation. 
That served the main purpose for Moscow. As per the dictates of Balance of Threat, Moscow’s 
chief goal was to ensure the upholding of the status-quo, where Russia had a favourable 
position in the regional balance. The war was a Russian strategic victory. The Russian troops 
remained in both the breakaway provinces, after the ceasefire and Moscow unilaterally 
recognised the independence of the provinces soon after, citing the Kosovo precedent. The 
primary military objectives were all achieved. The war ended Georgia’s nominal sovereignty 
over the provinces which Russia consistently considered as of immense strategic significance, 
and resulted in Russia re-establishing itself as the primary power broker and net security 
provider in the region. 
Second, Russia’s primary fear was NATO expansion in Moscow’s sphere of influence in the 
post-soviet space.582 As mentioned in the previous chapters Russia has long declared Georgia 
and Ukraine to be the redlines for NATO enlargement, and turning Georgia into a permanent 
simmering conflict zone entailed that Georgia’s accession to NATO was indefinitely 
forestalled. Georgia’s reputation as a volatile government, which is prone to conflict also meant 
that EU and NATO countries were sceptical of adding Georgia to the alliance. 583Russia thereby 
managed to achieve a balance of power and parity and the stability of a cold conflict 
zone.  Previously, it was considered a matter of time both Georgia and Ukraine would someday 
be a part of the Atlantic alliance, as put forth by the NATO membership action plan of 2008. 
While NATO members publicly stated that they intend to see Georgia as a member, there were 
                                                             
580 ‘Georgia started war with Russia: EU-backed report’, Reuters, Sept 30, 2009. 
 
581 Lesova, P.  (8 August 2008). "Fitch lowers Georgia's debt ratings to B+". MarketWatch. 
 
582 See, ‘Russia to Fund Abkhazian Military Modernization Amid Growing Tensions’ Reuters, Sep. 23, 2019. 
 
583 Facts about the 2008 war in Georgia Reuters Factbox, August 2009. 
176 
 
many private reservations about further ties with Georgia risking a potential conflict with 
Russia. The conflict served a strategic purpose of making NATO unlikely to be interested in a 
country with a frozen conflict.584 While Russia’s military was overall successful, it 
demonstrated flaws in operation, and showcased deep rooted problems in every single domain 
and provided the impetus long term reforms. A massive long-term rearmament was started 
under Medvedev, with the Russian forces particularly focusing on command and control 
breakdown and force mobilisation in the south Ossetian conflict and accounted for 27 percent 
increase in defence in 2009, a year after the war. 
The Russian offensive was rhetorically justified as a “peace creation” operation, rather than 
UN mandated peace keeping, and it is unlikely Russia ever intended to completely defeat the 
Georgian forces, or change the regime. The Russian force concentration as discussed above 
was insufficient. The Russian military was unprepared for a full-scale invasion, and conducted 
all operations with minimal force, and then scrambled to deploy additional troops picked and 
chosen from different parts of the country on an ad hoc basis. The seizure of Tbilisi and 
occupation of Georgia was never on the cards partly one can assume because it wasn’t planned, 
and partly Russia was not capable of a long term occupation force, as the Russian economy 
went on a severe and crippling downturn. Russians did not anticipate the ongoing global 
financial collapse as well, and the Russian economy was already slowing since July 2008, and 
there was increasing capital flight, due to the war. 
The ousting of Saakashvili and regime change was therefore not a primary objective, and 
Moscow settled for strategic restraint, condemnation of Georgia and status quo. 585This solved 
a few problems. Russia sought to create a new fait accompli, and attained its objective of 
stopping Georgia’s new revolutionary regime from turning Westward. Unresolved geostrategic 
issues and frozen conflict was enough for Russia to stop Georgia’s ascension to the EU and 
NATO both, and neither of those organisations were willing to offer any security guarantee to 
a volatile threat. Militarisation of the regions forced a new “fact on the ground” and removed 
the ambiguity of the Russian peacekeeping forces, while forcing the breakaway provinces to a 
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dependency on Russia. As Medvedev stated, there are regions in which Russia has a privileged 
interest and are home to countries which shares special historical relations. 586This terming of 
the region in civilisational terms betrays a narrow realpolitik which was achieved with a 
divided NATO over Georgia. 
In sum, the Russian foreign policy and military use of force in Georgia suggest that Russia was 
satisfied to carve out its privileged position in the region and use force to uphold the status-
quo. Second, Russia was not interested to occupy Georgia, and followed the dictates of Balance 
of Threat, and retreated back once the perceived threat was neutralised.  
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Chapter 7: The sources of Russian balancing  
  
The task of summarizing findings of a theoretical project attempting to explore the foreign 
policy of a great power is daunting, even more so, if the great power in question is secretive, 
and if the events studied for evidence are fluid and ongoing. It is also futile to claim that any 
single theory of international relations can provide a complete interpretation, as foreign policy 
is rarely monocausal. However, patterns emerge, and the purpose of any theory is to simplify 
complex phenomena.  
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the current literature and conventional wisdom about 
the Russian foreign policy in Europe and balancing behaviour is heavily tilted towards liberal 
democratic theories focusing on domestic politics of Russia, regime stability, diversionary war, 
with some constructivist theories which focuses on great power honour and ideology like 
Christian conservatism. There were no broad, overarching, long term, strategic analysis which 
considered the theoretical questions, and tried to explain that.  
However, an IR theory is as good as its explanatory power, and there were instances where the 
conventional wisdom fell short. Russia displays no mindless expansionism in every theatre 
everywhere, and the idea that any and all NATO expansion leads Moscow to aggressive 
balancing behaviour fails to explain why Russia chose conflict over Ukraine and Georgia, and 
not in Montenegro, the Baltics, or Macedonia. What considerations tilted the Russian decision 
in Ukraine and Georgia? It is not explained satisfactorily in current academic literature. 
Likewise, the idea that the Russian military aggression is predicated on Vladimir Putin’s 
declining domestic popularity also never sought to explain the timing of the Russian aggression 
in Ukraine, and Georgia with Putin’s popularity was sky high both the times, according to 
neutral polls taken by independent pollsters like Levada. The theory that Moscow uses 
diversionary war to polish over domestic economic fragility, also never explains the difference 
of 2008 and 2014, in the former case when Russia was economically sound and experiencing 
a phase of boom, to the latter case, when Russia was reeling. And finally, the constructivist 
theories of national pride, honour, Orthodox-Christian imperialism also severely lacks 
explanatory power. First, these frameworks are arbitrary. Second, it never explains what stops 
Russian militarism, or alternatively, what explains Russian return to status quo after every 
instance of military aggression. To give one recent example, if the Russian aggression of 
Ukraine was prompted by the idea of establishing Novorossiya, an imperial entity in line with 
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Russian historical regional hegemony, Moscow would not logically stop expanding. In reality, 
Russia’s military aggression was limited in scope, nature and territorial depth. The rhetoric of 
Novorossiya was quietly dropped after a few months, in the media. 
In that context, the theoretical framework of my thesis has a better explanatory power, in 
understanding the discrepancies of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy and military 
aggression in Europe. The aim of this thesis was not to provide an overarching theory of 
Russian foreign policy. That is beyond the limited scope or capability of one single PhD 
dissertation. Rather, this thesis aimed at testing a realist theory, within the broad realist 
framework. This dissertation attempted to explore Russian foreign policy and military 
aggression, especially the Russian balancing behaviour in Europe, in light of Stephen Walt’s 
Balance of Threat theory. The objective of that was simple. While Realism is a philosophical 
framework as well as research design, there are various realist IR theories within the broad 
framework, which are used to measure or understand various aspects of state behaviour and 
foreign policy. 
In this dissertation, the attempt was made to study Russian recorded military actions, balancing 
behaviour, and official rhetoric, to match the independent variables. Accordingly, the theory 
predicts a specific set of behavioural patterns. For example, aggregate power in a rival state or 
institution, that is the combination of total industrial and military resources would alter the 
perception of a state and higher or growing aggregate power would result in internal balancing, 
arms race, and search for allies. The political debates should have subsequently reflected those 
considerations and acknowledge the need to balance. Geographical proximity would also alter 
the regional balance, and threat perceptions, in the sense, if a perceived threat moves closer the 
threat perception would rise, and noticeable actions like repositioning weapons system, 
cultivating alliances, or increased military expenditure would be observed. Finally, if a state 
believed that these factors are combined with offensive power and weapons systems, and 
offensive intentions, and if the state believes that actions are existential, they would take 
actions, economic and strategic, to offset that threat and balance.  
  
To sum up, here are the broad theoretical predictions which were explored. 
1.      Higher aggregate power in a perceived strategic threat alters threat perception in 
Russia, and subsequently leads to internal balancing like arms race, or external 
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balancing, observable in alliance behaviour. That will reflect in the debates within 
Russian policy making circles as well as Russian actions. 
2.      The Russian state, regardless of regime type and era, will feel threatened by any 
power or coalition with overall greater aggregate power than Russia. That would 
include great powers, alliances, and coalitions. 
3.      The threat perception will incrementally increase if the source of threat moves 
closure to the Russian landmass and decrease if it moves away. The threat perception 
will also rise if offensive power increases, and will decrease if offensive power is 
replaced by defensive powers. These changes will be acknowledged by the Russian 
policy makers and there should be a record and reflection of that in debates and 
discussions. 
4.      A geographically closer threat with increased or increasing aggregate power, will 
result in greater concern and elevated threat perception in a state or great power, which 
will influence its balancing or bandwagoning behaviour accordingly. The Russia’s 
reaction to the NATO expansion, was explored to see if the causal variables are present 
in the events of a forceful reaction, or one or more of them is absent in the instances of 
muted reaction. 
5.      Finally, any altered security dynamic which threatens Russia’s privileged position 
in its neighbourhood, would result in Moscow’s balancing behaviour, and even use of 
military force, in extremis. Alternatively, the perceived threat, when neutralised or 
balanced, would result in Moscow moving back to status quo. This would also prove 
that Russia acts as a security maximiser, and not a power maximiser. Or in other words, 
Moscow is a status-quo and defensive realist power, and not a revanchist offensive 
realist power.  
 
The predictions from the theories were drawn accordingly and suggests a few key 
considerations. Higher aggregate power in a rival would always lead to internal balancing, arms 
race and altered threat perceptions, and the Russian state regardless of regime type and era 
would feel threatened by any power and coalition with overall higher aggregate power and that 
would include any great power, nation state or alliances. Any threat perception would 
incrementally increase if a threat was considered encroaching upon Russian strategic interests 
and would decrease if it was considered moving away. The threat perception would also 
increase if offensive power in a rival is increasing and would decrease if offensive power is 
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replaced by defensive power. Perceived and observable offensive intention or rhetoric would 
increase the threat perception in Moscow, regardless of actual power or capability in a rival 
state. All of these would be reflected in the Russian political decision making, and balancing 
actions would commence, for as long as the threat remains, and would subside when the threat 
is considered diminished. All of these assumptions, accordingly, lead to observable actions. In 
Russia’s case, if Russia’s neighbours lean towards NATO and the EU, it would be considered 
by Moscow as an increasing threat, whereupon a rival institution or power is slowly 
encroaching towards the Russian sphere of influence and threatening Moscow’s strategic 
interests, like naval ports, defence supply chains, defensible terrains, military bases, economic 
and export interests, etc., and accordingly Russia would take every action to offset that threat. 
Any instability in Moscow’s neighbourhood which will have Western support would be 
considered as Western measures, propaganda and penetration, and the threat perceptions will 
rise. All else being equal, these will be reflected in Russian actions, and Russian balancing 
actions would increase or subside depending on the perception of the centre or threat moving 
towards the Russian landmass. 
So, what should have been the observable actions on Moscow’s part? Ukraine’s move towards 
a security infrastructure with NATO or the EU, would be considered a threat by Russia and 
would be in turn considered an encroachment of a rival power in Moscow’s neighbourhood, 
which would destabilise local balance of power. There would be a distinct observable threat to 
material or strategic loss, which would be existential to Russia’s aggregate power and great 
power status. Russia would undertake every balancing action to offset those losses, for as long 
as the threat remains, and would only cease, when from Moscow’s perspective those losses 
diminished. Likewise, Georgia’s shift towards a rival alliance would result in balancing action 
from Russia, and any belligerence from Tbilisi would be considered offensive intention that 
alters the security scenario and balance of the region, and would result in direct action from 
Moscow, for as long as the threat remains. Russia would only return to status quo when the 
threat is perceived from Moscow to be over and the order of alignment of the region unchanged. 
In simple theoretical terms the findings should reflect these assumptions, Russia should attempt 
to balance any threat, and should act as a realist power. Alternatively, Russian return to any 
status quo whenever the perception of threat declines or is offset by the Russian balancing 
action, would emphatically suggest that Russia is a defensive realist power and security 
maximiser. If Russia is a power maximiser, it would act in a way consistent to unstoppable 
expansionism. If Russia is a security maximiser, it would be content as long as Russia’s security 
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interests remain unaltered, and the regional balance of power remain in Moscow’s favour. In 
the former case, any Russian military operation would be contingent with occupation forces 
and would continue, or follow a pattern contingent with regime change operations. In the latter 
case, the Russian military actions would cease after a time, and would show more narrow 
strategic restraint, and would be overall limited in nature, only meant to restore a balance or 
offset a direct threat to interests. 
That in itself is one of the key theoretical contributions from this study, and provide future 
guidance for the purposes of formulating policy and grand strategy. 
In all the cases observed, detailed in earlier chapters and summarised below, Russia behaved 
like a realist power. It weakened countries on the borderlands, and ensured that the Russian 
relative power, remains higher compared to her neighbours. Moscow ensured that the advance 
and enlargement of the EU and NATO is pushed back, and what it considers encroachment by 
hostile powers in Moscow’s sphere of influence is stopped. Russia balanced whenever the 
threat was sudden and moved back to status quo when the threats were neutralised. Russia also 
defended its supply chains, naval ports, military, and material interests in the regions where 
Russia already had a foothold. It carved out strategically defensible terrains, and created a fait 
accompli, even at the risk of changing the rules of post-war European order. It undertook 
extreme punitive actions against smaller powers which dared to act independent, but also 
moved back to status quo, when the threat of those smaller powers moving towards a hostile 
security infrastructure subsided. Most importantly, Moscow knew when and where to stop, in 
the middle of a conflict, preferring frozen conflict zones and leverage points, and did not, from 
evidence observed so far, engage in mindless continuous imperial expansion. 
Here is a summary of the key findings from each case studied. 
  
Russian reaction to NATO enlargement 
The Russian reaction to different phases of NATO enlargement was treated as evidence to test 
balance of threat theory. If the theory is correct, then any source of aggregate power, 
(institutional, alliances or states/great powers) moving closer towards Russian borders would 
trigger a heightening threat perception. Closer geographic proximity might heighten the threat 
perception in itself, but might or might not trigger a balancing reaction; but the threat perception 
would heighten even more if the offensive capabilities of the source of threat would increase. 
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If, however, Moscow is satisfied that there is no offensive capability or intention, there would 
unlikely be any military reaction. Likewise, if Moscow is satisfied that there is a lack of 
offensive intention then the threat perception would not increase, and no balancing action 
would take place. 
From the evidence observed, it can be argued, that NATO’s eastward enlargement was 
considered threatening by Russia, but the reactions to different phases of NATO enlargement 
showed variations, depending in turn on NATO’s offensive capability, and force posturing, as 
well as Russia’s perception of NATO’s offensive intentions. Moscow military and civilian elite 
were always opposed to NATO’s enlargement, and NATO’s first intended enlargement 
resulted in Russian alarm. Moscow however agreed on two conditions, that the enlargement of 
NATO would not result in new troops or offensive weapon systems in new member states. This 
was agreed between NATO and Russia and resulted in the NATO-Russia foundation act, which 
in turn led to permanent joint council as Moscow allowed theoretical expansion of Western 
power towards its former sphere of influence in Central Europe. 
Each phase of NATO enlargement resulted in varied Russian reactions. Prior to 1993, 
Moscow’s relative weakness was demonstrated in strategy doctrines which reflected Russia’s 
changed nuclear posture, as well as elite acknowledgement of Russia’s diminished status. The 
Soviet era No-First-Use policy was discarded when the NATO expansion was planned, 
signifying a heightened threat perception of a threat moving closer to Russian borders. But 
otherwise, Moscow’s reaction was muted, due to the absence of actual movement of NATO 
hardware east of Germany, as well as the agreement mentioned above, which demonstrated an 
absence of offensive intention on NATO’s part. Without any NATO troop, hardware, or 
permanent infrastructure in newer NATO countries, the actual balance of power did not shift 
in Europe and signified lack of offensive intention as well as offensive capabilities on NATO’s 
part, and NATO-Russia foundation pact ensured that the lack of offensive intention, on either 
side was institutionalised. During the build-up to Kosovo, NATO openly discussed moving 
headquarters from Germany to Poland, signifying the first time an intention to move 
infrastructure. Russian reaction changed immediately, when NATO intervened in Kosovo, and 
Moscow sent paratroopers to Pristina airport to secure Russian strategic interests. 
The September 11th terror attacks helped form new temporary alignment between Moscow and 
Washington, and the temporary transformation of NATO as a front against Islamic terrorism 
from a military alliance strictly focused on Europe, changed the perception in Russia. The 
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subsequent War on Terror and President George W Bush’s speech dubbing NATO as a political 
alliance or democracies instead of a purely military alliance, signified even lesser offensive 
intention on NATO’s part towards Moscow, and resulted in diminished threat perception in 
Moscow. However, that thaw was momentary, as NATO patrols over Baltics, and NATO plans 
for missile defence shields all over central Europe demonstrated a new offensive capability as 
well as shifting geographical proximity of threat towards Moscow. That, added with 
Washington’s support for democracy promotion, and steady flow of offensive capabilities 
eastward, under the Bush administration resulted in renewed scepticism in Moscow about 
Western intentions of encircling Russia. Moscow’s strategic doctrines reflected this change, 
and the Russian military elite as well as political elite, started to reconsider NATO as an enemy 
organisation. 
A more permanent break came with NATO’s second phase of enlargement, as Russia under 
President Putin started to move away from post 9/11 rapprochement with the West. While the 
conflict over Iraq resulted in Russia finding itself rhetorically aligned with France and Germany 
against Britain and the United States, a more permanent disruption happened with Western 
support of colour revolutions in former Soviet countries, as well as the NATO enlargement in 
2004. It also marked a change in NATO posture, as up until then NATO was at least nominally 
respectful of Russian aspirations as a great power. Post 9/11 American unilateralism, a 
permanent move of NATO firepower in the post-Soviet territories, a permanent shift of NATO 
hardware in the former Warsaw pact countries, and permanent and regular movement of assets 
over the Baltics close to the Russian military installations, signified a complete change of the 
balance of power in the region, and crossed a long determined territorial red line for Moscow. 
NATO’s offer of individual partnership action plan to Ukraine and Georgia after the colour 
revolutions, two countries which hosted Russian troops was another complete breach of 
Russian red line, and signified a source of existential threat moving inexorably towards 
Moscow. The rapid change of both offensive capability and perceived offensive intention on 
NATO’s part, reflected in Moscow’s military doctrines, as well as political leadership and led 
to Vladimir Putin’s infamous outburst in the Munich Security Conference of 2007. By the time 
the next phase of NATO enlargement took place in Albania and Croatia, Russian-Western 
relations were broken beyond repair and a war over territory in Europe, for the first time since 
WWII had already taken place. The Russian military doctrines in 2010, also finally reflected 
this new geopolitical reality, a position that has continued changed since. 
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All the aforementioned evidence demonstrates that Russia behaves per the theory of the balance 
of threat, when it comes to NATO’s aggregate power, territorial proximity, offensive 
capabilities and intentions. The Russian behaviour is in accordance with any realist power, 
which follows the dictates of balance of threat. The Russian threat perception rises with every 
phase of NATO enlargement, which from the Russian perspective is simply territorial 
expansion of a hostile entity. Each phase and movement towards the Russian border 
consolidate a Russian fear of encirclement by a hostile power. However, the Russian balancing 
action is dependent on offensive capabilities and perceived offensive intentions. Russia does 
not balance simply with any and every NATO enlargement, but only when the enlargement is 
accompanied with increased offensive power. Shifting of NATO hardware, platforms and bases 
are causes of concern for Russia with heightened risk perception, as well as the lack of 
offensive intention results in Moscow returning to status quo position. And finally, the Russian 
redlines about NATO enlargement in Ukraine and Georgia are strictly dependent on strategic 
and military interests and not some arbitrary ideological determinants. The behaviour of a great 
power is rarely explained by mono-causality, but the Russian behaviour with regards to NATO 
expansion gives us a solid groundwork on balance of threat theory, which is further 
corroborated in the cases of the Russian military aggression in Ukraine and Georgia. 
  
Russian balancing in Ukraine 
The evidence observed from Moscow’s belligerence with Ukraine suggest realist motives as 
well, and is in accordance to the balance of threat theory. The history between Russia and 
Ukraine suggests a pattern of Russian escalation, whenever there was a possibility that Ukraine 
was moving away from Russia’s sphere to join the security infrastructure of either NATO or 
EU, both in this case indistinguishable from Moscow’s perspective. The difference between 
2004 and 2014 is therefore in the scale of Russian reaction. It was evident that in the case of 
Ukraine, the primary worry from Russia’s side was Kiev slipping away. In both the instances, 
Moscow adopted a balancing behaviour, in the first instance, economic pressure and internal 
collapse of the revolutionary regime in Ukraine resulted in Moscow backing off and status-quo 
returning. In the second instance, the pace of the change was much more serious, and the threat 
was rapid, leaving Russia no option other than using force to defend strategic interests as well 
as force a fait accompli in the region. 
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Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a serious player in the European balance, as Ukraine 
provides Russia with defensible territorial buffer, a gigantic market for Russian products, 
strategic resources and supply chains which are not replicable and are existential for Russian 
forces, and access to Black Sea and navy port. Of course, with Russian nuclear weapons it 
would still remain a great power, but that is irrelevant in this context, as firstly, great powers 
do not like giving up their own power and strategic interests without any push-back, and 
second, Russia has more to lose in Ukraine than the West. Russian actions in Ukraine both after 
Orange revolution and the Euromaidan has therefore been one of strategic denial. In material 
terms, the gains to the Russian military after the annexation of Crimea, was historic in terms 
of capabilities and future potential. Crimea was a potential problem for Russia, and Moscow 
was never happy with legal constraints with leasing such a hugely strategic piece of real-estate, 
and those constraints were swept away with land annexation by force and a permanent base of 
the Black Sea Fleet, Russia’s primary European naval power projection force. Moscow now 
controls the region as the biggest naval power after the capture and interning of over twenty-
five Ukrainian vessels, making it the larger power compared to the nearest NATO rival, 
Turkey, while stopping all future lease payments to Kiev, a hefty amount of funds, to be 
potentially used for rearmament. 
Second, the Russian balancing action also highlighted a limited approach focused on strategic 
needs, instead of ideological expansion, both after the Orange revolution as well as after the 
Euromaidan and the resultant civil war. In the early days immediately after the Orange 
revolution, Russia deftly used energy resources to coerce the fledgling revolutionary 
government in Ukraine, and the rhetoric continued to be harsh. But Russia also kept diplomatic 
channels open with the local opposition, including pro-Russian politicians whom Moscow even 
supported during the election season. Moscow moved back to status-quo position promptly 
after the victory of Yanukovych. Likewise, after the civil war started, and Moscow rhetorically 
promoted the Novorossiya project, in reality, Russian-supported military actions were all 
localised conflicts, only in regions where Russia had direct strategic interests and supply chains 
located. For example, evidence studied suggest, very strongly, that Russian backed forces were 
concentrated in the regions in the Eastern parts of Ukraine, specifically those parts which 
produce hardware and mining products for the Russian military, and any ideological terms like 
the Novorossiya project were quietly dropped after a time.  
In short, there were no evidence of Moscow trying to spread the conflict in other parts of 
Ukraine, once it was satisfied that Crimea was annexed, the Naval port was in Moscow’s hand 
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permanently, and the supply lines for Russian armed forces are intact. While military decision 
making of Russia is opaque, there is strong ground to infer a logical restraint, that demonstrates 
a status-quo power. The key difference between 2004, and 2014 and the reason that Moscow 
went all the way to a conflict, might be therefore attributed to the pace of change, as after the 
Orange revolution, due to the dysfunction of the revolutionary regime, the threat of Kiev 
moving towards EU/NATO was not heightened as much as after Euromaidan, with the flight 
of Pro-Russian Yanukovych. But even in the latter case, once the strategic interests were 
safeguarded, Moscow pulled back instead of pushing forward with any more territorial 
expansion. 
The events of 2014 were catastrophic for Ukraine, with the economy shrinking by 20% in two 
years and over a hundred thousand internally displaced persons across Ukraine, compared to 
Crimea, which under Russian annexation is experiencing around 4 billion USD investment per 
year. Ukraine’s neighbours are also concerned with a conflict in the neighbourhood as well as 
worried about refugees, and both NATO and the EU have given up on the ascension of Ukraine 
for the near foreseeable future. This highlighted two lines of thinking. One, that the Russian 
government was aware of the relative inferiority both in aggregate power as well as allies, and 
the annexation of Crimea and the de facto control over Eastern Ukraine was a single largest 
increase in relative power in favour of Moscow. Two, by the simmering civil war, and proxy 
forces under Moscow’s command, as well as being a party to the Minsk accords, Moscow can 
control the tempo of fighting and that is purely used as a bargaining chip for Russia’s 
requirements. In fact, the Minsk protocol prevents a complete end of the hostilities, and thereby 
perpetuates the status quo, which is the desired outcome from Moscow, given Russia’s 
weakness. Kiev remains at a crossroad, without any help from NATO or the EU, dependent on 
Moscow, still for most supplies, while Russia retains control of the Black sea, a naval base, 
and enormous military infrastructure and hardware in the east of Ukraine. The simmering 
hostility itself makes Moscow the winner. 
The primary drivers of Russian actions were therefore material and strategic, the aim was to 
maintain Russian control over naval bases, and the military industrial centres. While archival 
evidence is inaccessible, the pace of annexation suggest a well-planned operation and the 
existence of such plans in advance. Moscow’s rapid transformation of Crimea attests to a 
contingency plan as well. With added ships to its fleet Russia now has extended control over 
strategic chokepoints, in Kerch Strait, and the Sea of Azov, as recent skirmishes also prove. 
The balance of power in the Black sea region remains in Moscow’s favour, and the simmering 
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conflict in the east, acts as a constant message to Brussels and Washington that there are costs 
when Russian interests are ignored. 
  
Russian balancing in Georgia 
While the evidence from the NATO and Ukraine case studies provides some direct 
corroboration of the balance of threat theory, the evidence from Georgia is more important, as 
this was the first instance of a declared war by Russia with a fixed end date, and the Russian 
approach to war not only provides one of the strongest evidence for the balance of threat theory, 
but also, the Russian limited military action provides a strong empirical refutation to the claims 
of Russian mindless militarism. In short, it is the evidence of Russian military aggression from 
Georgia, when studied in broader grand-strategic context, that provides the strongest 
confirmation of Russia acting as a status quo power, with limited martial capabilities and 
intentions, prone to act only when confronted with perceived threats to strategic interests. 
Russia, in reality, is afraid to lose its great power status, and losing Georgia and Ukraine to the 
EU or NATO, would essentially relegate Russia to a second-tier player with no stake at the 
balance of power in Europe. 
Evidence of the Russian war in Georgia, suggests that one, Russia was thoroughly unprepared 
for any eventual conflict; two that the Russian forces lacked the overall capability of occupying 
entire Georgian land, and three, the Russian leadership had no inclination to do so. It is Georgia, 
which provides the overall corroboration of the Russian status-quo behaviour, and balancing 
against threat that was evident and inferred from Russian conduct against NATO and Ukraine. 
The theoretical significance of the war is enormous, and substantially answers two key 
questions; Russian lead up to the war, the conduct during the conflict and operation after the 
cessation of hostilities and neutralizing remaining threats before falling back to a status quo 
position corroborate the fundamentals of defensive realism and the balance of threat theory, 
and Russia being a status quo power. Second point, which is a final evidence to the inferences 
drawn from other case studies, this being the only case with a declared conflict and fixed start 
and end dates, while direct evidence of the Russian decision making process remain 
inaccessible, from the Russian retrenchment after the conflict, it can be inferred that Russia is 
either incapable or unwilling to occupy Georgia, or instigate a regime change. Whatever that 
might point at, it does not make Russia an expansionist power determined to change the balance 
of power of the region, much less aspire to be a regional hegemon. 
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The Russian actions in Georgia did not reflect any bombastic rhetoric, and pointed at the lack 
of a plan for regime change, and retrenchment from Moscow’s side, the moment Russia was 
satisfied about achieving of strategic objectives, the objectives being retaining a Russian 
foothold and military presence in defensible terrain, having proxy regions for the Russian 
troops, and deterring future Georgian (and western) adventurism. The lack of coordination of 
Russian forces were only offset by a Soviet style mass movement and heavy reliance on 
overwhelming manpower even with withering losses. As the hostilities ceased, the Russian 
forces were ordered for clean-up operations which entailed every Georgian military 
infrastructure, in the occupied territories, captured during the war. The Russian government 
directives also led to the Russian units registering and interning surrendered weapons and 
platforms. The ceasefire essentially handed Russia the de facto control of the territories and 
buffer zones. 
The primary drivers of the Russian aggression in 2008 was strategic, and Georgia a potential 
candidate for NATO came out vanquished, divided and diminished in power, its military forces 
routed, and reputation shattered as a belligerent. The political agenda of domestic reforms that 
started immediately after the Rose revolution was shattered and stopped after the war, as 
Georgia’s belligerence and unnecessary war was a huge blow to its reliability as an ally and 
resulted in draining resources and aid and military investment, as well as the resultant shattered 
military infrastructures and hardware and American provided equipment. The Russian strategic 
victory was manifold, including control of breakaway provinces, which ended Georgia’s 
sovereign writ over these regions which Russia considered of immense strategic importance, 
where it already had troop present, which Moscow feared losing. Russia also established itself 
as a primary power broker and net security provider of the region, including the energy and oil 
pipelines.  
But more importantly, the Georgia war ended one of Russia’s long-standing fear of NATO 
expansion in its borders. Russian redlines in Georgia, similar to Ukraine, was against NATO 
enlargement, which would have resulted in a new security architecture. By turning Georgia’s 
provinces in a permanent frozen conflict, Russia indefinitely forestalled Georgia’s accession 
to NATO. Georgia’s own belligerence at pre-empting the conflict after Moscow’s provocation 
meant that the EU and NATO countries were sceptical in adding Georgia to the alliance. 
Moscow, thereby managed to achieve a balance of power and parity and the stability of a cold 
conflict zone. As tertiary benefits the conflict added to Russian experience of fighting a modern 
war, and showcased deep rooted problems in the Russian military operational process, and 
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resulted in a massive long term rearmament plan, especially focused on the command and 
control breakdown noticed during the operational phases of the conflict. 
There was no evidence of Moscow’s plan, capability or will of a regime change operation or 
plans to oust Saakashvili, and as was expected from a status quo power, Moscow demonstrated 
strategic restraint, condemnation of Georgia and retrenchment. The Russian offensive, which 
was rhetorical justified as a “peace creation” operation, rather than a UN mandated 
peacekeeping, which gave Moscow legal leeway to frame and shape the operation as it wished, 
however, was never intended to defeat Georgia or change the regime. The Russian force 
concentration was insufficient, military unprepared, and operational procedures displaying a 
punitive, rather than and territorial interest. The Russian economy was also severely crippled 
and facing a downturn due to the 2008 global financial collapse. But the Russian objective of 
creating a new fait accompli, of stopping Georgia’s revolutionary regime from joining any 
NATO/EU security structure, from stopping any loss of strategic territory which would result 
in the alteration of the balance of power of the region, an objective, was betrayed by Dmitry 
Medvedev when he bluntly stated, that there are regions in which Russia has a privileged 
interest. Everything else was simply rhetorical. 
  
Is Russia a realist great-power? 
Can Russian behaviour, balancing actions, and military aggression in Europe be explained by 
a framework of realism? Or in simpler terms, can Russian behaviour be attributed to realist 
logic, and is Russia behaving like a realist power in Europe? The answer would seem to be a 
cautious, yes. More specifically, Russia acts per the dictates of “balance of threat”, and thus, 
appears to be a defensive realist power, one which is cautious about strategic balance, willing 
to resort to force to defend established material, geographical and military interests, and willing 
to fall back to status-quo when the perceived threats are neutralised. It is also not evident that 
Russian policymakers are under any impression that they can be an expansionist and 
hegemonic power even if they so desire, and repeatedly Russia’s actual observed military and 
balancing actions have shown this disconnect from the usual bombastic rhetoric from the 
political class. 
What can one conclude form the Russian behaviour in Europe? Neorealism dictates that 
structural and material interests dictate the foreign policy of a great power. Material and 
military power determine states’ balancing behaviour, and the threat of loss provokes them to 
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aggression. The Russian understanding of geopolitics has always been one of vulnerability. As 
John Mearsheimer wrote, the perceptions of threat are often decided by geography. A great 
power which never had natural defensible borders or terrain or sea, and one which has 
constantly faced invasion from the Mongols in 12th century, Lithuania and Poland and Sweden 
between 13th and 17th century, to Napoleon Bonaparte, the Kaiser, and Hitler in modern ages, 
is wary of being surrounded or invaded by other powers. The Cold War era containment, that 
was designed to limit Soviet power, resulted in an alliance structure opposed to Russian hard 
power and hegemonic domination in Europe. With Soviet Union collapse, however, initially 
the Russians were Atlanticist, but with every phase of NATO enlargement, the Russians started 
to perceive a direct threat to their national interest. Moscow was acutely aware of its diminished 
position, and the ever-diminishing buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The understanding of a diminished strategic position is evident in the Russian military and 
political rhetoric and literature, as well as foreign policy. The desire to form or ensure new 
buffer zones were ever present, and the formation and creation of institutions like the 
Confederation of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the 
Eurasian Economic Union are testament to that grand strategy. Countries, in which Moscow 
already had strategic presence after the collapse of the Soviet Union were therefore vitally 
important to Russia’s aggregate power in Europe. Put simply, to use the terminology of 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Russia ceases to be a European great power with the loss of eastern 
Europe, especially Ukraine and Georgia. 
On the other hand, Russia lacks the power and capability of the Soviet Union to conquer the 
majority of Eastern Europe. The strategy of Moscow therefore reflects one of weakening and 
dividing, to prevent further loss of power in the region. In short, Russia’s fundamental aim 
appears to be the prevention of Ukraine and Georgia from joining any Western security 
architecture, which would in one swift move decouple Moscow’s supply chains, buffer zones, 
as well as naval ports and military bases in Europe. Unwilling to risk any military intervention, 
and occupation, Moscow’s favoured strategy therefore seems to be either punitive deterrence 
(Georgia) and frozen conflict and proxy wars (Ukraine). This further demonstrates the lack of 
capability and intention of Russia being an expansionist power. While Russia’s intention 
towards Ukraine and Georgia is undoubtedly hostile, it is still guided by a narrow strategic 
realism. Russia understands that losing Georgia and Ukraine would result in Russia being a 
non-actor in European balance of power. Moscow has so far taken every possible action to 
neutralize that scenario. Moscow has also not attempted any continued expansion westward, 
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like the Soviet Union in the 1940s. However, one might judge Russia ideologically, a power 
maximising expansionist it is not. 
In Georgia, Russia ensured its privileged position is maintained, through the “peacekeepers” 
that were already posted there since the early nineties. That was in itself the status quo to 
Russia, as that provided defensible terrain, a buffer zone, easy control over Georgia’s economic 
and political decision making, as well as a stake in Georgia’s market. When Saakashvili 
decided to restore Georgian sovereignty over the breakaway provinces, Russia used the excuse 
of being the peacekeeper, as well as protecting Russian lives, to invade Georgia. In reality, it 
was a simple measure to stall the change of power, as Russia controls these statelets and are 
perhaps in process of annexing their regions, as well as armed militias into regular army. 
Ukraine saw similar tactics, if not the same. Crimea already had the Russian forces and the 
Russian troops staged a putsch, and a controversial plebiscite, to take control of the region over 
which it already had control and which it feared was changing hands. In both the cases, Russia 
supplied arms to the separatist forces. 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia had Russian speaking populations and Russia intervened militarily 
on their behalf and justified the intervention rhetorically as a way of securing human rights for 
the Russian speaking people outside Russia, and also as a continuation of its historic 
peacekeeping role. Russia of course did not mention the Russian speaking people in the Baltics, 
given that the Baltic countries are under NATO protection. Likewise, in Ukraine, the Russian 
speaking population in rebel territories like Donetsk and Luhansk, prompted Russian 
intervention, and Russian diplomacy heavily used the human rights tropes. In both the instances 
of Georgia and Ukraine, the interventions came at a time when the either the move towards a 
Western security architecture seemed irreversible, or there has been a direct change of relative 
power and the conflict has already started. In the former case, observed in Ukraine, Moscow 
realised that unless they act fast, all is lost. In the latter case in Georgia, the conflict was 
initiated by the Georgian side. Both the interventions fall squarely with Putin’s redlines, about 
the unacceptability of Ukraine and Georgia falling into a Western sphere of influence. Russia 
lacks sufficient allies to balance against NATO. The actions were therefore aimed at securing 
the relative power advantage and denying strategic losses. Crimean annexation, and simmering 
war in Eastern Ukraine keeps the supply chains and buffer zones in Russian hand, while 
denying Ukraine a permanent move towards the West. Despite the bombastic rhetoric about 
continual human rights violation of the Russian speaking people in the near abroad, and talks 
of Novorossiya in Russian media, nothing in the evidence explored suggest that the Russian 
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military and political elite was ever interested in absorbing Ukraine and Georgia. The continued 
low-cost conflict is far more conductive for Russian strategic aims, than the risk of a full-scale 
territorial conquest, as well as the resulting insurgency and civil war. At this point, due to 
frozen conflicts neither Kiev nor Tbilisi can join NATO or the EU, nor are the NATO and the 
EU countries interested in any such enlargement. The Russian Black Sea Fleet is the strongest 
and secured in the region, and the breakaway and rebel provinces in both Ukraine and Georgia 
are ruled by Russian satellites.  
As mentioned previously, Realism of every school, states that the world order is anarchic. 
There is no overarching authority, and each nation-state is responsible for its security, and more 
importantly survival. To ensure survival, states undertake balancing and bandwagoning. 
Among neo-realists, offensive realists state that states pursue power maximizing, as maximum 
power determines maximum security. Defensive realists argue that states prefer security 
maximizing, as survival is the key, and unless external factors are involved, states are satisfied 
with security. In that regard, having a favourable relative power in a balance of power leads 
states to feel more secured. To manage threats, and ensure maximum security, therefore a great 
power tries to improve the relative power position alongside a prospective adversary. Nearly 
every single realist theory and sub-theoretical framework accepts this logic. Power difference 
is of course not zero sum and to be in a favourable position in the balance, increase of one’s 
power is as effective, as decreasing the opponent’s power, or defending and gaining on any 
sudden prospective loss of power. If a country is relatively weak, and without allies to depend 
on, it seeks to increase power through external actions. External balancing is more important 
for certain great powers than internal balancing. 
From every observable evidence, in the last few chapters summed up here, one can say that 
Kremlin, regardless of administration broadly follows the dictates of realism. It is a realist 
power, in the sense, Moscow’s foreign policy and strategy clearly follow realist predictions. 
Moscow slowly has attempted to rebuild its security buffer, after the heady days of early 
nineties. With every phase of NATO enlargement, the idea that Russia is in a hostile relation 
with the West has returned. Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now entrenched 
far more strongly that they were in the late nineties. In Ukraine, Russia controls Crimea, and 
in lieu of that, is the largest naval power in the Black sea. There are Russian controlled proxies 
in eastern Ukraine, which are de-facto under a Russian control. Neither Ukraine or Georgia is 
anytime joining NATO or EU, and Russian trade is secure, as is Russian access to markets, and 
Russian position as a net security provider. Diplomatically, Russia is the arbiter of the Minsk 
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accords, in the sense, Moscow controls the militias in Eastern Ukraine which can raise up the 
tempo of the simmering conflict, and used that as a pressure point against Ukraine. Russia is 
also the co-sponsor of the Geneva talks about the recognition of the breakaway Georgian 
provinces. From Russian perspective, NATO, the US, the EU, all are hostile power centres, 
and the difference in interests are timeless. From Russian perspective, it is therefore only 
logical to have buffer zones, and increase or be in an advantageous relative power position 
compared to its adversaries. In reality, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea are all Russian 
provinces, either de facto or de jure. Russian “peace keepers” in the breakaway provinces, as 
well as troops in Crimean peninsula serve under Russian colours and Russian insignia. The 
proxy rebel groups in Eastern Ukraine are also essentially under Russian control. Russia 
stopped NATO enlargement in these regions and any movement from these countries towards 
the EU. The Russian troops are now based as close as 25 KM from Tbilisi and the Russian 
proxy militias, mere miles from Kiev. As long as this status quo holds, Moscow is the real 
winner in the European balance. 
To sum up the findings, one only need to quote the Russian Federation’s Security Strategy, 
which states, “The strengthening of Russia is taking place against a backdrop of new threats to 
national security that are of a multifarious and interconnected nature. The Russian Federation’s 
implementation of an independent foreign and domestic policy is giving rise to opposition from 
the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain their dominance in world affairs.” 
Highlighting the threats, Moscow makes it clear that “the build-up of the military potential of 
NATO and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of 
international law, the galvanization of the bloc countries’ military activity, the further 
expansion of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian 
borders are creating a threat to national security.” 587  
  
“What is to be done?” 
Given that this dissertation is a theory testing project, which aims to provide policy-makers in 
understanding the Russian foreign policy from a theoretical perspective, the conclusion hangs 
                                                             
587 Vladimir Putin, “On the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy,” Presidential Edict 683, December 
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or falls on the question of policy relevance. This thesis therefore attempts to conclude by 
charting a prospective way forward. So far, it is observed that Western, and especially 
American analysis of Russia falls under a simple binary. For liberal internationalists and neo-
conservatives, Russia under Vladimir Putin resembles Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, with 
a revisionist agenda and expansionist aim in European continent. The evidence suggests that 
could not be further from the truth. Some realist analysis on the other hand, puts all the blame 
on the West, especially, on the NATO expansion. While that is partly true, that does not point 
to much. For example, if one follows John Mearsheimer’s theory that states seek to maximise 
power, it neither explains why Russia displayed limited aims in Europe, nor does it posit why 
would the United States logically seek to limit its influence and give up hegemony in Europe. 
More to the point, Mearsheimer’s own policy prescription does not say much about the future 
course of action, rather attempts an autopsy of the causes of the Ukraine crisis, which is 
important, but incomplete. 
By every measurable index, the Western policy on Russia has failed. Russia is nowhere close 
to be a liberal democratic great power aligned with Western values and part of a responsible 
global family. In the United States, across three decades it was hoped that Moscow would either 
be fully defeated and be a fellow democracy, or there would be a regime change (or even a 
colour revolution, so to speak) due to the inherent contradictions within the regime, and anyone 
other than Vladimir Putin would come and change Russian grand strategy and re-orient it 
towards the west. This was especially visible during the brief period when Obama 
administration hoped to have a rapprochement with Dmitry Medvedev. 
Unfortunately, Russia is not a liberal democracy, even when it is a democracy, and even with 
demographic decline it is still a major power in the world stage. Despite President Obama’s jab 
that Russia is a declining power, and John Kerry’s taunt that this is not the time to do 
19th century politics, Moscow has demonstrated that it packs enough punch. While facing 
crushing diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, Moscow has pushed back against 
western interests most notably in Ukraine and Georgia, and even when it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, at the time of writing this conclusion, in Syria. Moscow has also challenged and 
pushed the level of deterrence blatantly in cyberspace. The bottom line is that Russia is not a 
power to be defeated, or won over, and to hope for the collapse of the Russian regime is 





So, what conclusions can we draw from the evidence explored? I suggest there are two 
dimensions to it, the political and the military aspect. Consider the political dimension first. 
Moscow’s balancing behaviour, against NATO, and Moscow’s definition of its own strategic 
interests are timeless and not linked to any particular regime. In fact, there’s remarkable 
similarity that can be observed and was observed under Yeltsin’s final terms, Putin’s first term, 
Medvedev’s Presidency and Putin’s second term. That calls into question the assertion 
prevalent in liberal analyses, that the Russian regime type shapes Moscow’s foreign policy. In 
reality, Moscow’s foreign policy is determined by strategic interests and falls squarely within 
centuries of Russian strategic thought, and enjoys overwhelming support among the Russian 
military and political elite. It is unlikely that that would change, in the unlikely event of a liberal 
democratic president in Moscow. One, Yeltsin had a liberal phase. And two, Medvedev, was 
nominally a liberal President, compared to Putin. Even Putin in his first term was solidly pro-
American, for a variety of reasons. None of that lasted, and Moscow fell back to a balancing 
mode, whenever it felt its core strategic interests threatened, which included control over 
defensible terrain, threat of loss of naval ports, and threat of loss in regional balance of power. 
It is therefore imperative to understand that one, any future policy towards Russia would need 
to recognize the cause of Russian-Western hostility, and the cause is not the Russian regime in 
Moscow. Kremlin’s undemocratic politics is not responsible for the Russian balancing 
behaviour, and military aggression, and regime type is simply irrelevant in broader Russian 
grand strategy. Two, the problems between NATO, the EU, the US and Russia are not 
ideological, nor are they because of Putin. They are geopolitical, and neither regime change, 
nor a new President, from a different political party would change these problems, and in 
reality, Putin is still a beacon of stability in Russia. There is no guarantee that Russia would 
radically turn into Lichtenstein, after Putin. Put simply, the major power interests of Moscow, 
would remain, and any policy would need to accommodate those interests. 
What can one understand from the study undertaken? Russia’s interests include a buffer zone, 
with defensible terrain, out of logical fear of being encircled by an alliance which Russia 
considers militarily superior. Russian interests include advance infantry troop positioning, in 
regions which Russia has occupied ever since the collapse of the USSR, a privileged stake at 
the markets for Russian exports, a steady supply chain and logistics for the Russian military 
forces, and naval ports which guarantees the continuation of Russia being a great power. In 
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short, Russian interests are strategic, material and military, and not ideological. That in turn 
leads to a logical conclusion. The chances of a rapprochement, or engagement with Russia is 
possible if these interests are kept in mind. Moscow must be engaged through a balance of 
cooperation and competition, and the room to manoeuvre where interests are opposed must be 
dealt with in tandem with interests that run parallel or align. To take an example, Russia’s 
concerns, with regards to Ukraine and Georgia should be understood, and a neutral Ukraine 
and Georgia guaranteed instead of an inexorable push for those countries to join NATO and 
the EU and Western trade and security architecture. This is not a call to completely halt any 
further attempt to expand NATO, but a careful recalculation of regions where NATO can 
enlarge without affecting direct Russian military and strategic interests. In return, there might 
be areas of further cooperation, with regards to space research, WMD proliferation, and 
intelligence sharing, as was evident during the short phase of cooperation immediately after 
9/11. Likewise, any further attempt to promote democracy and NGO activities in Russia or 
throwing weight and support behind the opposition to Putin, or even supporting the spread of 
liberal institutions and liberal values in the Russian immediate neighbourhood, might stoke 
rather than subside Russian paranoia about covert push for regime change and colour revolution 
in Moscow. It is prudent to remember that the framework from Russian perspective is strictly 
strategic. 
In sum, the political policy proposal of this dissertation points out to two points. One, Russia 
has a specific set of interests, which are geopolitical and not ideological or contingent to the 
regime in Moscow, and which needs to be safeguarded and guaranteed, as well as kept in 
consideration during any policy formulation. Two, there are potential areas of rapprochement 
and engagement where interests overlap, which needs to be calculated. Russia is an adversarial 
power, but not a power determined to change the status quo. The Russian aggression is 
predicated on what it perceives to be the established balance of power, and there are no 
evidence of any further expansionist aims in mainland Europe. That, in itself points to a power 
with whom there could be engagement based on common interests. 
The second issue is with the Russian military threat. The Russian military suffers from massive 
disadvantages. The manpower of the Russian military is dwarfed by the NATO forces. The 
Russian military also lacks in almost all domains of traditional power, speed, range, and 
technological advancement. The Russian force structure is not like the Soviet Union, and 
Russia lacks both the capability and global ambition or ideological aspiration. However, the 
Russian forces when improvised during operations and were able to demonstrate conventional 
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capabilities, that were sufficient in tactical and operational levels of warfare. While the 
overwhelming understanding in the Russian political and military circle is that Russia is 
qualitatively inferior to NATO, the Russian military has shown appetite for conflict against 
smaller adversaries, as a broader show of force and deterrence against what it considers NATO 
intentions and designs in Moscow’s sphere. 
Russia clearly considers NATO enlargement a threat, and does not differentiate between the 
EU, NATO and the United States and is worried about NATO troops and armour next to the 
Russian borders. The Russian intention of safeguarding its own sphere of influence naturally 
leads to clash of interests in countries like Georgia and Ukraine which have expressed desires 
to join Euro-Atlantic institutions. With Russia’s return and rearmament, the expansion of the 
EU and enlargement of NATO, and erosion of a buffer zone, chances of conflict has increased, 
even though, there’s no evidence of active American support to come into the defence of 
Ukraine and Georgia and risk a conflict with Russia. 
The chances of a ground war with Russia is however, thin. It is unlikely, Moscow is planning 
such a war, or has any intention in initiating a war of that scale, given its narrow security 
interests, goals, strategy, and evident capability. Moscow is also constrained by geography, 
demographics, economy, technology, industrial efficiency, and manpower. Moscow, has also 
not faced any concerted push back, and as per war simulation reports, Russia is infinitely 
inferior to NATO ground troops. This remains a dilemma for both NATO and the Russian 
forces. While the Russian force concentration in its near abroad is higher compared to NATO, 
and according to estimates Russia can conquer the Baltics within matter of weeks, before 
NATO even fully steps in, it is unlikely given that Moscow shows no intention of 
expansionism. The Russian military literature, and as well as elite class also points out that 
Moscow will not be able to prevail in a full-scale conventional war with NATO, without 
resorting to nuclear weapons. However, recent years have demonstrated that Moscow can 
easily salami-slice regions and enclaves, of countries which are still not part of NATO, which 
favours its regional balance, and creates a new fait-accompli. And NATO or the US is helpless 
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